

The Classical Review

APRIL 1896.

ON THE PLACE OF THE *PARMENIDES* IN THE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF THE PLATONIC DIALOGUES.

THE question of the order of the Platonic dialogues has, ever since the time of Schleiermacher, been actively discussed in Germany. In England, when the subject has been mooted at all, it has been slightly regarded, chiefly, I believe, because of the variety of the theories which have been propounded, and the rooted distrust of internal evidence which is not unnaturally entertained by English scholars. The external evidence that has any real bearing on this inquiry is scantier even than that for a chronological arrangement of Shakespeare's Plays:—especially when the Platonic Epistles are discarded as an early forgery. For even granting that the forger worked upon a real tradition (and who is to guarantee us this?), we cannot rely upon him for those details which are alone in point. We are thus thrown back upon a kind of evidence which is justly discredited, because it has been so often abused. One who undertakes such an investigation in England has a thankless task. When he records his own impressions, he is warned against 'subjectivity'; and when he seeks to verify his perceptions, to visualize and make them objective by collecting instances, he is reminded of the plasticity of genius, which nullifies such a 'mechanical' mode of analysing a work of art. And yet no connoisseur of painting doubts that Titian or Turner had an earlier, middle, and later manner, or that a competent expert deserves to be listened to when he calls attention to the points of *technique* by

which the different periods of each master are severally distinguished. The prejudice against the argument from internal evidence is notwithstanding easily intelligible. What is harder to account for, is that the question of the chronological order of Plato's writings should ever have been thought unimportant. The industry of half a century, at the most critical time in the development of Hellenic culture, reflecting the life-long struggle of a supremely powerful mind with the central problems of philosophy, must surely be better understood, when at least some grouping of his works, corresponding to the principal periods of their production, has been obtained.

More than thirty years ago, when, after editing the *Theaetetus*, I addressed myself to the closer study of the *Sophistes* and *Politicus*, I was confronted by the twofold problem of genuineness and of chronological position. It occurred to me that the metaphysical tests which had been applied to the solution of such problems were insufficient, because they were apt to vary with the philosophical 'standpoint' of the inquirer. For example, the *Parmenides*, concluding as it does with unreconciled 'antinomies,'—though only, as Kant would say, between 'empty forms of the understanding,'—might seem to Kantian students more advanced than the *Sophistes*, in which Hegel (with some perversity of interpretation, it is true) found his own identification of Being with Not-Being. I therefore had

recourse to the wholly independent test of style and diction (not of course to the neglect of any more substantial evidence, which a further examination of the two dialogues might disclose). In bringing the subject of diction to a point I drew up a list of genuine dialogues, showing the proportion of words which a page of each of them (in the edition of Stephanus) contained that were 'common and peculiar' to it with three dialogues that were confessedly later than the Republic, viz. the Timaeus, Critias and Laws. In this list the Parmenides held a low place, having only about one such word in seven pages (or, to speak more exactly, six words in the forty-one pages (St.) of which the dialogue consists). I said at the time, however, that this proportion, in the case of the Parmenides, was due to 'exceptional circumstances'; and Mr. W. W. Waddell in his elaborate edition of the dialogue, inquires, 'What circumstances?' This question has been to some extent answered in my Essay on the Structure of the Republic etc., but I am surprised that so careful a student of the Parmenides should ask it. For a writing which deals almost exclusively with high abstractions in the severest way; from which accordingly all rhetorical, poetical, ethical, political, physical,¹ cosmological, psychological² terms, as well as words of common life are banished, is really incommensurable in this respect alike with the Republic and the Laws, and much more so with the Phaedrus. To compare it with them is like comparing two works undoubtedly attributable to the same period of that versatile author, Lewis Carroll,—the *Hunting of the Snark* and the *Evaluation of Π*.

The six words which are 'common and peculiar' to the Parmenides with the group consisting of Tim. Critia, Legg. are:—

* διαμελεῖω, Parm. Critia, Legg.

* ἴστιον, Parm. Legg.

†* παμμεγέθης, Parm. Legg.

† μεριστός, Parm. Tim.

† μόνως, Parm. Tim.

† σύνδυο, Parm. Tim. Legg.

If we separate pp. 126—138 from 138—166 we get the following result:—

1. 3 in 12 = $\frac{1}{4}$.

2. 4 in 28 = $\frac{1}{7}$.

And if to these six words are added the adverbial use of ἴσων in ἴσων ἀπέχειν (Parm. Tim. Critia) and the adverb παντοδαπῶς, we get a sum of eight words, raising the pro-

¹ Except γένεσις and κίνησις.

² Excepting ἐπιστήμη, νόημα, δόξα, φάντασμα.

portion of the Parmenides to one in five, the same with that ascribed by me in 1867 to the Euthydemus.³

In what remains of this paper I shall assume the general correctness of that arrangement of the dialogues according to which the Sophistes, Politicus and Philebus with the Timaeus Critias and Laws form the latest group, while the Phaedrus and Theaetetus belong to the middle period of which the Republic was the central work: the rest, with some doubtful and unimportant exceptions, such as the Menexenus, being relegated to the earlier time. The proofs of this position have been long accumulating and, though often ignored, and even laughed to scorn, are easily accessible to scholars. I do not wish like Thrasymachus to thrust my argument down unwilling throats. I will only call attention to one topic which has not yet been sufficiently noticed in this connexion, viz. the character of the vocabulary which is shared with the Laws by the other later dialogues. The un-Attic words,⁴ taken in connexion with the introduction of the Eleatic stranger, of Timaeus from Locri Epizephyrii, Hermocrates the Syracusan, Megillus the Spartan, Cleinias the Cretan, and with the scene of the last dialogue in the neighbourhood of Cnossus in Crete, appear to justify a threefold inference; (1) Plato had travelled; (2) he had become increasingly familiar with pan-Hellenic literature;

³ For the convenience of the reader, I copy here without the numbers the order in which the dialogues come out, when tried by this single test, viz. the proportion of words common and peculiar to them with the group consisting of Tim. Critia, Legg.

1. Polit. 2. Soph. Polit. (in one). 3. Phaedr. 4. Soph. 5. Rep. 6. Menex. 7. Phaedo. 8. Symp. 9. Philebus. 10. Ion. 11. Theaetetus.

12. { Protag. Cratylus.
Laches. 13. Apology. 14. { Euthydemus.
Lysis. Euthyphro. Parmenides.
Gorgias.

15. Crito (misprinted 'Critias' in the edition of Soph. Polit.). 16. Hippias Minor. 17. Meno. 18. I. Alcibiades. 19. Charmides.

The one thing proved so far is the close affinity of Soph. Polit. to the latest group. These dialogues are shown by these and other signs to divide the Republic from the Laws. The Phaedrus from its exuberance takes a higher place than of right belongs to it. The same is true in a less degree of the Symposium. On the other hand the Philebus and Parmenides, and to a less extent the Theaetetus and Sophistes stand lower in this list than they would if tried by other considerations. Both friendly and unfriendly critics have unfairly treated this quarter of a page as if it represented the whole of my argument, which extends over twenty-seven pages.

⁴ I may call special attention to the use of τέκνον for παῖδιον and of γυμναστής for παιδοτρίβης.

(3) he was writing for a wider public,—not only for his countrymen, but for ‘livers out of Attica’; in short for the whole Grecian world.

To which then of the three groups above distinguished does the Parmenides belong? And to continue first of all the previous method, what evidence is supplied by diction? For although this test has proved fallacious in finding the place of the Parmenides on a general survey, it may still be of value towards ascertaining to which of the three groups in question its vocabulary (jejune though it be) exhibits *most* affinity.

If with the three dialogues already brought into question, the Timaeus, Critias and Laws, we throw in the other three now grouped with them, viz. Soph. Polit. Phil., four words are added to the previous eight, making twelve in all which are common and peculiar to the Parmenides with this latest group. These are:—

- † ἀπειρία, Parm. Phil. Legg.
- * διαμελετώ, Parm. Critia, Legg.
- † ἴσον adv., Parm. Critia, Legg.
- * ἰστίον, Parm. Legg.
- † μέθεξις, Parm. Soph.
- † μερίζω, Parm. Soph. Polit. Tim.
- † μεριστός, Parm. Tim.
- † μόνως, Parm. Tim.
- †* παμμεγέθης, Parm. Legg.
- * παντοδαπός, Parm. Legg.
- * πολίος, Parm. Polit. Tim.
- † σύνδυο, Parm. Tim. Legg.

* These occur in the introductory portion, pp. 126—133.

† These are in the main portion of the dialogue, pp. 133—166.

Almost any of these words might have occurred in any Attic writer without surprising the reader. Suppose now that to the seven dialogues above considered we add those of the middle period,—Phaedrus, Republic, Theaetetus,—the list of words common and peculiar to the Parmenides with the other nine is considerably larger. It comprises:—

- * ἄγνωστος, Parm. Rep. Theaet.
- * ἀδολεσχεία, Parm. Phaed. Theaet.
- † ἀκίνητος, Parm. Rep. Theaet. Soph. Tim. Legg.
- * ἀνάπαντα, Parm. Rep. Phil. Legg.
- †* ἀνομοιότης, † ἀνομοιῶ, Parm. Phaedr. Rep. Theaet. Polit. Tim. Legg.
- †* ἀπειρος (infinite), Parm. Rep. Theaet. Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Legg.
- † ἀπέραντος, Parm. Rep. Theaet. Soph. Polit. Tim. Critia, Legg.
- †* ἀπέχω (*disto*), Parm. Rep. Tim. Critia, Legg.

* ἀπίθανος, (unpersuadable, irrefutable), Parm. Phaedr. Legg.

* ἀπρεπής, Parm. Rep. Legg. (*ἀπρεπώς*, Phaedr.)

† βέβηκα (= *insisto, sto*), Parm. Rep. Tim. Critia.

† γνωστός, Parm. Rep. Theaet.

* γράμμα (= *scriptum*), Parm. (singular) Rep. Phil. Tim. Legg. (plural).

* γυμνασία, Parm. Theaet. Legg.

* δεσποτία, Parm. Rep. Legg.

* διακόνω, Parm. Rep. Soph. Polit. Tim.

† διαφορότης, Parm. Rep. Theaet. Phil.

† ἐγκάθηναι, Parm. Phil.

† ἐξισούμαι, Parm. Rep. Legg.

† ἐπάνεμι = to revert (to a previous argument), Parm. Rep. Theaet. Legg.

* εὐκολον, Parm. Rep. Legg.

† εὐπετής, Parm. Rep. Soph. Legg. (*εὐπετώς*, Euthyd.)

† ἰσοῦμαι, Parm. Phaedr.

* ἰχνεύω, Parm. Rep. Phaedr. Tim. Legg.

† μεθίσταμαι, Parm. Rep. Tim. Legg.

* μετάληψις (in different senses), Parm. Rep. Theaet.

† μηδαμοῦ, Parm. Rep. Theaet. Polit. Phil. Tim. Legg.

† μικτός, Parm. Rep. Phil. Tim. Legg.

* ὁμοίωμα, Parm. Phaedr. Soph. Legg.

* ὁμόνυμος, Parm. Rep. Phaedr. Soph. Polit. Legg.

* πάππος, Parm. Rep. Theaet. Legg.

† ἐσκιαγραφημένος, Parm. Rep. Legg.

† στέρομαι, Parm. Rep. Phaedr. Theaet. Soph. Phil. Legg.

Besides these thirty-four, there are some other words which occur incidentally in the Meno or the Cratylus, but are otherwise confined to these ten dialogues.

Thus μέτρον (= *measure* not *metre*) occurs only in Crat. Parm. Rep. Theaet. Polit. Phil. Tim. Legg.

ὁμοῖω only in Crat. Parm. Rep. Phaedr. Theaet. Tim. Legg.

ὁρμῇ only in Crat. Parm. Rep. Phaedr. Polit. Tim. Legg.

The opposition of στάσις and κίνησις is confined to Crat. Parm. Rep. Phaedr. Theaet. Soph. Phil. Tim. Legg. [Of. also the use of στοιχεῖα in the Cratylus and in the later dialogues.]

Again πέρας in the sense of ‘limit’ occurs only in Meno, Phaedr. Rep. Soph. Phil. Tim. Legg.

περίεχω only in Meno, Parm. Soph. Tim. Legg.

σύμμετρος only in Meno (quoting Gorgias) and in Parm. Theaet. Phil. Tim. Critia, Legg.

Now if in this list of ten dialogues the

Phaedo and the Gorgias are substituted for the Phaedrus and Theaetetus, the result is strikingly different. The only words common and peculiar to Parm. with Gorg. Phaedo, Rep. Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critia, Legg. are:—

- † *ἄνισος*, Parm. Phaedo, Rep. Legg.
- † *ἀνισότης*, Parm. Phaedo, Tim.
- * *δεσπόζω*, Parm. Phaedo, Rep. Legg.
- † *δνάς*, Parm. Phaedo.
- † *ὄσοσπερ*, Parm. Gorg. Rep. Soph. Tim.
- † *παντελῶς*, Parm. Phaedo, Rep. Polit. Phil. Tim. Legg.
- † *συγκρίνεσθαι*, Parm. Phaedo, Tim. Legg.
- † *συνγυία*, Parm. Phaedo.
- * *τρέμω*, Parm. Phaedo, Rep.

Here are but six coincidences with the Phaedo, and only one with the Gorgias.

To these seven (none of them of any striking significance) may be added, rather doubtfully, *φθορά*, only quoted by Ast from Parm. Phaedo, Phil. Tim. Critia, Legg. (but with 'cet.' following) and the active and passive voices of *ἀλλάττω*. (The middle voice occurs also in Symp. Menex.)

This comparative study of the vocabulary (by no means a rich one) raises a strong presumption in favour of placing the Parmenides in the group of dialogues belonging to the middle period. Some slighter indications pointing in the same direction may be further noticed. Plato's diction is so varied that even this dialogue has in forty-one pages sixteen words that are peculiar to it:—

1. * *ἄβυθος*, *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον* for *ἄβυσσος*.
2. † *ἄπουσία*, in the curious phrase *εὐσίας ἀπουσία*.
3. † *ἀρτιάκις*, nowhere in earlier Gr.
4. * *διεκρινούμαι*, Xenophon.
5. * *δυσανάπειστος*, *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον*.
6. * *ἐπιδημία*, Xen. Demosth. [Hippocr.].
7. † *ἐτεροίος*, Hdt. [Hippocr.].
8. † *ἐτεροιώτης*, [Philo, Eustath.].
9. * *εὐμήκης*, Eur. Xenophon.
10. * *καταπετάννυμι*, Hom. II. Aristoph. (with dat. as here), Eur. Xen.
11. † *πανταχῶς*, Isocr. Menander, Demosth.
12. † *περιττάκις*, Plut. Iambl.
13. * *πραγματεωδής*, [Schol. in Gorg. Eustath.].
14. † *προαίρεσις*, Isocr. etc.
15. * *ῥύπος*, Aesch. Aristoph. [Hom. Od.].
16. * *συνδέομαι*, Demosth.

Now the greater number of these words belong to the class of new derivatives (*ἐτεροιώτης*, cf. *ποιώτης*) and compounds (*δυσανάπειστος*) which, as I have shown in my Essay on Plato's Use of Language, he used increasingly in the period to which

the Republic belongs. *εὐμήκης* occurs elsewhere only in Eur. and Xen.; *ἀρτιάκις* and *περιττάκις* are somewhat forced expressions.

The use of *γένος* as equivalent to *εἶδος* and the periphrasis with *φύσις*, e.g. *ἡ τοῦ ἐνὸς φύσις*, *ἡ τοῦ ἐξαίφνης φύσις* (cf. *ἡ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις* in the Phaedrus) do not belong to Plato's earliest manner.

Add to these peculiarities the use of *τὸ δὲ* without *τὸ μὲν* preceding—the most likely reading in 154C.

The employment of particles in the Parmenides has to be treated with the same caution as the general vocabulary. The nature of the subject does not admit of the variety of the Republic. In the absence of an Index Platonius or Concordance to Plato (both sorely needed) it is difficult to speak with confidence. But the German 'statisticians' have reached results which are not at variance with the preceding argument.

Assuming then, in accordance with these indications, that the Parmenides belongs to the same period with Phaedr. Rep. Theaet., it remains to inquire what place it holds in this central group. Here the stylistic data will hardly serve us, especially if I am right in maintaining that the exuberance of language in the Phaedrus and the scanty vocabulary of the Parmenides are alike due to 'exceptional circumstances.' We must have recourse to considerations of a larger and more general scope.

And first I recognize as common to the Phaedrus and Republic an exulting and triumphant note, a tone of smiling optimism, in marked contrast, for example, to the spirit of the Politicus and the Laws. Those who do not recognize this are not the persons for whom this paper is written. The philosopher in composing Phaedr. Rep. is conscious of being in possession of a method, which (although he states it somewhat differently in either dialogue) he evidently believes to be all-prevailing. In the Parmenides and Theaetetus on the other hand he is grappling with difficulties, with metaphysical *ἀπορίαι*, which remain unsolved, while without their solution the philosophic mind remains unsatisfied. It is hardly conceivable that works written in such different moods can have been composed simultaneously. Thus the group of four divides itself into two pairs: Phaedr. Rep. on the one hand; Parm. Theaet. on the other.

With regard to the Phaedrus a slight external datum is supplied by the death of

Lysias in B.C. 378, since the dialogue would seem to have been written in his lifetime. But, as the Republic gives us no such evidence (unless we count the allusion to Ismenias in B. 1), this point is practically useless. For two reasons, however, it appears to me that the Phaedrus must have been composed before the publication of the Republic. I say the *publication*, because a work may long have existed *in petto* or even partially in MS., before it was produced even for a limited circle. Cf. what Zeno is made to say in the Parmenides about his *γράμμα*, which he regards as a *péché de jeunesse* but is unable to keep back because it has been pirated.

1. It seems improbable that shortly after bringing out a book of such extent and of such world-wide interest, as the Republic, Plato should belittle written composition in comparison with oral discourse, as he does in the Phaedrus; and—

2. The philosophical portion of the Republic in Bks. vi., vii. exhibits a maturity of judgment, a sobriety of expression, a 'temperance giving smoothness,' which is hardly to be found in that 'Psalm in praise of logic,' which Socrates pours forth to Phaedrus.

The next point to be settled is which of the two pairs of dialogues has the priority in the order of composition.

Some would compare the tentative or 'peirastic' arguments and negative conclusions of Parm. Theat. with those of the Euthyphro, Charmides, Protagoras and Meno, and would construe them as evidence of an early date. But although there is some resemblance in the dialectical form, the writings thus compared are not *in pari materia*. In those earlier dialogues the subject of inquiry was either the definition of a simple ethical notion or the Unity of Virtue. But that which is here subjected to the Elenchus, is Unity itself in its highest abstraction, the nature of definition, and the whole metaphysical problem of Knowing and Being. And the essential point in reference to our present inquiry is to observe that both the ontological and the epistemological doctrines thus negatively discussed have a strong affinity to those which are so confidently affirmed in the Phaedrus and Republic. When it is further considered that in the Sophist, Politicus and Philebus a more mature theory is carefully elaborated, with no blinking of difficulties and no singing of paeans, the inference is obvious that the cold fit of philosophic doubt represented by Parm.

Theat. has come in the interval which separates the Republic from the later dialogues.

I conclude therefore that the Phaedrus is the earliest of the four dialogues, and that the sceptical pair, Parm. Theat., are a little later than the Republic. The question which remains is one of extreme difficulty, viz. whether the Parmenides or the Theaetetus is the earlier. I speak with much less confidence on this than on the preceding questions.

Before entering upon it I will put forward some considerations which appear to me to corroborate the linguistic argument, in favour of placing the Parmenides and Theaetetus, as here proposed, together after the Republic and before the Sophist, etc.

Mr. W. W. Waddell, in his edition of the Parmenides,—an edition characterized not only by great labour, but by exceptional candour and love of truth,—contends that the Phaedo is later in the order of composition. His chief reason for this appears to be that the singular argument, in which the inseparable association of Life with Soul is illustrated by the constant conjunction of Heat with Fire, presupposes that communion of kinds, *κοινωνία τῶν γενῶν*, which is elaborately proved in the Sophistes. But (1) Is Plato never to anticipate himself? And (2) Is fire in the Phaedo a *γένος* in the sense here spoken of? Mr. Waddell cannot have forgotten that Socrates in the Parmenides is doubtful whether or not to assume an *εἶδος* of *πῦρ*.

Another cause of this opinion is the impression which Mr. Waddell shares with Mr. H. Jackson, that the notion of the idea being a *pattern* (*παράδειγμα*) is expressed in a manner which shows it to have been hitherto unfamiliar. And he is well aware that in the Phaedo this conception as well as that of *παρονομία* is clearly implied. But arguments of this kind (turning on Plato's manner of stating a view) have really not much force. It is more pertinent to observe that while in the Phaedo the different modes of *μέθεξις* (or *μετάδοχσις*) are treated loosely and vaguely as indifferent or interchangeable, in the Parmenides they are distinctly stated in a well-considered order, and separately examined.

Such isolated coincidences, when unduly pressed, must lead, as they have often led, to strange and contradictory inferences. The indications of close affinity, notwithstanding great differences, which 'spring to the eyes' when, in accordance with the linguistic hints, the Parmenides and

Theaetetus are examined side by side, are of a different order from these.

1. There is first the supposed meeting of the young Socrates with the aged Parmenides, mentioned only in Parm. Theaet. Sophist.

2. Secondly, there is the reflex of the Zenonian as distinguished from the Socratic Elenchus, which pervades both dialogues, and in Soph. Polit. is continued in the person of the Eleatic Stranger. This (or a derivative form of it) had been ridiculed in the Euthydemus and contrasted with the sweet reasonableness of Socrates; but in these dialogues it is seriously confronted and earnestly grappled with. And in the Cratylus he had touched slightly on the opposition of Eleaticism and Heracliteanism, but here we have the first stages of a critical survey which pierces the very soul and marrow of both philosophies.

3. Thirdly, there is the haunting sense of the great difficulty, if not of the impossibility,—after rising through heights of abstraction to the Universal,—of descending again, and finding a way from the Ideal to the Actual, from Divine to Human Knowledge, from the One to the Many, from the certainty of Knowledge to the uncertainties of Opinion and Sensation; also of passing over from Being to Becoming, and so reconciling the equally necessary conceptions of Stability and Movement.

In the Phaedo, the philosopher climbs without the sense of effort out of the contradictions of sensible particulars into a region of universals by whose light the objects of sense are seen in their true nature as transient phenomena. The way upwards in accentuated, the way downwards costs little thought. Both methods are included in the Phaedrus and Republic Book vi.; but the difficulties which beset the Dialectic which is there imagined, though they are not ignored, are discounted through all-confident faith in the powers of the

The aged Parmenides.

An εἶδος of man, fire, water? (Parm. 130).

The promise of youth in Socrates (Parm. 135).

ἔχειν = 'to be obnoxious to' (a dialectical expression).

πάνν πολλὰ...ἔχειν (Parm. 135 A).

The esoteric tone.

(Parm. 136 D) ἀρεπῇ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν, (137 B) αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν.

Distinction of γίγνεσθαι and γενέσθαι.

εἰ γὰρ γένοιντο, οὐκ ἂν ἐτι γίγνοιντο (Parm. 155 A).

philosophic mind. In Parm. Theaet. they are for the first time seriously encountered, although the seriousness is not unmixed with irony.

In Soph. Polit. these same difficulties are partially removed,—in the Sophist by laying down the principles of a working logic; in the Politicus by obtaining an actual standing-ground for the scientific statesman; not without a lingering backward look at the Ideal, which in its perfection is unattainable 'upon this Earth.'

4. Fourthly, there is the gradual transition, increasingly perceptible in Parm. Theaet. Soph. Polit., from an ontological towards a logical conception of Being. It was this which gave occasion to the acute and perspicacious doubts of Socher. There is not room in this paper for developing this view, nor have I the time or strength for such a task. I leave it to some historian of the Science of Logic. I will only say that, in common with much else, this tendency is anticipated (but only anticipated) in the Phaedrus, where not only the method of diaeresis and synagôgê is bodied forth, but even amidst the poetic vision of the Heaven above the Heavens occur the pregnant words (249 B) δὲ ἂν ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὼν (Badham conj. ἰόντ') αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον.

5. Fifthly, there is, common to both dialogues, the determination that, in spite of logical difficulties which are clearly set forth but for the present remain unsolved, that high philosophic quest, which Plato identifies with Διαλεκτική, shall be steadfastly pursued. Few parallels in Plato are closer or more significant than that between Parm. 135 C τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας περὶ; ποὶ τρέψει ἀγνωστομένων τούτων; and Theaet. 196 E ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὃ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος; Σ. οὐδένα ὧν γε ὅς εἰμι.

6. Some minor points of coincidence may be added. Compare, e.g.:—

The aged and grave Theodorus.

ἄνθρωπόν τε...καὶ λίθον καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ εἶδος (Theaet. 157).

The promise of youth in Theaetetus (Theaet. 155).

τούτ' ἔχει κομψότατον (Theaet. 171 A).

οὔτε γὰρ δικαστής, κ.τ.λ. (Theaet. 173 C).

ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον τοῦτο εἶναι ἀνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον (Theaet. 155 B).

Three kinds of motion.

ἀλλοίωσις, περιφορά, φορά (Parm. 162).

ἔτερον, ἑκάτερον, ἄμφω (Parm. 139, 143).

Distinction of πᾶν, πάντα, ὅλον (Parm. 144, 145, 153).

[οὕτω τε] καὶ οὐχ οὕτως (Parm. 159).

τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ τοῦ τινός κ.τ.λ. (Parm. 160, 164).

οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι (Parm. 161).

εἴη τε ἂν ἥδη (Parm. 161).

ὄντα = ἀληθῆ (Parm. 161).

ἀλλ' ἡλὼν ἄρα ἔστι. τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐτι
λείπεται (Parm. 164 C).In the absence of Unity only ὄγκοι remain
(Parm. 165).

(Theaet. 181).

(Theaet. 185).

(Theaet. 204).

(Theaet. 183).

(Theaet. 157, 202).

(Theaet. 183).

(Theaet. 154).

(Theaet. 178, 179).

λείπεται δὲ . . . ἡμῶν ἀλλ' ἡλοῖς . . .
εἶναι (Theaet. 160 B).In the absence of Being, only an ἄθροισμα
(Theaet. 157).

To come now finally to the question,—Which was written first, the Theaetetus, or the Parmenides? M. W. Lutoslawski proposes to prove in his forthcoming work on Plato's Logic that the Parmenides was composed some time after the Theaetetus, i.e. in the interval between the Theaetetus and the Sophist. I am inclined to place it slightly earlier: and for the following reasons:—

1. I think that most Platonic scholars will agree with me in assuming that the meeting of Socrates with Parmenides is an invention of Plato's. That Parmenides should have visited Athens at all in the middle of the fifth century is unlikely. Did any 'coryphaeus' of philosophy come thither before the ascendancy of Pericles? But even granting the reality of such a visit, is the meeting of the μειράκιον Socrates, the stonecutter's son, with the great man at the house of Pythodorus likely to be more real than the intercourse of the same Socrates with Gorgias of Leontini in the house of Callicles or with Timaeus of Locri Epizephyrii and Hermocrates of Syracuse at a later Panathenaea? (Compare the opening of the Laches, where Soer. is personally unknown even in his father's neighbourhood.) Or, once more, even if, for the sake of argument, we make so sweeping an admission, would Plato in the Theaetetus have made Socrates at seventy revert for the first time to that occasion of fifty years ago, unless he had some special motive? And what motive can be more natural than to connect the Theaetetus with an already existing and kindred dialogue? The representation of Socrates as 'very young' at the time of the interview was of course inevitable, if the alleged meeting was to have any plausibility. But I still think that the youth of Socrates is made by Plato's skill to serve

another purpose, which I pointed out in the Art. 'Plato' in *Encyc. Brit.* ed. ix., and which Mr. Waddell has suggested independently: this imaginary circumstance accentuates Plato's implied confession, that the doctrine of Ideas as previously held by him was a crude theory, ἄρι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δηλὸς νεογενὴς ὢν.¹

2. Teichmüller imagined that he had found a dividing link between earlier and later dialogues in the Preface to the Theaetetus; all narrated dialogues being earlier, and all those later, in which 'said I,' 'said he,' etc., are omitted. And so much at least is true, that the latter form is adopted in all those of the Platonic writings which are demonstrably late, viz. Soph. Polit. Phileb. Tim. Critia, Legg. Therefore, although Plato was free at any time to vary his style, and it cannot be admitted that the Euthyphr. Apol. Laches, Crat. Gorg. Io, Meno, and Phaedrus are later than the Theaetetus, it does seem from the fact mentioned above that after a certain date Plato consistently preferred the more succinct and concentrated form, which, although in some ways less suited to the imaginative treatment of philosophy, was more convenient for the presentation of dialectical drybones. Now the statement of this preference is one motive of the Preface to the Theaetetus, and it seems improbable that he should have departed from this method in his next succeeding Essay, and then have maintained it during the rest of his time. M. Lutoslawski thinks that the terms of this Preface are sufficiently accounted for by a reaction from the tediousness of repeating ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἦ δ' ὅς and εἶφη, at every turn in the Republic. But if we are to speculate at all, is it not still more likely that he had wearied himself and his readers in the

¹ Soph. 259 D.

Parmenides with the management of what Hegel calls the fourth person: *ἔφη ὁ Ἀντιφῶν φάναι τὸν Πυθόδωρον...τὸν Παρμενίδην φάναι, κ.τ.λ.*? The elaborate manner in which both dialogues are introduced is in accordance with the date of composition here assigned to them. For it indicates the writer's consciousness of a wide gap between the lifetime of Socrates and his own, which has to be bridged over in some way. But in the Theaetetus his way of doing this is far neater, and his comment upon it in the Preface to that dialogue betrays the consciousness of a difficulty overcome.

3. The most original and suggestive passage of the Parmenides, that in which the possibility of change (*μεταβολή*) is provided for through the conception of the Instantaneous (*ἡ τοῦ ἐξαίφνης φύσις*), by removing the speculative difficulty which stood in the way of admitting the reality of *γένεσις*, may have cleared a path for Plato's onward thought, towards that analysis of sensation, perception, judgment, memory and opinion, as *processes*, which fills so large a space in the argument of the Theaetetus. Mr. Waddell finds that the insertion of this passage creates a want of symmetry between the two *ὑποθέσεις*, *ἐν εἰ ἔστιν* and *ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν*, but to have pursued the latter into the third consequence 'neither all nor none,' would have been tedious and unmeaning.

4. That Plato himself connected the Sophist with the Theaetetus is not a conclusive argument, for the evidence of style

suggests that a gap of time must have come between, and except in the last sentence, which may have been tacked on at any time, the Theaetetus presents no trace of having been originally intended to be the first of a series.

But, once more, in looking at the Parmenides as a whole, while the style is that of Plato's maturity, the dialogue presents more the effect of a first effort in a new region,—that of pure dialectical abstractions,—than the Theaetetus with its mellow blending of ethical, psychological, logical and metaphysical elements, and its profound analysis (taken up afterwards in the Timaeus) of the nature of perception.

At the same time I am ready to admit that this particular question may be argued in a contrary sense;—that the thorny subtleties of the Parmenides, so remote from the spirit of the Republic, are only approached towards the end of the Theaetetus, that the thorough-going notion of a philosophy which despises nothing however trivial is shared by the Parmenides with the later dialogues (Soph. Phileb.), and that the *ἐλεγκτικὸς ἀνὴρ* of the Theaetetus (a contemporary portrait) may have led Plato back to Zeno and through Zeno to the re-examination of 'the great Parmenides.' I have far less of certitude on this point than I have in maintaining that the Theaetetus and Parmenides are sister dialogues and that they are intermediate between the Republic and the Sophistes.

LEWIS CAMPBELL.

THE CAMPAIGN OF BASIL I. AGAINST THE PAULICIANS IN 872 A.D.

THIS campaign of Basil is of great interest and importance from a topographical point of view and will well repay a careful examination because of the mention of several geographical names which have not hitherto been definitely localized—the fortress Zapetra or Sozopetra (Zibatra in the Arab writers) which plays so important a part in frontier wars with the Saracens, the city Taranta (probably Derende), and the River Zarnouk (= Zarnūk) which is apparently not elsewhere mentioned in the Byzantine authors. When Zapetra is once fixed, it is possible to fix (from statements in the Arab geographers) the site of Adata (Al-Hadath). In his well-known *Historical Geography of Asia Minor* Professor Ramsay

makes no reference to this campaign, because, as he informs me, it was not possible at the time to localize the names mentioned. But he has very kindly directed my attention to Mr. Guy Le Strange's interesting translation (with notes) of Ibn Serapion [from *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, 1895], which has given me invaluable aid in writing this paper, as will be seen from the numerous references to the work.¹

¹ Since these lines were written, I have received from the Author (through the kindness of Professor Ramsay) a copy of his book with MS. corrections and additional notes. I am glad to find that in several points Mr. Le Strange's views now agree with conclusions reached in this paper, e.g. in reference to the River Hurith (Jurith) and the identification of the River Karākis with the Sultan Su, &c.

The accounts of this campaign given by our authorities are somewhat confused, but by no means hopeless. Basil's first campaign (probably in 871 A.D.) had ended in disaster (Geo. Mon.¹ p. 841, Sym. Mag. 690, Zon. xvi. 8). Next year he took the field again (872 A.D.), advancing towards the Euphrates no doubt by the ordinary military road passing Dorylaion and Sebasteia. The enemy retired before him and left him free to lay waste their country and destroy their villages. But when he appeared before their capital Tephrikē² (Devrik), he found that it was too strongly fortified and too well garrisoned to be taken except by a protracted siege, and so he contented himself with capturing some neighbouring forts (among which are mentioned Abara,³ Spathē, and Koptos), and devastating the surrounding country (Theoph. Cont., p. 267, Kedrenos, p. 207). The exact site of these forts is unknown.

In alarm the city of Taranta (ἡν Τάραντα λέγουσι, Cont.; Ταῦρας, Kedr., probably by mistake: *v. infra*), which lay not far off (γεγονόσθα ταύτη, sc. τῇ Τεφρ., Kedr.), sent envoys to Basil to sue for peace and permission to be 'enrolled among the Roman allies'; and their submission was 'graciously' accepted. Taranta is evidently one of the more important towns in the Paulician territory: it is called a 'Saracen' city in alliance with Tephrikē (ἡ ἑτέρα τῶν Ἰσλαμλιτῶν πόλις, . . . ὁμαχίαν ἔχουσα καὶ κοινοπραγίαν μετὰ τῆς Τεφρ., Kedr.), i.e. it is a Paulician stronghold. Professor Ramsay now identifies this town with Daranda (Dalanda), the modern Derende.⁴ He points out that the position of Taranta (which is probably a neuter plural, wrongly taken by Kedr. as an accus. sing.) is fixed by two⁵ passages of Theoph., pp. 312 and 372 (*ed. De Boor*). Heraclius returning from his second expedition into Persia in 626 A.D. hesitated whether to march by way of Taranta or by way of Samosata. The former road evidently denotes the great route across the Euphrates through Melitene,

Derende, Gurun (Gauraina), and Azizie (Ariarathia)—which indeed is most probably Herodotus' Royal Road.⁶ It is possible that Heraclius had taken this route in starting for his second expedition in 624 A.D., and perhaps Philippicus also traversed it in 585-6 A.D.; *v. Gerland*, 'die Pers. Feldzüge des Kaisers Herakleios,' p. 24 (*Byz. Zft.* iii. p. 351). Compare Ritter, *Erdkunde von Asien*, vol. x. 798 and 844-5. This identification shows that the Paulician territory included the whole mountain country extending south from Tephrikē as far at least as the Tokhma Su, the ancient Melas; and if the Paulician Argaoth⁷ (*see infra*) is Arga-Arca, as is very probable, their territory must have extended even south of the river. The identification of Taranta with Derende suits the conditions of our campaign. The next fact with regard to Basil's movements that is certain is that we find him encamped some distance to the south-west of Melitene, and the submission of Taranta suggests that he had marched to this point by the road which was thus opened to him.

The submission of Taranta was the signal for the surrender of several other towns or fortresses among which was Lokana,⁸ a fort held by Kourtikios (Kourterios, Kedr.), an Armenian, i.e. a Paulician leader. Basil's ulterior object is now plainly to attempt the capture of Melitene, the capital of the Saracen territory west of the Euphrates and north of Mt. Tauros. The Saracen towns in this district were the support of the Paulicians, and the conquest of these towns would isolate the rebel heretics and make their reduction an easy matter. The time was favourable: for the internal dissensions among the Abbassides and the revolutions at Baghdad had paralysed the Saracen power and prevented any aid from being sent across the Euphrates either to the Paulicians or to the Saracen towns on the west of the river. But Melitene itself was a strongly fortified place and powerfully garrisoned: and so Basil determined first of all to capture the towns in the rear which might send assistance to the capital. With this object he crossed the hill-country between the Tokhma Su (the Arabic Kubākib) and the Sultan Su (the Karākis), sending forward a flying column (κοῦρσον) of picked soldiers against Zapetra and Samosata, while he himself evidently en-

¹ The Bonn edition of the Byzantine authors is quoted, unless otherwise mentioned.

² Sym. Mag. (*l.c.*) calls the town Ἀφρική, Ibn Serapion's 'Abrik' (Le Strange, pp. 58, 63). This form is therefore not a mere error of the MSS. but a variant (see concluding paragraph). [Le Strange in his additional MS. notes proves that Abrik is Tephrikē (according to his first statement on p. 58), and not Arabkir (according to Mr. Hogarth's opinion, adopted by him on p. 740).]

³ Probably the Amara of Kedr. II. 154.

⁴ On Daranda I quote from his MS. additions to his *Hist. Geogr.*

⁵ In both passages Τάραντον is the form given.

⁶ The pass Βουκούλιθος on this road is mentioned by Kedr. II. p. 421.

⁷ Ἀργαῶν Kedr. II. 154.

⁸ Possibly identical with Gurun [R.].

camped in the country between the Karākis and the Zarnūk (see below). The column obviously took the road which leads from Melitene up the course of the Karākis (Sultan Su) and thence turns south-eastwards to Perre (Hisn Mansur, the modern Adiaman) and Samosata, joining this road of course on the west of Melitene. This road is shown in Professor Ramsay's map, (*H. G.*, p. 266). After passing through τὰ σπεῖα τῆς ὁδοῦ—the description given by our authorities is too vague to admit of any definite localization of the pass referred to—the detachment captured Zapetra and released many Romans who had for long been prisoners there. They then laid waste the adjacent country and captured Samosata. It is said that they also crossed the Euphrates and ravaged the country beyond, its defenders being all concentrated against Basil. This is not impossible when we bear in mind the temporary paralysis of the Saracen power: it would mean that they crossed at Samosata for a plundering raid merely. Then they returned to the Emperor whom they found still encamped on the Zarnouch (= Zarnūk), ἐν πρὸς τῷ Ζ. The ἐν is significant: Basil had remained quiet with the main body of his army all the time the detachment was away, and they found him where they had left him, close by the Zarnūk.

The above description, taken in connexion with other statements, leaves little doubt as to the site of Zapetra. Another reference to this place belongs to the year 836 A.D., when Theophilus in his campaign against the Saracens captured *Sozopetra* (Theoph. Cont. 124, Kedr. 130, Zon. xv. 29; 'Ozopetra' in Gen. 66; 'Zapetros' in Sym. Mag. 634), the birthplace of the Caliph Al-Mo'tacim,¹ and Samosata. Here it is said that he advances a considerable distance into the Saracen country (ποππο-ρέω τῆς Σαρρίας) before he reaches Sozopetra. Zapetra clearly lies on or near the road between Melitene and Samosata. This is confirmed by the Arab geographers. Abul-Fida (quoted by Weil, *Gesch. der Khal.* ii. p. 309, n. 2, and by Le Strange, Trans. of Ibn Serapion, p. 66), who visited the place in 1315, says, 'It lies two marches southward of Malatia and the same distance westward of Hisn Mansur [Perre—Adiaman] in a plain surrounded by hills.' This description exactly suits the site near the sources of the Sultan Su and the Geuk

¹ This fact seems to be unknown to the Arab historians and is probably a mere unfounded report current in Byzantine circles.

Su where stand the ruins called Viransheher (i.e. 'ruined city'), about four miles from the road,² the very spot indicated by Ibn Serapion (Le Strange, *l.c.* p. 63), when he says that the Karākis (= Sultan Su)³ 'passes near the gate of Zibatra.' The statements of Ibn Khordādbēh (*flor. ca.* 864) give a further confirmation of this argument, and at the same time indicate the site of Al-Hadath (Adata) as somewhere on the road between Zibatra and Marash. The frontier towns of Mesopotamia are given (De Goeje's Trans., p. 70) as Malatia, Zibatra, Al-Hadath, Marash (thirty miles between the latter two), &c. Again, the following route is given (pp. 70 and 165): Samosata, Hisn Mansur, Malatia—then, turning to the left (see p. 165), the fortress of Zibatra (in Greek power), Al-Hadath (frontier fortress quite close to Greek territory), and Marash (frontier fortress with only Greek territory beyond). Further (p. 193) 'the town nearest the Syrian frontiers is Marash, the next Al-Hadath: formerly Zibatra s'élevait dans le voisinage, but was sacked by the Romans in the time of Al-Mo'tacim,' referring to 836 (*supra*). All this proves clearly that Zibatra was at Viransheher and Al-Hadath (Adata) on the Ak Su near Inekli. As to the latter fortress, Ibn Serapion says, 'There falls into the Kubākib [= Tokhma Su] a river Hurith (Jurith): its course lies through certain lakes and it passes near the city of Al-Hadath, falling out into the Kubākib at a point in the direction of this town.' Here, as Professor Ramsay holds, Ibn Serapion is mistaken in making the Hurith fall into the Tokhma Su instead of the Jihan (Pyramus). Yakūt (*v. Le Strange, l.c.* p. 67) is undoubtedly right in saying, 'the Hurith flows out of the Lake of Al-Hadath

² Cf. Sir C. Wilson in his *Handbook*: 'Viransheher, ruins of ancient city in the plain four miles to the left,' i.e. west of the Marash—Malatia road. Cf. also Ritter, *l.c.* x. 850-1. This suggestion was made by Le Strange on Ibn Serapion, p. 65, and retracted on p. 745, in deference to Mr. Hogarth's argument. Now however he will probably recur to it again, see my first note.

³ Le Strange (*v. Addenda*, p. 744) doubts this identification, which he had made on p. 65, in deference to Mr. Hogarth's argument that *ca.* 900 the whole district of Melitene was permanently occupied by the Saracens, and therefore could not be the 'Greek country' in which Ibn Serapion says the Karākis rises. But Ibn Serapion may have written as late as 930-40, and the Taurus range was by that time in Greek power, even Melitene being captured by Joannes Kourkouas in 934. [The translation formerly given 'the source of the Karākis is in a lake in the Greek country' (p. 63) is now altered to 'in the confines of . . .']

near Marash; and flowing on, it falls into the Nahr Jayhūn.¹ The lakes are those out of which the Ak Su flows, and Al-Hadath is on the road leading from Marash (Germaniceia) by Inekli, Pavrelu, Surghi, and Viransheher (Zibatra)² to Malatia.

To return to Basil's march: the detachment found him encamped πρὸς τῷ Ζαρνούχ ποταμῷ, ἔνθα τὸ Κερακίσιον ἐστί. This river, named more correctly by Kedrenos 'Ἀρζαρνούκ, is the River Az-Zarnūk (i.e. 'the rivulet') which, according to Ibn Serapion, 'has its source in a mountain lying between Malatia and Hisn Mansur [Perre-Adiamān], and falls into the Kubākib [Tokhma Su] below the mouth of the Karākis [Sultan Su]'; and 'from the River Az-Zarnūk is carried a stream called Nahr Malatia which . . . falls into the Kubākib below the mouth of the river Az-Zarnūk; from the Nahr Malatia are brought the water-courses of Malatia,' &c. The whole campaign therefore has been confined to the west of the Euphrates. Basil had marched southwards, keeping on the west of Melitene, to a position on the Zarnuk. Professor Ramsay has suggested to me that τὸ Κερακίσιον may be an error for τὸ Κερακίσιον, i.e. the country about the Karākis; and, if so, this also shows that Basil's camp lay between the two streams. Then, just as we should expect, 'he breaks up his camp and marches with his whole army against Melitene' (Cont. p. 269). Constantine, however, (= Theoph. Cont. 269), imagines that he is on the east of the Euphrates and gives a grandiose description of Basil's prowess during the construction of a bridge over the flooding river, when like the Homeric heroes he carried as much as three or more ordinary men! [Cf. his energy in the campaign of 880, p. 280.] Then after crossing the river he captures a fortress, Rhapsakion (perhaps really an outlying fort of Melitene), and despatches the Khaldian and Koloniate troops to ravage the country between the Euphrates and the Arsines (= the Arsanās of Arab writers, Pliny and

Tacitus' Arsanias), while he marches himself against Melitene.

This account cannot be accepted. He is first on the east of the river, then crosses to the west, and then sends a division of his army over again! Probably the movement is misplaced and refers to a crossing³ above Kamacha later on. Basil would never have divided his force in this way when he was going to attack a fortified city like Melitene, and the fact that it is the Khaldian and Koloniate troops that are sent indicates that their operations took place in the country adjacent to these Themes. It is clear then that Basil proceeded straight against Melitene. The Emir's forces came out to meet him and a battle was fought before the town; but the Saracens were defeated and shut up within their walls. Seeing the strength of the place, however, the Emperor gave up the siege as hopeless, and withdrew again into the Paulician territory (τῇ Μανιχαίων γῇ) which he laid waste with fire and sword, capturing and burning the fortresses called Argauth (probably Arga-Arca), φρούριον Κουρακίου, φρούριον Στεφάνου, and Rachat (Ararach in Kedr., and hence no doubt the same as Arauraca). It was probably at this point that the troops of the Khaldian and Koloniate Themes were sent across the Euphrates. They devastated the country between that river and the Arsines (Arsanās) and sacked the forts of Kourtikion (Karkinion, Kedr.), Chachon (Glaschon, Kedr.), Amer (Aman, Kedr.), Mourinix (Mourēx, Kedr.), and Abdēla (or -ēla, Kedr.). The site of these forts I have found no means of determining. Basil in the meantime returned home, probably by the Sivas-Dorylaion route, to receive the crown of victory at the hands of the Patriarch (Cont. 271).

With regard to the names 'Ἀρζαρνούκ (Ζαρνούχ), Κερακίσιον (?), and 'Ἀφρικῇ (for Τεφρικῇ), it is interesting to see how the Arabic names are already displacing the Greek, even in the Greek historians. Τεφρικῇ becomes Abrik in Arabic, and then Zabetros in Greek. Compare the way in which, in the later centuries, Turkish names displace Greek names in the Byzantine writers, e.g. Τάξαρα (= τὸ Ἀκσεραί) for Ak Serai, Πέγισμαρ for Bey Sheher, &c. (cf. Ramsay, *Hist. Geogr.*,

¹ I am pleased to see that Le Strange now adds a marginal note: 'probably the true description after all.'

² The following additional references may be given. Edrisi (Weil, l.c.) says that Zibatra lay fifteen miles from Hisn Mansur (which is thirty miles from Malatia and twenty-two from Samosata—Arab miles, presumably). But Abu-l-Fida's authority is better, since he visited the place. Kudāma (Le Strange, l.c., p. 66) states that 'from Malatia to Zibatrā was five leagues.' The lake of Al-Hadath (cp. Weil III. p. 15) is probably the southern of the three on the course of the river.

³ Of course Constantine (Theoph. Cont.) may have mistaken one of the large tributaries (e.g. Tokhma Su) for the Euphrates itself.

pp. 290 n., 209 n., and *Cities and Bish. of Phrygia*, pp. 19 n., 21 n.).

J. G. C. ANDERSON.

NOTE.—Mr. Anderson's acute and suggestive paper clears away many difficulties. The discussion of Adata in my *Hist. Geogr.* p. 278 showed that it was situated on a pass that leads from Marash across Taurus; but the words of Theophanes, p. 313, seemed to show that the pass in question led to Arabissos. Probably in that passage, which obviously shows topographical confusion, Theophanes is trying unsuccessfully to report the meaning of an authority, and a slight

transposition would express the real facts, *περάσας τὴν Ἀδατα, εἰς Γερμανίειαν ἀφίκετο, καὶ πάλιν τὸν Ταῦρον ὑπερβὰς ἦλθε πρὸς τὸν Σάρον* (on the correction *Ἀδατα, Hist. Geogr.* p. 311). I would add here the correction on *Hist. Geogr.* p. 291, *lines* 32 ff. The three days journey there mentioned is measured apparently from Boukoulithos, a pass near the Euphrates, and not from Caesarea; and the city Lykandos is to be identified with the Paulician Lokana, at or near Gurun on the 'Royal Road,' between Tsamandos and Taranta-Derende.

W. M. RAMSAY.

ADVERSARIA UPON THE POETICS OF ARISTOTLE.

No one who renews his studies of Aristotle's *Poetics* with a perusal of Prof. Butcher's stimulating work can help feeling that there is still much demand for conjectural emendation based upon sound principles. Nowhere could the inseparability of interpretation from textual criticism be more conclusively demonstrated. Not to criticize the existing texts is not to be in earnest with the study of the meaning. The well-chosen critical matter given by Prof. Butcher affords many gratifying proofs of the success which may still attend logical acumen combined with palaeographical knowledge.

On the other hand I venture to think that there are a large number of instances in which the incorporated or suggested emendation, however apt in sense, must necessarily be regarded as a *pis aller*.

It is, for instance, undoubtedly necessary to insert words (or groups of words) with rather a free hand. But to interpolate words is to assume that those words have actually fallen out, and that they have fallen out for a reason which will readily appear when the words are reinstated. For example, they may begin with the same, or much the same, shapes and sounds as words later on (*homoeokatarcton*), or they may end with the same, or much the same, shapes and sounds as words preceding (*homoeoteleuton*). There may be other considerations. The present contention is simply that some such explanation should spring to the eye as soon as the correction is made. Theoreti-

cally, no doubt, every critic acts upon this principle, and Prof. Butcher has for the most part dealt wisely with conjectural material. I do not, indeed, see why in Cap. vi. *ἅπαντες* should have disappeared in *αὐτῶν* <*ἅπαντες*> ὡς εἰπεῖν, nor how *ἄλλων* fell away in Cap. xxii. *τὴν τῶν <ἄλλων> ὀνομάτων σύνθεσιν*. But *ἄλογα* like these are rare, and it is in no captious spirit that I draw attention to them.

The following suggestions may occasionally fall short of my own ideal, but I venture to hope that one or two among them may be of distinct use.

C. i. 1447a 26.

αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ῥυθμῷ μιμοῦνται τοῖ (αἰ. ἡ) τῶν ὀρχηστῶν.

Read *οἱ <α'> τῶν ὀρχηστῶν*, i.e. *οἱ πρῶτοι*.

Ibid. 29.

ἡ δὲ ἔπιποιία μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις.....(ἀνώνυμος) τυγχάνει οὔσα.

For *ΗΔΕΠΟΠΟΙΑ* read *ΗΔΕΤΙΠΟΙΟΥΣΑ*, i.e. for *ἡ δ' ἐποποιία* read *ἡ δέ τι ποιούσα* (*τι = π* as often). 'The art which ποιῇ τι by means of prose or verse without music....' This art is immediately discussed in connection with the verb ποιεῖν, the noun ποιητής, and the compounds in -ποιός. ποιούσα is therefore the right word. The mistake is due partly to similar letters, partly to misconception of the copyist as to sense.

1447b 14.

οὐχ ὡς τὴν κατὰ (al. κατὰ τὴν) μίμησιν
ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες.

If merely κατὰ τὴν were correct the inversion of order would be unaccountable. Read οὐχ ὡς χρῆν κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν κ.τ.λ. (When χρῆν had become τὴν the true τὴν was omitted.)

Ibid. b 20.

ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν εἴ τις ἅπαντα τὰ μέτρα μιγνύνοντο τὴν μίμησιν, καθάπερ Χαιρήμων ἐποίησε Κένταυρον μυκτὴν ῥαψωδίαν ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν μέτρων, καὶ (τοῦτον add. al.) ποιητὴν προσ-αγορευτέον.

Aristotle has just said that people wrongly name writers according to their metre, ἐλεγιοποιοί if they write elegiacs, ἐποιοιοί if they write epic verse. He here reduces the position to the absurd. 'What then if a man writes in a medley of all sorts of metres?'

The natural answer is...καὶ τοῦτον <π ο υ πα ν τ ο> ποῖον προσαγορευτέον, i.e. 'him also, I suppose, we must call a παντοποιός.'

C. iii. a 19.

καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμῆσθαι ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα (ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνώμενον, ὥσπερ Ὀμηρος ποιεῖ, ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα), τῇ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους.

All the difficulties are removed by inserting after μεταβάλλοντα the words <ὅτε δ' εἰσάγοντα> and omitting the ἢ (which became inevitable after the loss had once occurred). 'Sometimes in narrative...sometimes by introducing all his imitating characters in the capacity of actors and doers.'

C. iv. 1448b 20.

After the statement of one φυσικὴ αἰτία of poetry (viz. our congenital love of μίμησις), the second αἰτία is rather hard to distinguish in the text. Professor Butcher rightly finds it here, but his translation hardly corresponds to the original.

κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῖν τοῦ μιμῆσθαι καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ (τὰ γὰρ μέτρα ὅτι μόρια τῶν ῥυθμῶν ἐστί, φανερόν) τῆς ἀρχῆς πεφυκότες καὶ αὐτὰ μάλιστα κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων.

Place a comma after μιμῆσθαι and insert <ἐρ ᾱ ν> after φανερόν (i.e. ΦΑΝΕΡΟΝ-ΕΡΑΝ) outside the parenthesis, thus:

κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῖν τοῦ μιμῆσθαι, καὶ ('also,' 'in the second place') τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ.....<ἐρ ᾱ ν> ἐξ ἀρχῆς πεφυκότες κ.τ.λ., i.e. 'in the second place, being naturally passionately fond of harmony and rhythm, and gradually advancing these elements.'

For the use of ἐρ ᾱ ν (which fits well with ἐγέννησαν) cf. e.g. Ar. Vesp. 89 ἐρ ᾱ τοῦ δικάζειν, etc.

C. iv. 1449a 7.

τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπισκοπεῖν παρέχει (al. εἰ ἄρα ἔχει) ἥδη ἡ τραγωδία ἱκανῶς ἢ οὐ κ.τ.λ.

The readings are best accounted for by εἴ τ' ἄρ' ἔχει. For εἴτε...ἢ...see Lex.

(I may remark in passing that a restoration of the text with the usual *elisions* would yield useful results.)

C. vi. 1450a 13.

τούτοις μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὀλίγοι ταύτων ὡς εἰπεῖν κέχρηται τοῖς εἰδεσιν.

The emendation embodied in Prof. Butcher's text involves change at too many points. Read τούτοις μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτόνως ὡς εἰπεῖν κ.τ.λ., i.e. 'many writers have used them all by native wit, instinctively.' (This is the legitimate sense of αὐτόνοος.)

C. vi. 1450b 19.

τῶς γὰρ τῆς τραγωδίας δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἁγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἐστίν.

I am surprised that no one has made the obvious emendation σῶς. (The preceding word ends in -s.)

Ibid. 38.

συνχεῖται γὰρ ἡ θεωρία ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀναισθήτου χρόνου γινομένη.

Read χρόνῳ: 'at length.'

C. ix. 1452a 2.

ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται καὶ μάλιστα καὶ ἑμᾶλλον ὅταν γένηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα.

The usual transposition is much too free. Rather simply read κα ἄ λ λ ο ν for ἑμᾶλλον (a frequent corruption) and render 'these effects are produced both in the strongest degree and also more artistically when the events occur with a surprise through a reciprocal connection of cause and effect.'

C. xiv. 1453b 15.

ἀνάγκη δὲ ἡ φίλων εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὰς

τοιαύτας πράξεις ἢ ἐχθρῶν ἢ μηδετέρων † ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐχθρὸς ἐχθρὸν, οὐδὲν ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε ποιῶν οὔτε μέλλον, πλὴν κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος· οὐδ' ἂν μηδετέρως ἔχοντες.

It is no wonder that Pazzi inserted ἀποκτείνῃ after ἐχθρὸν and the editor of Aldus δείκνυσσι after μέλλον, so that Bekker reads ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐχθρὸς ἐχθρὸν <ἀποκτείνῃ>, οὐδὲν ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε ποιῶν οὔτε μέλλον <δείκνυσσι> κ.τ.λ.

Yet, obviously, these interpolations render no satisfactory account of themselves. I therefore believe that after μηδετέρων there has been lost the word ΔΡΩΙΗ (δρῶν), and that ἂν has shifted its place and meaning in consequence, the true reading being <δρῶν> μὲν ἂν οὖν ἐχθρὸς ἐχθρὸν οὐδὲν ἐλεεινόν, οὔτε ποιῶν οὔτε μέλλον, κ.τ.λ.

C. xiv. 1454a 4.

It is quite inconceivable that Aristotle, who thinks the most artistic tragedy is one which combines περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις in such a way as to produce the most of pity and fear, and who commends plays which end εἰς δυστυχίαν, should here say that the 'best' situation is that in which the deed is not performed at all, but is forestalled by a recognition. To be consistent he must claim that the best contrivance is one by which a deed is done unwittingly and the recognition made afterwards. The struggles of Essen and Susemihl to rearrange the passage are creditable to their perception of the difficulty, but the results are not critically acceptable.

What Aristotle *does* say, I believe, is not 'but the best kind is...' but 'the kind which chiefly prevails, the most popular kind.'

This meaning can hardly be attached to the simple word κράτιστον, but it can be very well expressed by κρατεῖ <δὲ πλεῖ> στον..., with which cf. ἡ πλειόστη χρῶνται (c. xvi. *init.*) and such expressions as ἡ φάτις πολλὴ κρατεῖ.

Aristotle admits that such plays are best liked διὰ τὴν τῶν θεατῶν ἀσθένειαν.

C. xvii. 1455a 27.

ὁ γὰρ Ἀμφιάραος ἐξ ἱεροῦ ἀνῆγει, ὁ μὲν ὄρωντα † τὸν θεατὴν ἐλάνθανεν κ.τ.λ.

To bracket τὸν θεατὴν is bold; to alter to τὸν ποιητὴν is perhaps more so.

More easily ὁ μὲν ὀρώντ' αὐτὸν θεατὴν (i.e. ὡς αὐτὸν θεατὴν ὄντα) 'and when a poet did not see this in the character of a spectator...'

Ibid. 30.

πιθανώτατοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἰσι.

Emend ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῶν φύσεως. (The attraction of flexion-endings is a frequent cause of corruption.)

C. xviii. b 26.

λέγω δὲ δέσιν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τούτου τοῦ μέρους ὁ ἔσχατον ἐστίν, ἐξ οὗ μεταβαίνει εἰς ἑὺτυχίαν.

Inasmuch as the change is as often (and, to the mind of Aristotle, more properly) εἰς δυστυχίαν, editors are inclined to add <ἢ εἰς δυστυχίαν>, which may very well have fallen away.

It occurs to me, however, that the sense is met by reading εἰς ἐτεροτυχίαν.

Ibid. 32.

τραγωδίας δὲ εἶδη εἰσὶ τέσσαρα· τοσαῦτα γὰρ † καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη· ἢ μὲν πεπλεγμένη κ.τ.λ.

But the μέρη of tragedy are six and not four, and, in any case, those μέρη do not determine the enumeration of the εἶδη.

Most editors bracket τοσαῦτα...ἐλέχθη. Rather read τοσαῦτα γὰρ κατὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη 'for that is the number before mentioned in detail (though not brought together and classified).'

C. xviii. 1456a 20.

ἐν δὲ ταῖς περιπετείαις καὶ ἐν τοῖς † ἀπλοῖς πράγμασι στοχάζεται ὧν βούλονται.

Read ἀλλοῖς (cf. 1451b 33).

Ibid. 28.

τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς τὰ ἀδόμενα μᾶλλον τοῦ μύθου ἢ ἄλλης τραγωδίας ἐστίν.

This is the exact opposite of the sense. Prof. Butcher agrees with those who insert <οὐδὲν> before μᾶλλον. But how was the word lost?

In the next sentence the same objection of Aristotle is put in the form of a question. So here I should read τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς <πῶς> τὰ ἀδόμενα μᾶλλον τοῦ μύθου ἢ ἄλλης τραγωδίας ἐστίν;

C. xxi. 1457a 32.

τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐκ σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσήμου (πλὴν οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματος σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσήμου) κ.τ.λ.

If ὀνόματι is right, whence came ὀνόματος? The natural supposition is that the original was ἐν τῷ ὀνόματος.

C. xxii. 1458a 27.

κατὰ μὲν τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων σύνθεσιν οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεταφορὰν ἐνδέχεται.

Some editors insert <ἄλλων>, others <κυρίων>. Perhaps the original was κατὰ μὲν τὴν τῶν <συννηθῶν> σύνθεσιν, to which ὀνομάτων was an adscript.

Ibid. 31.

ἔκ τῶν γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός. This abrupt remark follows αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὐτῇ ἰστί κ.τ. λ.

Answering τε with τε and filling in the sense we may read ἔκ τ' <ἀμίκτ> ὧν γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός. I am further disposed to believe that a larger loss has occurred and that the original text was e.g.

ἔκ τ' <ἀμίκτ> ὧν γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός <ὁῦλον ὅτι ποιείται>. δέῃ ἄρα κ.τ.λ.

C. xxii. 1458b 12.

τὸ μὲν οὖν φαίνεται ἄπως χρώμενον τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ γελοῖον κ.τ.λ.

The word wanted is <ἀναίσθη> ἥτως, the first two syllables having been lost through the similarity of -αἰεσθαι and ἀναισθη- (αι=ε, cf. 1455a 20 and very frequently). ΗΤΩC then became ΠΩC.

C. xxiv. 1460a 23.

διὸ δὴ, ἂν τὸ πρῶτον ψεύδος, ἴαλλ' οὐδὲ (al. ἄλλον δὲ) τούτου ὄντος ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ προσθεῖναι.

The point is that 'granted the second, there is no necessity to establish the first'—popular fallacy being sufficient for the purpose. Prof. Butcher gives the right sense; but, for the reading, I should suggest διὸ δὴ, ἂν τὸ πρῶτον ψεύδος, ἄλλ' οὐδὲ ν, τούτου ὄντος, ἀνάγκη <κακεῖν> εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι πρὸς <θεῖν> θεῖναι, 'if the first is (a) fiction, nevertheless (ἀλλὰ) there is no necessity, when the latter is (a fact), to begin by laying it down that the former also is or becomes.'

The cause of the loss of κακεῖν' in -κη <κακεῖν> εἶναι is obvious.

C. xxv. 1460b 18.

εἰ δὲ τὸ προελεσθαι κ.τ.λ.

Rather than εἰ δὲ <διὰ> τὸ read εἰ δὲ τῷ (cf. 1448a 8, 1449b 11, &c.).

Ibid. 27.

εἰ μέντοι τὸ τέλος ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ <μὴ> ἦττον ἐνεδέχτο ὑπάρχειν καὶ κατὰ τὴν περὶ τούτων τέχνην ἡμαρτησθαι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς.

Rather than omit ἡμαρτησθαι I should read <μὴ> ἡμαρτησθαι and render 'if it had been possible for the end to be attained quite as readily, and yet for no error to have been made in respect of the art to which they belong.'

C. xxv. 1461a 27.

τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως, οἷον τῶν κεκραμένων ἢ οἷον φασιν εἶναι, ὅθεν πεποιήται ὁ Γανυμήδης Διὶ οἰνοχοεῖν, οὐ πινόντων οἶνον.

Prof. Butcher inserts <ἐνια> after κεκραμένων. I should prefer (for sense as well) to read τῶν κεκραμένων <οἶον οἶον> οἷον φασιν εἶναι: 'any and every sort.'

C. xxvi. 1462b 5.

ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἓνα μῦθον ποιῶσιν, ἀνάγκη ἢ βραχεῖα δεικνύμενον μύθον φαίνεσθαι, ἢ ἀκολουθοῦντα τῷ τοῦ μέτρου μήκει ὑδαρῇ. <.....> λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰς πλείονων πράξεων ἢ συγκειμένη, οὐ μίαν.

The usual methods of filling in the lacuna, though good in sense, do not account for the loss. I should fill in with <εἰ δὲ πάλιν μὲρ ἢ> and account for the loss by homoeoteleuton (-αρή...ερή).

Further notes upon textual questions and upon the interpretation of difficulties are reserved for another occasion. Meanwhile, inasmuch as the *Poetics* are now regularly read in the University of Melbourne, I should be grateful for the opinion of any scholar upon the views taken above.

T. G. TUCKER.

XENOPHON'S *OECONOMICUS*.

(Continued from page 104.)

8, 1.—ναὶ μὰ Δί,' ἔφη ὁ Ἰσχόμαχος, καὶ δηχθεῖσάν γε οἶδα αὐτήν... ὅτι τῶν εἰσενεχθέντων τι αἰτήσαντος ἐμοῦ οὐχ εἰχέ μοι δοῖναι.

It seems necessary to insert *ποτε* somewhere in this sentence. A Greek could not have omitted it, any more than in 10, 2 ἐγὼ τοίνυν ἰδὼν *ποτε* αὐτήν κ.τ.λ. It would have fallen out most easily perhaps after *ὅτι*, but its more natural place would be after *δηχθεῖσάν γε*. (Herwerden after *οἶδα*.)

8, 10.—καὶ σὺ οὖν, ὦ γύναι, εἰ τοῦ μὲν παράχον τοῦτον μὴ δέοιο, βούλοιο δ' ἀκριβῶς διοικεῖν τὰ ὄντα εἰδέναι καὶ τῶν ὄντων εὐπόρως λαμβάνουσα ὅτῳ ἂν δέῃ χρησθαι... χώραν τε δοκιμάσωμεθα τὴν προσήκουσαν ἐκάστοις ἔχειν καὶ κ.τ.λ.

Hartman is probably right in demurring to διοικεῖν τὰ ὄντα. It is not a question of knowing how to 'administer your property,' but simply of avoiding confusion in your stores and knowing what you have or have not got. He reads ἀκριβῶς τὰ οἴκοι ὄντα εἰδέναι, but I am not sure that οἴκοι can be used indiscriminately for ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ. I have thought of διαρρεῖν (cf. 17 and 9, 6) but it does not quite satisfy me. The optatives εἰ δέοιο and εἰ βούλοιο, to which Dr. Holden calls attention, seem unsuitable here and are probably an error for the present indicative, δέει and βούλει. Not only is the mood inharmonious with δοκιμάσωμεθα, but it puts as a mere future contingency what the speaker would naturally assume to be an actual fact. He takes it for granted that his wife wishes to avoid disorder and to have things handy.

If ὅτῳ ἂν δέῃ χρησθαι is right, the attraction is very unusual.

Just below in ἡ γὰρ χώρα αὐτὴ τὸ μὴ ὄν ποθήσει should we read τὸ μὴ ἐνόν? I hardly think that ὄν is to be understood from the sentence before, or that ὄν can be used here by itself.

8, 16.—In a storm, says the sailor, there is no time to search for things or get them out: ἀπειλεῖ γὰρ ὁ θεὸς καὶ κολάζει τοὺς βλάκας. ἀπειλεῖ is not exactly an inappropriate word, but there is a very similar word so much more appropriate that I believe Xenophon to have used it: ἐπείγει... καὶ κολάζει τοὺς βλάκας. So Soph. *O.C.* 1540 ἐπείγει γὰρ με τοῦκ θεοὶ παρόν.

8, 19.—ὥς δὲ καλὸν φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.

I think Hartman is right in doubting the exclamatory use of ὥς here, which would indeed be very much out of place, but he does not say how the words are to be dealt with. It seems pretty certain that this ὥς must be like the two in the preceding sentence, which follow upon εἰρηται, though εἰρηται comes after them in order. I should suppose that Xenophon was in like manner going to put something later on which this ὥς κ.τ.λ. would follow, but was diverted by the length of the sentence into an anacoluthon. What he had in his mind really appears in the next sentence (21) εἰ δ' ἀληθὴ ταῦτα λέγω, ἔξεστι... καὶ πείραν λαμβάνειν κ.τ.λ. It is as though 19–21 ran ὥς δὲ καλὸν φαίνεται... τοῦτον ἔξεστι πείραν λαμβάνειν κ.τ.λ. *Ages.* 7, 7 is a sentence of somewhat similar irregularity, for it contains no regular apodosis to εἰ δ' αὖ κ.τ.λ. but the sense is given in another form.

9, 5.—οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρηστοὶ (τῶν οἰκετῶν) παιδοποιησάμενοι εὐνούστεροι ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, οἱ δὲ πονηροὶ εὐπορώτεροι πρὸς τὸ κακογυγνὲν γίνονται.

Xenophon may have meant only that bad slaves got increased facilities (εὐπορώτεροι) for mischief or dishonesty, and this makes fair sense. But the antithesis to εὐνούστεροι suggests that some effect upon their dispositions was what he meant to express. If so, he may have written εὐφορώτεροι in the sense in which Aristotle, more than once has *εὐκατάφορος*. When *εὐφορώτερον* is used of the body (*Symp.* 2, 16) it has the somewhat similar meaning of 'more flexible,' 'more easily moved.' So *Περὶ Ὑψους* 44, 1 πρὸς ἡδονὰς λόγων εὐφοροί and 4, 1 πρὸς λόγων ἐνίστε μέγεθος οὐκ ἄφορος. Cf. the analogous uses of δύσφορος, ἐπίφορος, παράφορος, &c. I have also thought of εὐροπώτεροι.

9, 18.—χαλεπώτερον γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη φάναι, εἰ αὐτῇ ἐπέταττον κ.τ.λ.

ἂν cannot stand here with the adjective and without a verb. Add εἶναι before ἔφη or after φάναι.

10, 12 seems to me imperfectly expressed and I conjecture that it ran somewhat as follows: καὶ <ἡ> ὄψις δὲ, <ἔφην>, ὁπότεν ἀνταγωνίζηται <δέσποιν> διακόνη καθαρωτέρα οὕσα πρεπόντως τε μᾶλλον ἡμφισμένη, κινητικὸν γίγνεται. There is nothing in the preceding sentences from which δέσποιν can conveniently be understood.

ἐφην is perhaps not absolutely necessary, but is usually added when a transition is made from *oratio obliqua*. I see not the least reason for doubting ὅψις, as Hartman does, but it probably wants the article.

11, 4.—ἀπαντήσας τῷ Νικίου τοῦ ἐπηλύτου ἵππῳ.

In this troublesome expression can Xenophon have written τῷ ἐπηλύτῳ (or ἐπηλυδί) ἵππῳ? Cf. Herod. 1, 78, 3 λέγοντες ὅφιν εἶναι γῆς παῖδα, ἵππον δὲ πολέμιον τε καὶ ἐπηλυδα. It is contrary to all probability that τοῦ Νικηράτου (Cobet) should have been corrupted thus.

11, 18.—τὰ μὲν βάδην, τὰ δὲ ἀποδραμὼν οἴκαδε. Perhaps βάδην should be βαδίσας: cf. 8, 4, ὁ μὲν βαδίζων τὸν τρέχοντα. Otherwise we must insert ἐλθὼν or some other aorist participle, perhaps βαδίσας itself. Hartman <ἰών>, but an aorist is needed to match ἀποδραμὼν. (In his text H. has βαδίσας after Herwerden.)

11, 22.—ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμελλον δὲ ἐγώ... τοῦτο ἐρήσεσθαι.

Perhaps δέ should be σε. καὶ... δέ seems hardly possible after ἀλλά.

12, 14.—It will not do to omit ῥάδιον, as Hartman proposes, in the first half of the sentence, though εἰπερές ἐστι might have been omitted in the second. If any change were to be made, I should prefer to insert another infinitive after εἰπερές ἐστι, but perhaps none is necessary. Holden falls into a remarkable mistake in saying that εἰπερές is 'not found elsewhere in Xenophon.' Not only does he adopt it himself in 15, 13 of this dialogue from the conjecture of Wytttenbach (MSS. εἰπρεπές), but Sturz' lexicon will furnish many other examples of both adjective and adverb. Holden is also in error in this § as to ὅταν παρῇ τὸ πρακτέον. The sense shows that παρῇ is from παρίημι, not from πάρεμι. Cf. Soph. O. C. 1229: Plat. Rep. 460 E.

13, 8.—καὶ τὰ κινῆδια δὲ πολλὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ ὑποδέεστερα ὄντα ὅμως καὶ περιτρέχειν καὶ κυβιστᾶν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ μανθάνει τῷ αὐτῷ τοιῦτ' τρόπῳ.

That dogs are inferior to man τῇ γνώμῃ is intelligible enough, but what can be meant by calling them inferior also τῇ γλώττῃ? or what has the tongue to do with running round in a circle and tumbling head over heels? The editors do not appear to have asked themselves these questions. But I do not see what is to be done with τῇ γλώττῃ. What is there besides γνώμη that it would be apposite to mention here? I can think of nothing, unless it were power of attention or docility. Did Xenophon

write μελέτῃ? (πολὴ τῇ γνώμῃ ὑποδέεστερα ὄντα Hartman.)

13, 9.—τῇ γὰρ γαστρὶ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις προσχαρίζομενος ἂν πόλλ' ἀντίτοις παρ' αὐτῶν.

ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις seems to make no sense. Can it be an adscript meaning that Xenophon uses γαστήρ here 'of the bodily desires'? (Hartman καὶ for ἐπὶ.)

14, 5.—Speaking of the laws of Draco and Solon, Ischomachus says γέγραπται γὰρ ζημιούσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κλέμμασι καὶ δεδίσθαι, ἣν τις ἄλῳ ποιῶν, καὶ θανατοῦσθαι τοὺς ἐγχειροῦντας.

This statement has puzzled the commentators considerably, as it appears to give a severer punishment for an attempt at theft than for a theft actually perpetrated. Some have made the obvious suggestion that the words should be transposed, reading καὶ δεδίσθαι τοὺς ἐγχειροῦντας καὶ θανατοῦσθαι ἣν τις ἄλῳ ποιῶν. Others have understood ἐγχειροῦντας very improbably of assault, not theft. But the addition of a word before ἐγχειροῦντας will give us an unexceptionable sense and bring this passage into harmony with the *locus classicus* on the subject in the *Timocrates* of Demosthenes. We read there that ὁ Σόλων... νόμον εἰσήνεγκεν, εἰ μὲν τις μεθ' ἡμέραν ὑπὲρ πενήκοντα δραχμῶν κλέπτει, ἀπαγωγὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἑνδεκ' εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τις νύκτωρ ὑπὸ τῶν κλέπτει, τοῦτον ἐξεῖναι καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τρώσαι διώκοντα καὶ ἀπαγαγεῖν τοῖς ἑνδεκ', εἰ βούλονται. τῷ δ' ἄλῳ τῷ αὐτῷ ἀπαγωγῇ εἶναι, οὐκ ἐγγυητὰς καταστήσαντι ἔκτισιν εἶναι τῶν κλεμμάτων, ἀλλὰ θάνατον τὴν ζημίαν. The words of Demosthenes make it certain, I think, that we should read here θανατοῦσθαι τοὺς <νύκτωρ> ἐγχειροῦντας. It is well known that at Rome the old law allowed any thief to be killed by night (*duodecim tabulae nocturnum furem quoquo modo, diurnum autem, si se telo defenderet, interfici impune voluerunt*, Cicero *p. Milone* § 9): Xenophon and Demosthenes are speaking rather of the penalty inflicted in course of law, though the latter seems to include private killing as well.

In the words that immediately follow, δῆλον οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐγραφοῖν αὐτὰ βουλόμενοι &c., αὐτά should probably be ταῦτα, though αὐτά may be defended as referring to πολλοὺς τῶν νόμων in 4.

15.—It is difficult to resist the conclusion that §§ 1-4 were never meant to stand before the following §§, which simply repeat their contents at somewhat greater length, but that we have here an instance of a *duplex recensio* or two alternative versions of the same matter. How the two

versions originated, is not an easy question to settle.

15, 1.—ἐπειδάν γε ἐμπούσης τινὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι σοὶ εἶναι τὰγαθά, ἐμπούσης δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως ταῦτά σοι ἐπιτελεῖται, ἐπὶ δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ἐπιστήμην κτήσῃ αὐτῷ, ὡς ἂν ποιούμενα ἕκαστα τῶν ἔργων ὠφελιμώτερα γίγνοιτο κ.τ.λ.

κτήσῃ αὐτῷ is certainly wrong, as Cobet pointed out, but it is hard to see how to improve it. Another ἐμπούσης is not plausible, for why should it have been so corrupted?—nor is ἐνεργάσῃ. Holden and Hartman both propose κτήσεται αὐτός, which is quite unsuitable, as Socrates is speaking throughout of what the overseer is taught, not of what he learns for himself, nor would there be any good reason for making such a distinction in this one thing. I can only conjecture that κτήσῃ αὐτῷ, which is not necessary to the construction, was an ill-worded adscript of some one who wished to give ἐπιστήμην a verb.

It may be that the first ἐμπούσης should be followed by a μέν and no doubt that is the common usage, but there are too many cases without μέν to make the restoration safe. We have another in 2, 3 καὶ πόσον ἂν...οἰε...εὐρέν τὰ σὺ κτήματα, πόσον δὲ τὰ ἐμέ; and cf. 11, 4. πολλούς...πολὺν δέ. Perhaps ὥσπερ σὺ σαντῷ just below should be <ὁμοίως> or <ὡσαύτως> ὥσπερ σὺ σαντῷ.

16, 12.—εἰκὸς γάρ...τὴν πῶν ἀναστρεφόμενῃν...τηνικαῦτα κόπρον μὲν τῇ γῇ ἥδη παρέχειν, καρπὸν δ' οἴπῳ καταβαλεῖν ὥστε φύεσθαι.

οἴπῳ can hardly stand instead of μήπῳ with the infinitive here. It might perhaps stand in the first of two clauses after εἰκὸς ἐστὶ, if one word or idea was strongly negated and another, as it were, put in its place: but in the second clause it is impossible. (Kühner, § 514, 2, B, points out rightly that in Plat. *Soph.* 254 B εἰκὸς οὐχ ἦττον ἐκείνων οὕτως ἔχειν the οὐχ goes closely with ἦττον.) I would not however read μήπῳ here. If we notice the change from the present παρέχειν to the aorist καταβαλεῖν, for which there is no reason, we may probably conclude that it is καταβαλεῖν which is wrong and restore καρπὸν δ' οἴπῳ καταβαλεῖ. The future is used as in 11 σκληρὰ ἡ γῇ ἔσται. (For a similar error cf. note on 20, 16.)

17, 7.—οὐκοῦν τοῦτο μὲν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἥδη μελέτης δέεται, ὥσπερ τοῖς κιθαρισταῖς ἡ χεῖρ, ὅπως δύνῃται ὑπηρετεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ.

The traditional punctuation is wrong here. The subject of δέεται is not τοῦτο (which is an accusative meaning 'in this

matter': cf. 16, 6) but ἡ χεῖρ. A comma must be placed after κιθαρισταῖς, if we put one before ὥσπερ.

18, 1.—στὰς ἐνθα πνεῖ ἄνεμος ἢ ἀντίος;

I suspect ἐνθα should be ἐνθεν. Cf. Bast's *Comm. Palaeogr.* p. 807. An adverb of place at which can be turned by attraction into an adverb of motion from or to, but not, I think, vice versa. (So too Hartman in his text.)

18, 5.—ὅπως δὲ τὸ δεόμενον κόψουσι..., τίνι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Read τίνι τοῦτο <ἐπιμελητέον>. Hartman <προστάξεις>.

19, 2.—ἐν ὁποῖα τῇ γῇ δεῖ φυτεῖν.

Omit τῇ. It has perhaps arisen from a dittography of γῇ.

19, 19.—διδάσκει τρυγᾶν ἐαυτὴν, ὥσπερ τὰ σῖκα συκάζουσι, τὸ ὀργῶν ἀεί.

Read ἐαυτῆς. Cf. *Mem.* 3, 11, 1 ἐπιδεικνύναι ἐαυτῆς ὅσα καλῶς ἔχει.

20, 3.—οὐδ' ὅτι ἀγνοήσας τις τὴν γῆν φέρουσαν ἀμπελούς ἐν ἀφόρῳ ἐφύτευσεν.

τὴν γῆν <τὴν> φέρουσαν Hartman. A word has indeed been omitted, but not the article. A man planted vines in unsuitable soil, because he did not know—what? that it would not grow them; ἀγνοήσας τὴν γῆν <οὐ> φέρουσαν ἀμπελούς. Hartman has himself very plausibly added an οὐ in 2, 3, writing οὐ πᾶν for πᾶν. Cf. on 16 below.

20, 8.—Insert αὐ after φυλακάς. Some particle is needed and this seems the likeliest. It occurs again in the next §.

20, 16.—μέγα δὲ ἔφη διαφέρειν κ.τ.λ.

Read μέγα δέ, ἔφη, διαφέρει. The whole of this ch. is in the *oratio recta*. διαφέρει, διαφέρουσιν, &c. occur repeatedly.

Ibid. βράδιος γὰρ ἀνὴρ εἰς παρὰ τοὺς δέκα διαφέρει τῷ ἐν ὥρᾳ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἄλλος γὰρ ἀνὴρ διαφέρει τῷ πρὸ τῆς ὥρας ἀπείναι.

In company with the man who goes away early Xenophon must have put him who begins late, that is, he must have written τῷ <μῆρ'> ἐν ὥρᾳ ἐργάζεσθαι. He has just said it is the overseer's business to see ὡς τὴν ὥραν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ οἱ ἐργάται ὦσιν, 'begin work in good time,' and it would be extravagant to speak as though only one workman in ten did so.

20, 18.—ὅταν ὁ μὲν πράττη ἐφ' ὧν ὥρμηται βαδίζῃ, ὁ δὲ ῥαστώνῃ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ παρὰ κρήναις καὶ ὑπὸ σκιαῖς ἀναπαυόμενος κ.τ.λ.

Cobet may be right in adopting ἐφ' ὅτε from Stephanus, but not in branding βαδίζῃ as an *inficetum interpretamentum*. The antithesis to ἀναπαυόμενος however, while defending βαδίζῃ, suggests that we should add to it some adverb such as προθύμως or ὡς τάχιστα.

20, 20.—Agreeing with Schneider that ἐπιμελείσθαι has no business to be mentioned here, I should suggest that τὸ δὲ δὴ καλῶς ἐργάζεσθαι ἢ κακῶς, τοῦτο δὴ κ.τ.λ. may be the right reading. ἐπιμελείσθαι was perhaps added by some one who failed to see that κακῶς went with ἐργάζεσθαι.

Ibid. ὅταν, σκαπτόντων ἵνα ὕλης καθαραὶ αἱ ἄμπελοι γένωνται, οὕτω σκάπτωσιν (σκαλλόντων and σκαλλῶσιν Hartman) ὥστε πλείω καὶ καλλίω τὴν ὕλην γίνεσθαι, πῶς οὕτως οὐκ ἄργον ἂν φήσαις εἶναι;

Surely καλλίω should be κακίω. The fineness of the weeds is hardly a thing to dwell on. So *De Vectigalibus* 4, 36 the κάκιον of Stephanus has been universally adopted for the κάλιον of the MSS. (Hartman μὴ μίω). It also seems natural to suppose that οὕτως ἄργον should be τούτους ἄργους.

20, 23.—Perhaps by a contrary error to that twice pointed out above (16, 12 and

20, 16) ἔχει χῶρος πάμφορος γιγνόμενος has been written here for ἔχειν χῶρον πάμφορον γιγνόμενον. The words seem wanted to finish off the father's statement of the case.

21, 5.—αἰσχυνομένους τε ἔχουσιν αἰσχρὸν τι ποιεῖν καὶ πείθεσθαι οἰομένους βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ ἀγαλλομένους τῷ πείθεσθαι ἕνα ἕκαστον καὶ σύμπαντας, πονεῖν ὅταν δεῖσῃ, οὐκ ἀθύμως πονοῦντας.

(1).—ἔχουσιν after παρέχουσιν in the preceding sentence seems sufficiently defended by the precisely similar use of the two words in *Ages.* 6, 4, 5. Cf. too *Hiero* 11, 12 ἐκόντας τοὺς πειθόμενους ἔχους ἄν. (2). If we do not insert a καί before πονεῖν, or before ἕνα (ἕνα τε!), we must at least take ἀγαλλομένους τῷ πείθεσθαι as subordinate to πονοῦντας. ἕνα ἕκαστον and σύμπαντας must not be separated.

H. RICHARDS.

ATTIC JUDICATURE.

In the numbers of this *Review* issued in April and May 1893 I was permitted to describe some part of the mechanism of Attic judicature in the light of statements of the recently discovered Aristotelian *Constitution of Athens*. Since that date the acumen of Professor Blass has satisfactorily deciphered further passages of the MS. that had been almost effaced by destructive agencies, and had hitherto proved illegible. With the help of this new information I will now attempt to complete the shadowing of an Athenian juror throughout his day of service; and at the same time will take the opportunity of criticizing some divergent views proposed by Gilbert in his *Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens*.

1. The assignment by lot of eponym letters of the alphabet, λ, μ, ν, etc., to the several law courts was the work of a single Thesmothetes, whether acting in rotation or appointed by lot, is not mentioned. ἐπειδὴν δ' ὁ θεσμοθέτης ἐπικληρώσῃ τὰ γράμματα ἃ δεῖ προσπαράττεισθαι τοῖς δικαστηρίοις...63, 5.

2. The assignment of the courts to the several magistrates was the duty of two Thesmothetæi chosen by lot. τίθεται δ' ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν δικαστηρίων κ' κληρωτήρια καὶ κύβοι χαλκοὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπιγέγραπται τὰ γράμματα τῶν δικαστηρίων καὶ ἕτεροι κύβοι ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπιγεγραμμένα. οἱ λαχόντες δὲ τῶν θεσμοθετῶν χωρὶς ἑκατέρους

τοὺς κύβους ἐμβάλλουσιν, ὁ μὲν τῶν δικαστηρίων εἰς ἐν κληρωτήριον ὁ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰς ἕτερον, column 33, lines 28 seqq. (Blass' reconstitution of the text is taken from Kaibel's *Stil und Text von Aristoteles Politeia*). The 'first' of the courts apparently denotes the court which had the letter L assigned to it for an eponym. Kaibel observes that there was no need of more than two balloting urns, and for κ' would read β'. This is a better reading; but γ' is perhaps as likely, indicating that a third urn received the pairs of cubes after they were simultaneously withdrawn from the others. Unless the letters are distinctly visible, I would suggest that κληρωτρίδες (not κληρωτήρια) and μίαν κληρωτρίδα (not ἐν κληρωτήριον) and ἐτέραν (not ἕτερον) should be read; for it is scarcely credible that in adjacent pages of the same treatise κληρωτήριον should be used to denote such dissimilar things as balloting urns and balloting rooms. The latter usage occurs in: κανονίδες δέκα ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν κληρωτηρίων, col. 31, 16, and τὴν φυλὴν καλεῖ εἰς τὸ κληρωτήριον, col. 31, 18.

3. Instead of the total number of juror tickets in the boxes, Gilbert (p. 400) thinks that only a fraction of them were suspended on the Kanonides; but see the following paragraph. (The pages of Gilbert's treatise referred to are the pages of the translation by Brooks and Nicklin.)

4. In describing the sortition (κυβεία) of jurors for the service of the day, the writer uses the following terms: εἰσὶ δὲ κύβοι ξύλινοι μέλανες καὶ λευκοί· ὅσους δ' ἂν δέη λαβεῖν δικαστάς, τοσοῦτοι ἐμβάλλονται λευκοί, <οἷον> κατὰ πέντε πινάκια εἰς, οἱ δὲ μέλανες τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, col. 31, 20. Of these words Gilbert, if I understand him rightly, gives the following interpretation. To shorten, presumably, the process of lottery, the white cubes employed were not equal in number to the jurors required, but only a fraction of that number, say one fifth; and as soon as an amount of πινάκια equal to twice the number required had been fixed on the Kanonides, no more were withdrawn from the κυβώτια, but an equal number of black cubes were thrown into the urn. *E.g.* if a hundred jurors were wanted from a given tribe, twenty white and twenty black cubes would be used and two hundred tickets placed on the Kanonides. Then five tickets were withdrawn at a time from the Kanonides, and either selected or rejected in a lump by a single white or black cube. There are, however, several objections to this explanation:—

(a) If this is the meaning, why, instead of οἱ δὲ μέλανες τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, did not the writers say καὶ μέλανες ἴσοι?

(b) How can we believe that he left such an amount of pure hypothesis, viz. the canonizing of not the whole number of candidates, but only twice the number wanted, to be supplied by the reader's conjecture, when his account is so explicit and distinct in all the other details?

(c) The method could never be employed when there were not present twice as many candidates as were required for the courts.

Gilbert's solution, then, cannot be accepted. I propose the following: The first thing to be done was to ascertain how many candidates had to be rejected. For this purpose all the tickets were exhibited on the Kanonides and counted. Then black cubes were put into the urn, not equal in number to the white cubes, but bearing the same proportion to the number of candidates to be rejected as the white cubes bore to that of the jurors required. Thus, if 100 jurors were wanted, and there were 300 candidates, 200 had to be rejected. Accordingly 20 white and 40 black cubes were cast into the urn, and the candidates were selected or rejected in batches of five. If only 100 candidates were present, none had to be rejected, no black or white cubes were employed, for no lottery was needed.

Gilbert's account of the process of κυβεία,

at least as it appears in the translation, is mysterious. In 63, 2 he reads κλη[ρωτήρια] (not κληρωτήριδες) εἴκοσι, δύο τῇ φυλῇ ἐκάστη, and with reason holds that κληρωτήριον can only signify a balloting room. In p. 401 he says: 'Aristotle, 63, 2, gives two κληρωτήρια for each tribe, which I should explain by supposing that in the one were the πινάκια on or in the ten κανονίδες of the κληρωτήριον, in the other the κύβοι.' And in p. 400: 'Then the Archon drew the dice for his κληρωτήριον, whilst the ἐμπήκται for each die drawn took the five uppermost tokens from their κανονίς.' What was the advantage of having the cubes and the Kanonides in different rooms is not explained. Taking κληρωτήριον to mean a room, Gilbert cannot specify any vessel that was either the original or subsequent receptacle of the cubes. My view is that they were originally placed in one κληρωτήρις, and cast, as they were from time to time withdrawn, into the other κληρωτήρις.

5. Each juror, as I interpret the passage, when designated for service by the dice, immediately drew from one ἰδρία an acorn to decide the court in which he was to serve; this acorn having performed its function was at once thrown into the second ἰδρία; and the archon at once cast the juror's πινάκιον into the box inscribed with the same letter as the acorn and the court.

Gilbert, p. 400, thinks that all the lottery (κυβεία) for service was finished before the jurors began to draw lots for the courts, reading ἐπειδὴν δ' ἐξέλη τοὺς κύβους καλεῖ τοὺς εἰληχότας ὁ [ἀρχων], instead of Blass' ἐπειδὴν δ' [ἐξαιρή] τοὺς κύβους καλεῖ τοὺς εἰληχότας ὁ [κῆρυξ]; and supposes that in the meantime the πινάκια of the selected jurors were provisionally deposited in the second ἰδρία. When the lottery was finished the archon, he holds, drew the πινάκια one by one from the ἰδρία where they were deposited, and simultaneously the juror an acorn from the other ἰδρία; whereupon the archon cast each πινάκιον into its proper κυβώτιον. The first ἰδρία being thus occupied by the tickets, the acorns have to remain in the hands or pockets of the jurors till they reach the door of their allotted court. But there seems to be no adequate reason why the jurors should not have handed over their acorns immediately after showing them to the archon; and the ἰδρία would not have been blocked by the πινάκια, if each juror drew his acorn immediately after he was selected by the dice.

6. If we follow the selected jurors and observe what credentials (*βακτηρία*, *σύμβολα*) they received, and what use they made of them, we find that after allotment to a court each juror received from an official a staff coloured like the lintel (*σφηκίσκος*) of his particular court. *ὁ δὲ ὑπὸν ἱππάρχου δίδωσιν αὐτῷ βακτηρίαν ὁμόχρον τῷ δικαστηρίῳ... τοῖς γὰρ δικαστηρίοις χρώματα ἐπιγράφονται πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τῷ σφηκίσκῳ τῆς εἰσόδου*, col. 32, 3 *seqq.*

7. On entering the court each juror received a ticket for pay (*σύμβολον*). *ἐπειδὴ δ' εἰσέλθῃ παραλαμβάνει σύμβολον δημοσίᾳ παρὰ τοῦ εἰληχότου ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν*, col. 31, 13. The *εἰληχός* may, until we have further information, be regarded as a *κωλακρέτης*, though the existence of such officials in the fourth century B.C. is not shown by any extant inscription.

Gilbert, p. 402, supposes that the juror now surrendered the acorn, which he had hitherto kept in his possession. Kaibel, also, thinks the juror was still seized of the acorn: *Durch den Stab wie durch die Eichelmarke legitimirt, steht ihm der Eingang offen*, p. 262. But, as before suggested, it was probably thrown, immediately after performing its function, into the second *ὕδρῖα*. The juror was sufficiently 'legitimated' or accredited by his staff, and the acorn was now superfluous.

8. When the arguments were concluded the *ψῆφοι* were distributed, and, after casting his vote, each juror surrendered the staff which was his badge of office. This we may reasonably assume with Gilbert from what is stated of the next stage.

The *ψῆφοι*, like the *πινάκια* and the *σύμβολα*, were marked on one side with letters of the early part of the alphabet, corresponding to the Heliastic divisions. The object of these letters on the *ψῆφοι* is not obvious. Gilbert, pp. 394 and 411, thinks that the specimens so marked belong to a time when the permanent Heliastic divisions sat constantly in particular courts. If this arrangement ever existed, we must at least suppose that the assignment of magistrates, that is, of causes, to the several courts was a matter of daily sortition: as otherwise the facility of corruption which the system furnished would have been too obvious. Moreover a single brigade would hardly be able to furnish the whole number of jurors, possibly 1500, required for a single court.

Compared with *νῆες διαπεραί*, *naves solutiles* (see *Ancient Ships* by Cecil Torr, p. 38), the expression *ἀμφορεύς διαπεραί*, col. 36, 3, probably means that the two vessels that received the voting discs could be taken to

pieces to ascertain that they were empty before the voting began.

9. When in a *τιμητὸς ἀγών* a second vote was required, the jurors received back their staves and gave up their *σύμβολα*: *ἔπειτα πάλιν τιμῶσιν, ἂν δέη τιμῆσαι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ψηφίζόμενοι, τὸ μὲν σύμβολον ἀποδιδόντες, βακτηρίαν δὲ πάλιν ἀπολαμβάνοντες*, col. 36, 35. In the fifth century B.C. the assessment of damages or penalty was on waxen tablets, on which a long line was drawn if the juror voted for the assessment proposed by the plaintiff or prosecutor, a short line if he voted for that proposed by the defendant or accused: *σκεῖν δικαστικά, σύμβολον, βακτηρία, πινάκιον τιμητικόν, μάλθη ἢ καταλήλιπτο τὸ πινάκιον, ἐγκεντρὶς ἢ εἰλκὸν τὴν γραμμὴν, μακρὰ δ' ἐκαλεῖτο ἢν καταδικάζοντες εἰλκὸν*, Pollux 8, 16. But the words in the preceding quotation, *τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ψηφίζόμενοι*, show that this method was discarded in the fourth century.

10. After casting their second votes, it may be assumed that the jurors again gave up their staves, being *functi officio*, and received back their *sumbola*, being now entitled to their pay.

11. On leaving the court the jurors gave up their *sumbola*, received their pay and recovered their *pinakia* at the pay office of the *κωλακρέται*. These officials seem to have had a pay office in each court, divided into ten compartments, each distributing pay to one of the ten Heliastic divisions. *ἐπειδὴ δ' αὐτοῖς ἡ δεικασμένα τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων, ἀπολαμβάνονσι τὸν μισθὸν ἐν τῷ μέρει οὗ ἔλαχον ἕκαστοι*, col. 37, 5. The *μέρος* refers to the permanent brigade or regiment to which the jurors had been allotted. The regimentation was mentioned in 69, 4 (*νεμένηται*), but the mode of allotment (sortition) was not specified. Here *μέρος* seems to denote the place where that brigade or regiment received its pay. Where was this situated? After stating that the *πινάκια* of the rejected candidates were restored to them by the *Empektai*, and that the boxes, λ, μ, ν, etc., of the selected jurors were taken from each balloting room by servants of each tribe to the several courts, column 33 thus proceeds: *παραδιδόασιν δὲ τοῖς εἰληχόσιν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς δικασταῖς ἐν ἑκάστῳ [δ]ικα[στηρί]ῳ ἀριθμῷ τὰ πινάκια, ἵνα ἐκ τούτων σκοποῦντες ἀποδιδῶσι τὸν μισθόν. γίνεται δὲ πάντα ταῦτα κατὰ δικαστήριον. Οἱ εἰληχότες* are the *κωλακρέται* or whoever were the paymasters of the jurors in the fourth century. Instead of *δικαστηρίῳ ἀριθμῷ*, which is unmeaning, I would suggest that we should read *δικαστικῷ ἀριθμῷ*, assuming that *δικαστικός ἀριθμός* was

a term equivalent to μέρος. This seems not unlikely when we remember that the letters of the alphabet were both eponyms of the Μέρη and symbols of numbers. If the extant specimens of σύμβολα have been rightly identified, each σύμβολον bore upon

it one of the letters A, B, Γ, etc., indicating a Heliastic brigade. The ten compartments of the pay offices may supersede the ten entrances to the law courts suggested in the April (1893) number of this *Review*.

E. POSTE.

THE ORIGIN OF THE CONSTRUCTION οὐ μή.

SINCE the publication of Prof. Goodwin's *Moods and Tenses*, it may be said that his view of the origin of οὐ μή has held possession of the field. At least it has become one of the stock articles of diet, with which the British schoolboy's appetite for grammar is sated. But though it is universally taught, it is by no means universally accepted as a final solution by those who teach it. It would therefore be well to examine the merits and demerits of the theory, now that it is possible to review it, after the lapse of many years has tested its validity.

Οὐ μή sometimes expresses a strong denial, sometimes a prohibition. Prof. Goodwin explains both forms on the same principle, and it must be admitted that any theory which explains them on different principles is *prima facie* very improbable. Accepting this view, οὐ μή καταβήσκει (Ar. *Vesp.* 397) cannot be regarded as a question;¹ indeed the interrogative theory is hardly tenable on any grounds, since the combination of οὐ μή + fut. with the fut. alone in such cases as Eur. *Bacch.* 792, *El.* 383, 982, Ar. *Ran.* 202, is practically fatal to these words forming a question: for these futures are clearly 'jussives,' being equivalent to the imperatives which it appears might be similarly used (Ar. *Nub.* 296, the only instance).² Further we agree with Prof. Goodwin in rejecting Soph. *Aj.* 75 (and other examples *M. T.* § 299), and would add to the list Aesch. *Sept.* 250, Eur. *Hel.* 437, *Hipp.* 498, Ar. *Eccl.* 1145, Plat. *Symp.* 175 B. In all these cases the οὐ in the first clause is not connected with the μή. These instances being rejected, the construction οὐ μή is plainly in our opinion only continued by using μηδέ in the following clause (Ar. *Vesp.* 394).

So far Prof. Goodwin appears to us not

only to have made a clear statement of the facts, but to have established it incontrovertibly. Our criticism of the structure, which he has erected upon this basis, may be divided into two parts. We propose to inquire (1) whether his theory of the direct descent of the Platonic μή + subj. from the Homeric μή + subj. is supported by facts, and (2) whether the prefixing of οὐ to such independent clauses would give the required meaning of strong denial or prohibition.

(1) Prof. Goodwin states that the independent subj. with μή 'is familiar in Homer in expressions of apprehension combined with a desire to avert the object of fear' (p. 392); that 'the real force of the negative was in abeyance' (p. 397); that the same construction 'was in good use in the fifth century B.C.' (p. 393) where it is used 'implying no apprehension' (*ibid.*), and here can be seen 'the transition from Homer's clause of apprehension to Plato's cautious assertion' (p. 292); finally Plato 'restored it to common use as a half-sarcastic form of expressing mildly a disagreeable truth' (p. 293).

To this view we offer three objections:—

(a) We deny that in Homer μή ever loses its prohibitive force.

(b) We deny the possibility of the ordinary form of prohibition passing into a cautious statement in any language.

(c) We assert that all the instances quoted either from fifth century writers or from Plato, retain the prohibitive force of μή or bear obvious traces of a different parentage to that assigned them.

(a) That μή in Homer is a prohibitive particle, and that with it the subj. has the character of an imperative (Monro *H. G.* § 278) requires no demonstration. After examining all the instances given by Prof. Goodwin, Kühner, Weber, and others, I am unable to see that the negative has in any sense lost its proper force,³ though there is

³ This also applies to cases in which it is used with the fut., *H.* x. 330 (Monro *H. G.* § 358, b).

¹ References throughout to Dind. *Poet. Scen.* As far as possible examples other than those given in *M. T.* are quoted.

² To my ear οὐ μή does not even sound like the beginning of an interrogation.

sometimes a difficulty in expressing it in English. 'Apprehension' may be implied, but 'prohibition' or at least 'deprecation' is expressed. Nor is this a mere quibble or hair-splitting about names. There is a fundamental distinction between 'deprecation' and 'apprehension,' because in all languages the negative force in the former is essential and indestructible, while in the latter the negative expressed in the subordinate clause loses its meaning in some languages (e.g. French and Greek). Though Prof. Goodwin says these clauses express 'apprehension combined with a desire to avert,' yet in his article he absolutely disregards the 'desire to avert,' which is essential, and only concerns himself with the 'apprehension,' which is accidental. This is a most grievous error, and one into which only those could fall who regard constructions not as they are, but as they might appear when translated into some other language. I append some examples: *Il.* xxii. 122 *μή μιν ἐγὼ μὲν ἴκωμαι ἰών, κ.τ.λ.* 'I must not come to him, and he not pity me.' *Il.* ii. 195 *μή τι χολωσάμενος ῥέξῃ* 'I would not have him evilly entreat the sons of the Achaeans in his wrath.'

(b) Something may be said further on more general grounds. It is of course true that nearly all prohibitions do carry with them an apprehension of a danger which the speaker anticipates and desires to avert. When I say to my form 'Don't use the aorist middle for the aorist passive,' I have an apprehension (founded on experience) that they will occasionally do so; nevertheless I do not expect to be told that my remark was not a prohibition at all, but merely a cautious attempt at prophesy, equivalent to 'You will perhaps be tempted to use the middle for the passive aorist.' This magnifying of the *implied* apprehension, until it swallows up the prohibition, nay until the *μή* which suggests the apprehension actually swallows itself up or, as Prof. Goodwin happily puts it, 'seems to be in abeyance,' is a freak of language, on whose like we shall hardly look again—or once. It is perfectly incredible that the Greeks, or any other people, could by imperceptible stages have changed 'Thou shalt not steal' into 'I have some suspicions of your honesty,' and this too though all the while they retained the construction in its original sense! Yet Prof. Goodwin is of opinion, or at all events his theory pre-

Note that in *Soph. Aj.* 572, which is often quoted as similar, the fut. really depends on *ἔσται* in l. 567.

supposes, that when a Greek said *μή σκώψῃς* his hearer was left in doubt as to whether this meant 'Don't jest' or 'Perhaps you are jesting' or 'I fear you may jest.'

(c) We have endeavoured to show in the preceding paragraph that a prohibition *could not* pass into a cautious statement; it remains to point out that it *did not* do so. Prof. Goodwin quotes 8 instances earlier than Plato¹ (Weber 97, 130), 34 from Plato himself (Weber 191, where the quotations are given in full) and 1 from Demosthenes (Weber 171) in which 'the speaker expresses fear and desire to avert its object' or makes a simple cautious assertion, in either case the negative being in abeyance. On examination it will be found that these 43 instances may be divided into three classes:—

(1) Those in which *μή* is followed by *οὐ*, 25 cases (20 from Plato).

(2) Those in which the verb is *ῥῆ*, 23 cases (22 from Plato;² 12 of these overlap the preceding).

(3) Those in which *μή* is followed by some other verb, 7 instances, viz. *Eur. Alc.* 315, *H.F.* 1399, *Or.* 776, *Plat. Euthyd.* 272 C, *Symp.* 193 B, *Leg.* 861 E, *Theag.* 122 B.

It is with the third class that we are mainly concerned. In 5 of them the prohibitive force of *μή* is apparent and necessary; they do not differ from the quotations given in *M.T.* § 255 and 259. *H.F.* 1399 *ἀλλ' αἶμα μὴ σοῖς ἐξομόρωμαι πέπλοις* 'I must not wipe off the blood upon thy garments.' *Plato Euthyd.* 272 C *μή οὖν καὶ τοῖν ξένου τις ταῦτ' οὕτω δυνείσῃ* 'Now I should not like the strangers to experience similar treatment' (Jowett). *Symp.* 193 B *μή μοι ὑπολάβῃ Ἐρυξίμαχος κομφιδῶν τὸν λόγον* 'I must beg Eryximachus not to make fun' (Jowett). *Leg.* 861 E *μή τοῖνυν τις... οἴηται* 'I would not have any one suppose' (Jowett). *Theag.* 122 B *μή γὰρ πολλάκις ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ ὑπολαμβάνω, σὺ δὲ ἄλλο, καί περ πόρρω που τῆς συνουσίας αἰσθώμεθα γελοίοι ὄντες* 'Don't let me understand it in one sense and you in another,' etc. The two instances that remain are a little more difficult. However in *Alc.* 315 it is clear that Alcestis is in no condition to make cautious assertions; rather the words contain a passionate appeal (deprecatory force of *μή*) 'Don't let her' (or 'She must not') 'mar thy marriage.' So in *Orestes* 776 *μή*

¹ Dr. Verrall would add *Aesch. Sept.* 201 (183), *ἔνδον δ' οὐσα μὴ βλάβην τιθῇ*, 'at home she is like enough to be in the way.' See note *ad loc.*

² In one of these cases, *Lys.* 219 D, there is another verb *ἐξαπατᾷ* coordinated with *ῥῆ*, but this does not affect the argument.

λάβωσι σ' ἄσμενοι 'Let them not be only too glad to catch thee,' unless with Brunck and Porson we should read $\mu\eta\ \sigma\upsilon$ as in *Troad.* 982, *Rhes.* 115. In any case these two passages are not claimed as cautious assertions. Now observe: it is only in classes 1 and 2 that $\mu\eta$ is found without its negative force, expressing a mild assertion, that is to say, only in cases where $\sigma\upsilon$ is inserted or the verb is η , e.g. *Eur. Rhes.* 115 $\mu\eta\ \sigma\upsilon\ \mu\acute{o}\lambda\eta\varsigma$, *Plato Cratyl.* 425 B $\mu\eta\ \phi\alpha\upsilon\lambda\omicron\nu\ \eta$. This is so remarkable as to require some explanation. There can be no reasonable doubt that this limitation was enforced *in order to prevent any possibility of confusion between this construction and ordinary prohibitions.* Let me repeat. $\mu\eta$ + subj. is only used in this sense in such expressions as were impossible in any other sense: $\mu\eta\ \eta$ cannot mean 'let it not be,' $\mu\eta\ \sigma\upsilon\ \pi\acute{\epsilon}\iota\sigma\eta\varsigma$ cannot mean 'Do not fail to persuade,' therefore they could be (and were) used in the sense of 'perhaps it is so,' 'perhaps you will not persuade.' The two constructions, so far from being closely connected, are most carefully contrasted. Prof. Goodwin on the other hand holds that $\mu\eta\ \sigma\kappa\acute{\omega}\psi\eta\varsigma$ can mean 'perhaps you are jesting.' *Yet he cannot adduce one single instance of $\mu\eta$ (as opposed to $\mu\eta\ \sigma\upsilon$) with the subj. of any verb other than $\epsilon\iota\mu\acute{\iota}$ in this sense.*

To apply these results to $\sigma\upsilon\ \mu\eta$. Prof. Goodwin's whole theory rests on the supposition that if the $\sigma\upsilon$ be removed from expressions with $\sigma\upsilon\ \mu\eta$, a possible Greek construction is left. Let us try. Take *Aesch. Sept.* 281, $\sigma\upsilon\ \mu\eta\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\gamma\eta\varsigma$, remove $\sigma\upsilon$, and we have $\mu\eta\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\gamma\eta\varsigma$. This means 'do not flee' and cannot possibly mean anything else. If it can, where are the examples? Again *Aesch. Sept.* 199 (cf. *Supp.* 228) $\sigma\upsilon\delta\epsilon\ \mu\eta\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\gamma\eta$. What authority has Prof. Goodwin for saying $\mu\eta\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\gamma\eta$ can mean 'perhaps he will flee'? Not one single instance. For he does not himself claim that the instances from Plato and Euripides in class 3 are 'cautious assertions,' but that they are expressions of apprehension. Now let us attempt the converse process. If we put $\sigma\upsilon$ before any of class 1 and 2, we ought, according to Prof. Goodwin, to get a possible Greek construction. Therefore place $\sigma\upsilon$ before an instance of class 1, e.g. *Eur. Troad.* 982 $\mu\eta\ \sigma\upsilon\ \pi\acute{\epsilon}\iota\sigma\eta\varsigma$. The result is $\sigma\upsilon\ \mu\eta\ \sigma\upsilon\ \pi\acute{\epsilon}\iota\sigma\eta\varsigma$. The idiom is one of which the student need not be ashamed to confess his ignorance, seeing that it is unknown to the Greeks themselves. Or again from class 2 take e.g. *Gorg.* 462 E,

and prefix $\sigma\upsilon$; we obtain $\sigma\upsilon\ \mu\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\rho\omicron\upsilon\kappa\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\ \eta\ \tau\acute{o}\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\varsigma\ \epsilon\iota\pi\acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu$. Here too the Greek world appears to have conspired against our grammatical Athanasius; for there is no single instance of $\sigma\upsilon\ \mu\eta$ followed by η , and this can hardly be accidental, since the examples of $\sigma\upsilon\ \mu\eta$ are very numerous; indeed I have found 117 instances¹ not later than Demosthenes. The whole of the preceding criticism may be summed up in a sentence. Prof. Goodwin asserts that $\sigma\upsilon\ \mu\eta$ is the negative of $\mu\eta$ in cautious assertions; yet if any one of the existing instances of cautious statements be negated by prefixing $\sigma\upsilon$, or if any one of the existing instances of $\sigma\upsilon\ \mu\eta$ be made affirmative by the omission of $\sigma\upsilon$, a construction is produced, in support of which he cannot quote one solitary example. Those who would dwell beneath the shadow of this theory may be congratulated upon the fact that at least they will not be in danger of stumbling over its roots.

(2) The second part of our criticism can be more briefly set forth. Supposing that $\mu\eta$ with the subj. of any verb did express a mild affirmation, what would be the meaning of the sentence, if $\sigma\upsilon$ were prefixed? We are warned (*M.T.* p. 394 note) that the $\sigma\upsilon$ is not to negative the verb, but the whole expression. What then is the negative of a mild and cautious assertion? There are two possible answers. It is a strong and incautious assertion, or a mild and cautious denial. This requires no demonstration. But we are told that the real negative is a strong denial. I have no wish to parody Prof. Goodwin's argument, but the application of his logical method to a parallel case will perhaps best prove its fallaciousness. His argument runs as follows: 'Such expressions' (viz. $\mu\eta$ + subj.) 'are practically cautious affirmative statements' (p. 391), they 'always retain the implication that the fact thus stated is an object of apprehension to some one' (*ibid.*); by the insertion of $\sigma\upsilon$ the expression 'would come into the language in the sense of a denial of this apprehension' (p. 394), that is to say, the $\sigma\upsilon$ negatives the apprehension; and 'between negating a suspicion and suspecting a negative there is all the difference in the world' (p. 394 note). Apply the same process to the expression $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\ \nu\kappa\eta\gamma\eta\rho\iota\alpha$. $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\ \nu\kappa\eta\gamma\eta\rho\iota\alpha$ is an affirmation, 'he wins the prize': the middle voice however has the implication that the fact

¹ The authors include *Aesch.*, *Soph.*, *Eur.*, *Aristoph.*, *Herod.*, *Thucyd.*, *Xen.*, *Plato*, *Aeschin.*, *Demosth.*, *Isaeus*.

thus stated is an object of interest to the subject: the insertion of an *οὐ* would come into the language in the sense of a denial of the interest of the subject in the action: it would therefore mean 'he wins the prize for some one else,' which is quite different from not winning it at all. The absurdity is apparent, the cause in each case is the same. The subjective side, the implication that 'the fact is an object of apprehension' (or interest) 'to some one' is brought into undue prominence, it throws the rest of the sentence into the background; it is then negatived, and all is complete,—if only it were possible. But it is not possible; it is not conceivable that *οὐ* could negative the 'apprehension' in this way, unless some word of apprehension be mentally supplied, or rather, unless some word of apprehension had actually been employed at some stage in the development of this construction.

We will conclude by summarizing what appears to us the true history of these constructions. The ordinary independent prohibition (*μή*+subj.) became associated with and afterwards subordinated to verbs of fearing,¹ though of course the independent use was still retained. The process is already complete in Homer (*M.T.* 362, 363, Monro *H.G.* 281 (2)). When used in dependence on a verb of fearing (and here only), the *μή* loses its negative force. *Il.* xi. 470 *δεῖδω μή πάθῃσι τι* 'I fear he will come to grief.' In colloquial language this dependent clause began to be used independently.² But the traces of its previous dependence remain (1) in meaning, it expresses apprehension and not prohibition, (2) in form, its use is limited to those cases

in which there can be no confusion with the original independent prohibition, *i.e.* it is confined to *μή ᾗ* or *μή οὐ*,³ that is to say, forms which are possible after verbs of fearing, but impossible in prohibitions.

The construction with *οὐ μή* has a somewhat similar history, whether earlier, or later, or synchronous.⁴ The two are perfectly distinct, neither presupposes the other. However the *οὐ* must have been added when the verb of fearing was actually expressed, or at least mentally supplied; otherwise *οὐ μή ληφθῶ* could not bear the meaning it does. We would call attention to three points. (1) The limitations observed in the use of *μή*+subj. are of course not applicable here. (2) While *μή*+subj. was always colloquial, *οὐ μή* has a more dignified turn, being used in the stately language of prophecy: *Soph. Phil.* 610, *Eur. Phoen.* 1585, *I.T.* 18. (3) *οὐ μή* is far more common than the simple *μή*. This is no doubt due to the greater demand for imperatival forms than for cautious or semi-ironical expressions. For the rest of the development we return to Prof. Goodwin's guidance. *Οὐ μή ληφθῇς* = 'there is no fear that you will be caught' and so 'assuredly you will not be caught'; similarly the English slang 'No fear' means 'Certainly not.' The future was then substituted, as was also the case when words of fearing were actually expressed (*M.T.* § 367). Lastly with the 2nd person this (and also *οὐ μή*+subj.) came to be used as a strong prohibition, 'You shan't come down' being equivalent to 'I'll take good care you don't' or simply 'You are not to come down.'

C. D. CHAMBERS.

¹ I have assumed that the *μή* after verbs of fearing is the prohibitive not the interrogative *μή* of *M.T.* 369, 376, to which I would add for purposes of comparison *Ar. Lys.* 326.

² Compare the construction '*ὅπως ἀνὴρ ἔσει*,' *Eur. Cycl.* 595, where the dependent conjunction *ὅπως* clearly shows that this imperatival expression also went through a stage of subordination before it was used independently.

³ If I apprehend Prof. Goodwin's meaning *M.T.* § 263, he himself regards *μή οὐ* as necessarily dependent, or at least does not believe in the existence of any independent instance.

⁴ If in *Aesch. Ag.* 1640 (1618) *μή* should be read (*v.l. μοι, μήν*), it was probably earlier, since it is there already stereotyped.

HESYCHIANA.

1.

'Α θά μ α ν τ α' τὸν θυόμενον νεφέλαις.

Read τὸν θυόμενον, Νεφέλαις, or, <ἐν> Νεφέλαις: *Arist. Nub.* 258

ὥσπερ με τὸν 'Αθάμανθ' ὅπως μὴ θύσεται.

2.

'Α λ ο ῶ ν' πλανῶν καὶ τύπτων.

The gloss is from *Arist. Thesm.* 2, as the existing 'scholia' show.

ἀπολεί μ' ἀλοῶν ἀνθρωπος ἐξ ἐωθινοῦ.

3.

Ἀντιβολῶ παρακαλῶ.

The gloss is from Arist. *Eq.* 142, where the same glossema is given among the existing 'scholia.'

εἴπ' ἀντιβολῶ τίς ἐστίν.

4.

Ἀρχέλας τὸν ἐπιστάτην τοῦ Λυκείου παρὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὕτως ὠνόμασεν ἔνιοι δὲ τὸν ἀρχοντα τοῦ ἐλαίου θέλουνσιν ἀκούειν.

Read τοῦ ἐλεοῦ. Some grammarians held that the word was used in *Eq.* 164 because the ἀλλαντοπόωλης came on the stage with his ἐλεός or μαγειρικὴ τράπεζα.

5.

Γράμματα· τὰ γεγραμμένα, καὶ συλλαβαί. καὶ τὰ ζωγραφήματα. καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς δικαστικαῖς ψήφοις.

Read τὰ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ψηφίσματα—the numbers (i.e. numerals) on the Courts at Athens.

6.

δεῖν· δεσμεύειν. καὶ δέον καὶ δέσιν καὶ τὸ πνεῖν φέρειν εὐρίσκειν καὶ στρέφειν Κύπριοι.

The τὸ πνεῖν is an explanation of βδεῖν. In late Greek πνεῖν has often the sense of βδεῖν.

7.

κέλυφος· ὁστέον λεπτόν. κυρίως δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς ὀπώρας καὶ τῶν δένδρων.

Read ὄστρακον. λέπυρον· κυρίως κ.τ.λ.

8.

κήρυγμα· ἀχρεῖον. ἀσθενές.

The explanation of this gloss is to be found in the 'scholia' to Arist. *Vesp.* 757, which show that ΠΑΡΕCΩC-ΚΙΕΡΑΜΑΤΟΝΗΡΑΚΛΕΑ had been misread πάρες ὡς κηρία μὰ τὸν Ἡρακλέα, the ὡς κηρία being thought to mean ὡς ἀσθενής. Whether the κιεραμα had been corrupted still further before it entered the Lexicon is uncertain.

9.

Λαύρα· ῥύμη δι' ἧς ὁ λαὸς εἰσέρχεται. ἡ φλόξ. οἱ δὲ τόπους πρὸς ὑποχώρησιν ἀναιμένους. οἱ δὲ ἀμφοδα. οἱ δὲ στενωπούς. καὶ δίοδοι.

Read:

Λαύρα· ῥύμη δι' ἧς ὁ λαὸς ῥεῖ καὶ ἔρχεται. αὐλαξ.

Λαύρας· τόπους πρὸς ὑποχώρησιν ἀναιμένους, κ.τ.λ.

The first glossema of Λαύρα is etymological. In late Greek αὐλαξ seems to have the sense of a vaulted passage (cp. Hesych. Αὐλακας· κοίλους τόπους), a meaning approaching nearly to that of a cloister or monastery. The second gloss is from Arist. *Pass* 99. At any rate the first glossema refers to that passage.

10.

νωδός· ὁ ὀδόντας οὐκ ἔχων. [καὶ ἐννεός. κωφός. μὴ λαλῶν.]

The bracketed words do not belong to νωδός. They have been wrongly copied from the adscripts to some text of Arist. *Plut.* 266, in which the reading was

ῥυπῶντα κωφὸν ἄθλιον ῥυσὸν μαδῶντα νωδόν.

That κωφόν was read for κνφόν there is plain from the existing 'scholia,' where οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄφωνον should be corrected into οὐ γράφειν δεῖ [κωφόν] ἄφωνον.

11.

ὁδωδὴ· ὁσμή.

The variant ὁδωδὴ for ἐδωδὴ is implied in the 'scholia' to Arist. *Pass* 29.

12.

ὁλκάς· πλοῖον. ναὺς φορτηγός. ἀηδών. εἰρήνη. δυνατάς.

Read:

ὁλκάς· πλοῖον. ναὺς φορτηγός [Πίνδαρος] ὠδαῖς. [Ἀριστοφάνης] Εἰρήνη.

ὁλκάς· δυνατάς.

In the 'scholia' to the passage of Pindar (*Nem.* 5, 3) we find ὁλκάς εἶδος φορτηγοῦ πλοῖον ἄκατος δὲ πλοῖον βραχυτάτον. The reference to the *Peace* is line 37. The conjecture Εἰρήνη was made by M. Meibom (1671).

13.

πιτύλους· οἱ ἀλειπταὶ τὰς ἐν περιόδῳ καταβολὰς τῶν πληγῶν· οἱ δὲ ναυτικοὶ τὸ πρὸς κέλυσμα ἐλάσαι.

Read πληγῶν· πιτυλεῦσαι δὲ οἱ ναυτικοὶ κ.τ.λ. Cp. the 'scholia' to Arist. *Vesp.* 678.

14.

χλωρόν· ἰγρόν. δεινόν. χαλεπόν.

Read δειλόν. Cp. 'scholia' to Arist. *Pl.* 204.

Also χαροπόν, i.e. blue, in lieu of χαλεπόν.

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NOTE ON CIC. *DE FIN.* ii. 56.

CICERO *De Finibus* ii. § 56: *uester sapiens, magno aliquo emolumento commotus cum causa, si opus erit, dimicabit.* The words *cum causa* have generally been assumed to be corrupt. Some inferior MSS. give *animi causa*, but, as Madvig remarks *animi* has arisen from the contraction for *cum*, misunderstood. According to Iwan Mueller, the Erlangen MS. has *ni causa*, which has apparently come from *ai* (= *animi*) *causa*. Many have been the emendations of the suspected phrase, but the palm for ingenuity can never be wrested from Kraffert, who conjectured *cum caupa*, after having described the passage as a 'berichtigte crux interpretum'! Some other corrections are *cum amico* or *amica* (Madvig); *cum Medusa* (M. Haupt); *amicum suum necabit* (Koch and Morel). The last-named

reading is preferred by C. F. W. Mueller to that of Madvig, as 'non ueri similis, sed aptius.' I venture to hold that the words *cum causa* are sound, and afford a satisfactory meaning. The Epicurean philosopher will face danger, not for glory, but for a sufficiently important material advantage. He will then fight 'for good reason,' or 'not without reason' (*cum causa*), in accordance with his philosophical principles. It is easy to find parallels to the employment of the words *cum causa*, e.g. *Ad Quint. Fr.* 1, 2, 2 scio te fecisse *cum causa*; *De Orat.* 2, 247; *Ad Herenn.* 2, 5 and 45; *Varro de re rust.* 1, 17, 4 and 3, 16, 7. Tacitus uses *causa* alone, with the same signification (*Ann.* 13, 37). Similarly *cum ratione* is employed; and equivalent phrases are *non sine causa* and *non sine ratione*.

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NOTE ON PLAUTUS, *TRUCULENTUS* 252.

SCHOELL reads this verse thus:

Qui ubi quamque nostrum prope videt hasce
aedis adgredi.

A reads *NOSTRARUM VIDET PROPE* with all the manuscripts; BCD read *hac si* which A omits altogether; A reads *AEBIS* and *ADGREDIRI*, B reads *edis*, C *aedis*, D *edis*; B reads *adgredias*, CD *agredias*. The old editions, not having A, constructed a text on perfectly sound principles of text criticism, reading:—

Qui ubi quamque nostrarum videt prope hac
si aedis agredias,—

Schoell's reading deviates from A in *nostrum* for *nostrarum*, in inverting *videt prope*, in reading *hasce* where A has nothing, and in reading *aedis*. A itself is undoubtedly at fault in omitting a word or words before *aedis*, and misspells in *aebis*. These two faults render A's reading *adgrediri* liable to suspicion. It is entirely improbable that any archetypal *nostrum* would have become *nostrarum*, or any *hasce* have become *hac si* in all the manuscripts but A.

Why strain at the reading of the older editors? Priscian tells us of active forms of *adgredi* in Naevius, and in general, in

the early period, the deponents show sporadic active forms. Now if the difficulty of an active form be waived, a syntactical difficulty remains, viz. that *quamque nostrarum*, an indefinite 3rd person, is repeated in the ideal 2nd person implicit in *adgredias*. This makes the verse run something like this: 'But when he sees any of our <girls> near here (hereabouts, *prope hac*), if you (one) approach the house,' etc. For this rendering of *prope hac* I compare *prope hic* in *Rud.* 229, and *Ter. Ad.* 453; *prope hāc* differs from *prope hic* by referring to the route of approach (thus meaning something like 'on the way hard by'), rather than to mere proximity, and is proleptic for *si—adgredias*.

Fatal to the reading of Schoell is the fact that A omits any correspondent of his *hasce* while reading *adgrediri*. Assuming that *hac si—adgredias* stood in the archetype, the condition of A is just what we should expect of a careful grammatical corrector who was offended by the free use of the 2nd pers. *adgredias* referring to *quamque nostrarum*; he therefore corrected to the infin. *adgrediri*, and omitted [*hac*] *si* to secure syntactical correctness, his objection to *hāc* probably being that he did not understand its relation to *prope*.

In view of these points I think we must prefer the traditional reading to Schoell's, and in general be on our guard against the great triumvirate edition which seems to me not infrequently (cf. the author, *Am. Jr.*

Phil. xv. 362 sq.), to proceed not *ad fidem codicum* but *ad hypothesin sive metricam sive grammaticam editorum*.

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NOTE ON PLATO'S *THEAETETUS* 171d.

In this passage Socrates is afraid that Protagoras may convict him of some error. Evidently making use of figurative language he says of him :—

καὶ εἰ αὐτίκα ἐντεῖθεν ἀνακύψει μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἐμέ τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα, καταδὺς ἂν οἴχοιτο ἀποτρέχων.

Steinhart conjectured that the picture presented here was that of an actor coming up and descending again by Charon's steps in the theatre. This view is also favoured by Wohlrab in the last edition of Stallbaum's Plato and is noticed without comment by Professor Campbell in his *Theaetetus*.

It seems more probable that we have here the recurrence of an intermittent metaphor that is previously found at 161c and 167b. If this is so, it represents Protagoras not as an actor, but as a *frog*. Socrates is turning back on him words which Protagoras had used before. For in 161c it is said of Protagoras: 'in the beginning of his Essay on Truth...he showed that we

honoured him like a god for his wisdom; but he happened to be not better in intellect than a [frog] tadpole.' At 167b he says in explanation of his former position: 'I call some things better than others but not more true; and wise men I am far from calling frogs.' Then, applying the figure to its author, Socrates in 171d represents him as raising his head out of the water just long enough to confute them and then diving again.

'Ανακύψας is thus used several times in *Phaedo* 109d and e of popping up out of the sea like a fish; and frogs are also mentioned in the immediate neighbourhood of this passage (109b) as if they formed a related image. The same verb is also used in the *Phaedrus* 249c of emerging from the interior sphere into the clear light of heaven. But it will be difficult to find any place in Plato where its meaning corresponds to the Müller-Steinhart translation 'aus der Erde sich erhebe'; or where Charon's steps are mentioned.

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NOTES ON HORACE.

Odes i. 3, 21—24:

Neququam deus abscidit
Prudens oceano dissociabili
Terras, si tamen impiae
Non tangenda rates *transiliunt vada*.

With *transiliunt*, which, as Ritter remarks (and Wickham after him), is expressive of *levitas et impudentia*, we may compare Horace himself, *Odes* ii. 18, 23—26:

Quid quod usque proximos
Revellis agri terminos et ultra
Limites clientium
Salis avarus?

See also Ovid *Met.* i. 134 where in speaking of the degeneration of the third age, the age of bronze, Ovid proceeds in words which seem in part reminiscent of Horace:

Vela dabant ventis, nec adhuc bene noverat
illos
Navita, quaque diu steterant in montibus
altis,
Fluctibus ignotis *insultavere* carinae.

The comment in the Siebelis-Polle school edition is "tanzten darauf," die Gefahr verachtend."

Odes i. 12, 11—12:
(Orphea) blandum et auritas fidibus canoris
ducere quercus.

On *auritas* Mr. Page remarks: 'Most commentators think the word unworthy of comment: it seems to me difficult.' Yet an ample commentary upon the word may be found in Horace himself at Odes i. 24, 13—14:

Quid si Threicio blandius Orphea
Auditam moderere arboribus fidem,

a passage, by the way, which is not cited in this connection by Orelli, Schütz, Smith, or Kiessling. Surely, if the poet may speak of the lyre 'as heard by the trees,' he may venture to describe the trees themselves as 'eared.' Hence there is no real difficulty in *auritas*. Again, we have a parallel to Horace's use of the word in the (non-Plautine) Prologue to the *Asinaria* vs. 4:

Face nunciam tu, praeco, omnem auritum
poplum,
which, after I had myself noted it in my reading of that play, I found recorded by Orelli. Schütz compares Plaut. *Mil. Glor.* 608, where Palaestrio before conferring with Pleusicles and Periplecomenos, takes the precaution to see that the coast is clear, remarking:

Sed speculabor, ne quis aut hinc aut ab
laeva aut dextera
Nostro consilio venator adsit cum *auritis*
plagis.

This passage is a complete parallel to that in Horace as illustrating the application of the word to a non-sentient object.

On the other hand it should be noted with Kiessling that the use of *auritas* here is in keeping with the familiar personification which endowed the trees with hair (*coma*, κόμη) and heads (cf. *Iliad* 12, 132 δρῦες ὑψικάρηντοι). Finally for the sake of completeness note (with Schütz) *muros auritos*, Sid. *Carm.* 16, 4 and (with Kiessling) Manil. v. 332 et sensus scopulis et silvis addidit aures.

Satires i. 1, 61—62:
At bona pars hominum decepta cupidine
falso
'Nil satis est' inquit 'quia tanti quantum
habeas sis.'

To the references usually given on verse 62, as well as on Juvenal iii. 143, add Pliny *Epist.* i. 14, 9: Nescio an adiciam esse patri eius amplas facultates. Nam cum imaginor vos quibus quaerimus generum, silendum de facultatibus puto: cum publicos mores atque etiam leges civitatis intueor, quae vel in primis census hominum spectandos arbitrantur, ne id quidem praetereundum videtur.

Satires ii. 1, 30:

Ille velut fidis arcana sodalibus olim
Credebat libris. . . .

Compare Pliny *Epp.* i. 9, 5 where he says of the life at his Laurentine villa, nulla spe, nullo timore sollicitor, nullis rumoribus inquietor: *mecum tantum et cum libellis loquor*.

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NOTE ON HORACE *CARM.* II. 12, 14.

Cur non sub alta vel platano vel hac
Pinu iacentes sic temere et rosa
Canos odorati capillos,
Dum licet, Assyriaque nardo
Potamus uncti?

DR. WICKHAM's note is: '*sic* = οὔτως, "as we are," *temere* = εἰκῇ, "with no preparation."' Mr. Page's note is: 'carelessly just as we are. Cf. μᾶψ οὕτω and οὕτως εἰκῇ. For the use of *sic* cf. Ovid, *Fasti* 1, 421 *sicut erat*.' Lewis and Short give a

similar explanation. Munro in his note on *Lucr.* v. 970 has left it doubtful whether in this place he took *sic* as = *sicut erat* or = *negligenter*.

I think there are good reasons for explaining *sic* differently.

(1) If *sic* equals *sicut erat* or *negligenter* then *temere* is tautological.

(2) I submit that *sic* is used here exactly as in the following places: Plaut. *Rud.* 422 *non licet te sic placidule bellam belle tangere*. id. ib. 1261 *an sic potius placidule (sc.*

eam). Amph. 117 *processi sic cum servili schema*. Ter. Phorm. 145 *quid rei gerit?* G. *sic tenuit*. id. Eun. 601 *limis specto sic per flabellum clanculum*. Cic. Flacc. 66 *sic summissa voce agam*. Sen. Hipp. 394 *sic temere iactae colla perfundunt comas*. In every one of these passages (including the last, as is clear from the context) *sic* is = *hoc modo*, the *modus* being indicated by a gesture or intonation of the voice, the meaning being further and more clearly indicated by the adverb or adverbial expression which follows.

(3) *Hac* immediately preceding and the vividness of the words which follow, *Quis restinguet* etc., *Quis eliciet*, point to the use as being *δακτικῶς*. For the realistic language cf. Ode i. 27. In Ter. Eun. 595 *cape hoc flabellum, ventulum huic sic facito*, we have a good parallel for the juxtaposition of *sic* and *hic*.

I therefore suggest that *sic temere* ought to be translated 'like this, at our ease,' or 'like this, carelessly.'

J. STANLEY.

A PHRASE OF A BOEOTIAN POET.

In *Misopogon* p. 477, l. 4 *sqq.* ed. Hertl. (= Spanh. 369 B), Julian, speaking of the price of corn, quotes a proverbial expression from a Boeotian (presumably Hesiodic) poet:

εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτα μέτρα θέρουσ' ἦν παρ' ἡμῖν τοῦ νομίσματος τί προσδοκᾷν ἔδει τηνικαῦτα, ἡνίκα, φησὶν ὁ Βουώτιος ποιητής, χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι τὸν λιμὸν ἐπὶ τῷ δράγματι;

This is the reading of V(ossianus). Other MSS. have *δράγματι*, *δράματι*. The vulgate is *ἐπὶ δώματι*, on which Reiske has this note: *ea anni tempestate quum desider-*

ium est domi propter frigus, exclusis quarendi alimenti ergo excursionibus. The meaning clearly is: Hunger is a hard visitor to entertain in winter, but *δώματι* is not likely to have been thus corrupted. I suggest that we should restore *ἐπὶ τῷ φράγματι*, the original line perhaps ended in *χαλεπὸν δ' ἐπὶ φράγματι λιμός*.

Limos is imagined to be prowling at the enclosure of the farmyard; *φράγμα* = *ἐρκος* *αὐλῆς*.

J. B. BURY.

NOTE ON SOPH. TRACH. 660.

"Ὅθεν μόλοι πανάμερος.

MR. VERRALL's interesting treatment of this passage in the March number of the *Classical Review* suggests to me the publication of my own view of the true reading. It is so simple that I feel sure it must have been anticipated, yet I cannot find that it has been. It is to preserve *πανάμερος* of the

MSS., but to take it from *ἡμερος* not from *ἡμέρα*. The formation is quite right; cf. *πανάθλιος* and scores of other adjectives. The meaning, 'all-peaceful' after war's alarms, is far better than that given by the so-called emendation *πανίμερος*. No sense can be extorted from *πανάμερος* if derived from *ἡμέρα*.

R. Y. TYRRELL.

'BASSAREUS.'

I OMITTED in my note on Bassareus to quote, in addition to Apollo Smintheus and Apollo Lyceus, Apollo Parnopius at Athens to whom (Pausanias i. 24, 8) a bronze statue made by Pheidias was erected in consequence of his promise to drive away a plague of locusts (*πάροντες*). My friend Mr. J. G. Frazer out of his boundless stores of learning has pointed out to me a passage from Strabo (613) which shows the frequency of deities being named after some

pest, which injured vines and other crops. It runs thus:—

καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν παρνόπων, οὓς οἱ Οἰταῖοι κόροντας λέγουσι, κορνοπίονα τιμᾶσθαι παρ' ἐκείνοις Ἡρακλῆα ἀπαλλαγῆς ἀκριδῶν χάριν ἱποκτόνον δὲ παρ' Ἐρυνθραίους—ὅτι φθαρτικός τῶν ἀμπελοφάγων ἱπῶν.—Ῥόδιοι δὲ ἐρυνθιβίου Ἀπόλλωνος ἔχουσιν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἱερόν, τὴν ἐρυνσίβην καλοῦντες ἐρυνθίβην. παρ' Αἰολεῖσι δὲ—θυσία συντελεῖται παρνοπίωνι Ἀπόλλωνι.

WILLIAM RIDGEWAY.

HAVET'S FABLES OF PHAEDER.

Phaedri Augusti liberti Fabulae Aesopiae.
Recensuit LUDOVICUS HAVET. Paris.
1895. Fr. 7.50.

THE facsimile of the original codex of Phaedrus' (or, as M. Havet writes, Phaedrus's) *Fables*, from which Pithou first published them in 1596, and which is now in the library of the Marquis de Rosanbo—a facsimile beautifully executed, and most carefully edited by M. Ulysse Robert—has been before the public nearly two years. The fine character of its writing, which belongs to the tenth century, and the palaeographical interest attaching to a MS. which, since the destruction by fire of the codex of Rheims in 1774, is the only complete preserver of the undisputed remains of the fabulist (for in spite of Havet and a multitude of critics the Perottine fables are not yet proved to be by Phaedrus), the jealousy with which the MS. has been guarded by its possessors since Pithou's time, the rarity now-a-days of Berger de Xivrey's transcript of it published in 1830, the interest in Phaedrus newly roused by the recent researches of Hervieux, extending as these do to a full conspectus of the various prose versions and poetical transmutations made in the Middle Ages—all combine to make a new edition opportune if not necessary. And it is right that this should be French. We are separated by the interval of just 300 years from the date of Pithou's editio princeps: there is a seaminess in the fact that the edition which opens the fourth century since then is by a Frenchman.

M. Havet gives a list of the critics who have published or corrected the text of the *Fables* (pp. x.—xii.). Few scholars are aware how vast a number of emendations have been propounded; Havet mentions a great many, including not a few by Bentley. He himself has added a very considerable number to the list. Most of these are based upon metrical considerations drawn from a minute study of Phaedrus' iambics. It is obvious that Havet is here following in the steps of Lucian Müller, who has laid down a more or less precise code on which Phaedrus constructed his verse. Far however from being a slavish follower, Havet calls in question many of his master's assertions. The Essay on Phaedrus' metric extends to sixty-four pages (147—211) and

is very interesting reading to any one who cares to trace the niceties of Latin metre as elicited by modern criticism, and to see how strange an approximation this point of metre has made between the simple verses of Phaedrus and the elaborately constructed senarii of the tragedian Seneca.

Large as is Havet's book (295 pages), it contains no commentary, which however may perhaps be reserved for another volume. I think there is enough in the diction, occasionally even in the explanation of the *Fables*, which would make such an additional volume welcome. We are, besides, living in a period when the subject of fables is awaking new interest; witness the monumental labours of Hervieux on Phaedrus and Avianus, my own edition of *Avianus* (1887), Rutherford's *Babrius*, and the recent discoveries of some of Babrius' *Fables* on wax tablets, a discovery which has already determined Prof. Crusius to undertake a new critical edition.

One of the most important points on which Havet departs from the MSS. and accepted opinion is as to the unity of the Prologue to Book iii. This prologue consists of sixty-three verses addressed to Eutychus. Havet finds in them *two* separate poems, 1—32 a Prologue to Book iii., in which Eutychus is called a man of business, too much occupied to have leisure for reading, especially *uiles nenias* such as fables, and is then told he must change his habits if he wishes to enter the threshold of the Muses; Phaedrus himself had found only tardy recognition among his brother poets: how can Eutychus expect to understand him, absorbed as he is in a thousand occupations, and never resting to read or think? Still, come what may, as Sinon says in the *Aeneid*,—Phaedrus has made up his mind to write a third book of fables and to dedicate it to Eutychus, whether he will read it or not. These verses are followed in *P R* (the codex *Pithoeanus* and *Remensis*) without any break in the continuity by 31 verses in which the origin of fables is discussed and attributed to the servile spirit produced by despotism, which thus only could find a safe vent for indignant feeling. Phaedrus had followed in Aesop's track, widening his narrow path into a broad way, and inventing much of his own. In doing this he had incurred the active hostility of Seianus, who was at once accuser, witness,

and judge. Against a man so powerful he dares not plead guilty; he will only say generally that his purpose in writing fables is not to vilify individuals, but to exhibit human life and character. Aesop the Phrygian, Anacharsis the Scythian, had done so before him: Phaedrus is almost a Greek, the Thracian compatriot of Orpheus and Linus, who were sprung from the gods. Let envy be silent: and do *you* judge my merits with candour. In these 31 verses Havet considers we have the *Epilogue* to Book ii., the person addressed in the last two of them being *not* Eutyclus but some more learned reader. The beginning of this epilogue Havet finds in the eight verses, *Si nostrum studium ad aures pervenit tuas to Donec fortunam criminis pudeat sui*, which form the finish of the last poem in Book ii. An epilogue of thirty-nine verses (31 + 8) in all is thus secured.

I confess I am not convinced that Havet is right in this somewhat arbitrary dissection of what the MSS. give as one continuous Prologue to Book iii. It does not seem that the objections which he raises have occurred to the earlier editors, not to Pithou, Rigault, Scheffer, Gronov, Bentley, or Hare. It is, however, a theory which is interesting in itself, and may help to revive discussion on the MSS. of the *Fables*. Havet goes on to connect with it a theory of the archetype. Two leaves must have changed places, one containing the thirty-two verses of the Prologue to Book iii., and a heading, the other the thirty-one verses of the Epilogue to ii. Between both a space must be taken into the account which may be reckoned at about four verses. Then $32 + 1 (+ 1)$, $31 (+ 3) = 34$ verses in each leaf; 34 then must be the sum in the *other* leaves of our supposed archetype. This archetype Havet calls X: behind it is an earlier of thirty verses in each leaf: this is called Y: and this again goes back to a still earlier Z. Those who possess Ulysse Robert's facsimile of P will be better able to judge of this archetypal theory than I, who can only see the facsimile in libraries: but we must not forget that it rests on *many* assumptions, and that the fundamental point on which it is based, the separation of Prologue iii. into two distinct portions, is itself purely hypothetical.

It must not be supposed that questionable points like these constitute more than a small portion of Havet's volume. Its merits are of a far more solid, unassailable character. To mention some of them. The

reader will find here the very things done for him which he most looks for, and in an orderly and methodical way. It is of some importance in constituting the text of Phaedrus to have before one the earliest of the prose versions, that of Ademar, of the Anonymus Wissemburgensis, and Romulus. The task of hunting for these in the voluminous collection of Hervieux is not small. Havet gives the references to each of them with the page in Hervieux at the outset of each fable.

Secondly, the readings of all the MSS. are cited with the most minute exactitude; and where there is a doubt, as in the lost *Remensis*, the different reports are stated. In this respect the new edition is a great advance on all previous ones, not excepting that of L. Müller.

Thirdly, such corrections of the MSS. as are admitted in the text are distinguished by italics, so that the reader is at once aware whether a word or combination has the authority of MSS. to support it or not.

Fourthly, Greek parallels are cited when they help, as they often do, to clear up a doubt. The same may be said of illustrative inscriptions (see Havet on iii. 8) and of parallel uses of words, where their rarity or strangeness has induced former editors to believe them wrong, e.g. *limasset*, iii. 10, 49.

Fifthly, the large number of emendations quoted throws much light on this much-debated point, and proves satisfactorily that the best corrections are not always ascribable to the most celebrated names. For instance, Heinsius, to judge by the samples quoted, has done little or nothing for Phaedrus: Rigault a great deal: yet no one would compare Rigault as a scholar with Heinsius. On this point, it is worth while to mention as a useful mine of information the variorum edition of Valpy, which seems not to have been used by Havet.

The new editor himself contributes much of new, often of plausible, correction. But, unless I am mistaken, his study of L. Müller's edition has had upon him an effect which is only partially desirable. On the one hand, it has opened his eyes, as it cannot fail to do with all attentive students of metre, to the care, not to say precision, with which Phaedrus constructs his iambs; on the other, it seems to have led him, in his anxiety to avoid metrical pitfalls, to suspect corruption where it need not exist. Thus in the section *de interpunctione*, Havet lays down as a principle, that a full or

strong pause should not occur in the middle of a hemistich: accordingly finding in PR

Non semper ea sunt quae videntur despici
(despiciit, R as reported by Dom Vincent)
Frons prima multos.

he rejects Pithou's correction *despiciit*, hitherto universally accepted, changes *despici* to *dispici*, then imagines a lost verse ending with *despiciit*, alleging in his note on the passage 'rarissime collocatur apud Phaedrum interpunctio post semipedem nonum' (videntur: despiciit). Yet he himself cites three instances on p. 155, and there are others. Havet seems here guilty of the very thing he urges against L. Müller, the wish, namely, to convert a commonly observed principle into a rigid law. Take this other instance, which occurs almost at the beginning of the collection. MSS. give as follows:—

Cum tristem servitutem flerent Attici
Non quia crudelis ille sed quoniam grauis
Omnino insuetis onus et coepissent queri.

Havet places *Non quia...Omnino insuetis* in a parenthesis, constructing *onus* with the following words *et c. queri*, because to break up the verse into two disconnected halves by punctuating after *onus* is against the metrical laws observed by Phaedrus. The ordinary reading is *grauet*, the highly probable emendation of Tollius, and this appears to me to agree far better with *quoniam*, which is unnecessary unless it introduces a new and distinct subject like *onus*.

Olim quas uellent esse in tutela sua
Diui legerunt arbores. Quercus Ioui
Et myrtus Veneri placuit.

Havet changes *Diui* to *Dii ut*, mainly on the ground that a sudden full pause at the end of the fourth foot is against Phaedrus' usage, but also because *Diui* is not here in antithesis to *men*, as it usually is. The latter objection I feel; but the former is arbitrary; and the correction *Dii ut* seems impossible; if elided, *dei* (which Havet, p. 68, only offers as an alternative) would be preferable: but such an elision even of *dei* (plural) would be in itself suspicious. Possibly Phaedrus wrote *superi* or *Di sibi*.

In marked opposition to his scruples about the pause, is Havet's boldness in proposing two emendations in which *hiatus* is admitted. iv. 1, 1 is thus given in P

Mustela cum annis et senecta debilis.
NO. LXXXVI. VOL. X.

Havet writes

Mustela cum *anus* ex senecta debilis

introducing a very violent hiatus (of which there is no example in the *Fables*) and as a consequence altering *et* to *ex*. The second is in the Perottine collection, viii. 20, 21

enimuero eici

Ut *rē* in atroci Magnas stomachans imperat

where the two MSS. in which the fable is preserved give *ut in re a.*, adding *uirum* to the end of the verse before, after *eici*. Jannelli removed *uirum*; L. Müller prints *Virum ut in re a.*, suggesting in his note that *in* should perhaps be deleted. I am not convinced, spite of the harsh elision, that Jannelli is wrong in his *Ut in re atroci*: surely this is more probable than L. Müller's elided anapaest or Havet's hiating dactyl. But in no case should the Perottine fables be placed on a level with the undoubtedly genuine Phaedrus. To do so is to commit the same critical error of which Hilberg has been guilty, in ranking the *Epiccedion Drusi* and the spurious *Heroides* and the *Nux* with the undoubtedly genuine works of Ovid. I may be permitted to refer to my Inaugural Lecture on Phaedrus' *Fables* (pp. 25—27) on this much disputed question. There is nothing in Havet's volume which I so much desiderate as a full discussion on this point, on which I am conscious of being in disagreement with the majority of critics. Even if a hiatus like *ut rē in* were conceded to the Perottine Fabulist, I should demur to extend such a permission to the genuine Phaedrus.

One of the most interesting sections of Havet's dissertation on Phaedrus' metric is his examination of the two points (1) whether Phaedrus ever allowed a final cretic to be preceded by a short syllable (*edidisse dicitur*), (2) whether Phaedrus admitted elision of an iambic word. It is one of L. Müller's most signal services to the criticism of our poet that he first emphasized the stringency of the former of these two rules: and since he pointed this out, no one will venture to deny its force as a generally binding rule. There are however, a certain number of exceptions to it, which Havet passes in review *seriatim*, and, after long suspension of judgment, pronounces to be all corrupt, though capable of easy correction.

Omitting four instances from the Perot-

tine fables, there are eight cases, which I quote in the order of Havet's dissertation:—

1. Tum moriens uocem hanc edidisse dicitur.
2. Hoc quoque consumpto flagitare ualidius.
3. A diuo Augusto tunc petiere iudices.
4. Numquam est fidelis cum potente societas.
5. Mures ueloces non ualeret adsequi.
6. Canis parturiens cum rogasset alteram.
7. Tu nōn uideris perdidisse quod petis.
8. Asellus apro cum fuisset obuius.
9. Sinuque fouit contra se ipse misericors.

Havet restores in 1 the order of Daniel's codex *edidisse* (cod. Dan. *dedisse*) *hanc uocem dicitur*: in 2 *flagitari* (also in Dan. cod.): in 3 *petierunt*, cf. the similar endings *quam petierunt naufragi*, *responderunt proximi*: in 4 *potenti*, with a suggestion however, that the right reading may have been *N. fidelis cum potentest societas*: in 5 iam *adsequi*, one of the prose paraphrasts giving iam *non sequebatur*: in 6 supposes a lacuna to exist, so that *alteram* really belongs to the end of a lost verse following: in 7 *perdidisse id quod petis*: in 8 *cum tulisset se o.*: in 9 *se ipse contra misericors*: Hare had already proposed *c. se ipsum m.*

How conscientiously our editor arrived at this conclusion is best stated in his own words (p. 179): 'Aliquando tamen diiudicanda res in alterutram partem erat. Itaque cum me sentirem ad credendum adduci non posse, praetereaque locum unum (6) agnouissem esse procul dubio mutilatum, quem uix ulli prius putaueram obnoxium suspicioni, intellexi esse ex pectore exigendam, qua prius obtorpuerat animus, criticam ignauiam. Atque modo litterulas modo uoculas aut loco moui aut addidi aut leniter immutauī donec instaurata est in toto Phaedro seuerissima illa regula, quae in toto Seneca inuiolata conspicitur.'

An unbiased critic might urge that the remedies, though for the most part easy, are not so in 6, 8: and that in 1, 2 the weightier codices (PR) are *against* the spondee, *for* the iambus: to say nothing (in 1) of the inharmonious verse which the cod. Dan. seems to point to, *Tum moriens edidisse hanc uocem dicitur*. A graver objection, I think, lies in the assumption that the iambic of fable is constructed on the same inflexible laws as the iambic of Neronian tragedy.

That they should approximate (as they certainly do) is not enough to establish as a law for Phaedrus what is a law for Seneca. On the contrary it would be only natural that the refined fabulist should observe the rule generally, yet allow himself and his subject an occasional freedom of deviation. Possibly a longer study of the *Fables* may determine me to side with Havet in his thorough-going extirpation of these violations of a generally observed rule. But at present I must plead to scepticism. On the other point, the elision of iambic words, Havet's discussion will probably meet with an active hostility, involving as it does a too acrimonious attack on the great critic of Berlin, Lachmann. Lachmann laid down in his commentary on Lucretius, that an iambic word ending in a long vowel like *tōnā* is not elided before an accented syllable in all the stricter Latin poets. And we find, accordingly, that if such a word is elided, it is either before an unaccented syllable like *tona eloquio*, *āquā inuoluens*, or a monosyllable like *et id aut*, or elided *atque*. Such combinations as *Aere cauo ora sonat*, *Obruit auster aqua arma uiri*, *Obstupui steteruntque comae*, *horrui agmina* are objectionable. Havet says this is equally true of pyrrich words in the same situation *egō, mōdō, sātā, nōuā, quōquē, fōrē*, or words ending in *m*, like *domum, lacum*, which will be found elided as a rule only before monosyllables like *et, aut, ad, in, hic, hanc, huc, or atque* elided, or polysyllables not accented on the first syllable, and he denies that such avoidance of iambic elided words is a studied rule of the stricter Roman poets, or indeed anything, more than an almost necessary consequence of the laws of metre. To which it may be replied that at any rate it was a long time before the Roman poets acted on the principle of avoiding such elisions, that Lachmann himself does not extend it to poets like Phaedrus, and that the cases in which a pyrrich is elided before an accented syllable are frequent, those in which an iambic word is so elided very rare. On this point the tragedies of Seneca are instructive. Seneca elides *suo, Ioui, manu*, before *at, hoc, hac*; *grauī, suā, sinu, specu, meae, tuae*, before words beginning with *—* like *immenso: ferae, supra*, before words beginning with *—* like *excutient*; *diu* before *expetitos, mea* (abl.) before *ipse*. He admits elisions of words like *prope, trabe, Ioue, date, tua, age*, and again such as *parum, diem, deum, suum*, with comparative frequency. There is in fact, a most marked

and essential difference between pure iambic words (*tona*) and impure (*parum*) or pyrrichs (vv); and this it is which Lachmann was I believe, the first to emphasize, and in doing so he appears to me to have drawn attention to a point of signal importance in Roman metric, even if some rashness has been shown by his followers in forcing some passages to fit into his rule against MSS. and probability. But in accepting the two elided iambs which Havet cites from Phaedrus *Tace, inquit* and *Veni ergo*, I quite agree with his verdict that they should be left untampered with; and Lachmann himself would not have altered them.

As a whole, however, the essay on the metre and prosody of Phaedrus is written with remarkable care, and will probably materially influence the future criticism of the *Fables*. Strange as it may seem from an editor who alters every case of a short syllable before a final cretic, the general tone of the discussion is one of adherence to MSS. and against unnecessary correction. For instance, Havet retains the one instance of an elision at the beginning of the first foot

Quam opprimere captans alapam sibi duxit
grauem

against L. Müller's *Quam premere*: rightly it would seem from the equally unique *Si ad uitulam spectes* of Vergil *Ecl.* iii. 48, the more frequent cases in Catullus, and the comparatively numerous specimens in Seneca's tragedies. Similarly he defends a tribrach formed like *Nec aliud, Et aliam*, in the first syllable (of which the *Fables* give three instances), and again of the proceleusmatic (vvvv), also in the first syllable, of which Phaedrus's MSS. give five specimens:—

Süpër ëtiam iactas tegere quod debet pudor.

Itã cãpüt ad nostrum furor illorum pertinet.

Qüiã uidëor acer, alligant me interdiu.

Älii önerant saxis: quidam contra miseriti.

Itaque hödle nec lucernam de flamma
deum.

I may again express my hope that Prof. Havet will not leave his task uncompleted, but will consummate his undertaking by a commentary as fresh and original as the present volume.

ROBINSON ELLIS.

PAULI ON THE LEMNIAN AND ETRUSCAN LANGUAGES.

Altitalische Forschungen ii. 2; *Eine vorgriechische Inschrift von Lemnos*, von DR. CARL PAULI. Leipzig: Barth. 1894. 14 Mk.

THE work before us is by one of the two or three specialists who devote themselves to the study of Etruscan. Pauli's name and Deecke's stand in fact almost alone in this field of research, which, to use the language of an American professor, may be called 'special speciality.' It is perplexing to the layman, like myself, to note that these investigators are not in agreement. Deecke came forward in 1878 by reviewing in a rather caustic fashion Corssen's book, *Über die Sprache der Etrusker*, saying of Corssen, among other things, that he: 'durch Incorrectheit im Material, willkürliche Hypothesen, und abenteuerliche Etymologien auf den schlimmsten Abweg gerathen zu sein schiene.' Corssen laid himself open to an easy attack by interpreting six words found on a pair of dice, not as numerals, according to the most probable guess, but as a dedicatory inscription. These numerals, if such they be, do not lend themselves to

comparison with the Aryan numerals, and Corssen picked out from the almost entirely unintelligible Etruscan inscriptions a set of words he adopted for numerals. Deecke rightly objected to such methods, and insisted as Pauli now does that Etruscan must be interpreted by itself. From his original point of view Deecke has moved gradually to the belief that Etruscan is an Aryan language, and he now employs comparative etymology as a means of interpretation. Here Pauli has broken with him.

Dark and mysterious has the Etruscan question always been. Both the racial and linguistic affinities of this people are elusive. An Egyptian inscription gives the name of the Tuirsha in a list of their allies in the thirteenth century B.C., and this name has been associated on good archaeological evidence (Chabas, *Études de l'Antiquité historique*) with *Etrusci* || *Tusci*. There is nothing to show, however, whether this folk came from the lands north of Italy or from Asia Minor whence the ancients had a tradition that the Etruscans came. A new Egyptian connection with Etruscan was

discovered in 1891 when Krall of Vienna showed that an inscription on a mummy-cloth—brought with the mummy to Agram in 1848—was in Etruscan writing, and the language has since been shown to be Etruscan.

Two years before this however an inscription in Greek characters, but not a Greek inscription, was found on the island of Lemnos. The Etruscan specialists are substantially agreed that this 'Lemnian' language is closely akin to Etruscan. Modern discoveries thus seem, on the face of it, to have made good the traditions connecting the Etruscans with Egypt and with the neighbourhood of Asia Minor. As to the Egyptian mummy-cloth however all are agreed that the Etruscan inscription must be charged to some Italian Etruscan, engaged in trade with Egypt. Pauli undertakes to discuss the bearings of the Lemnian inscription in the volume before us.

He begins with some polemic against the methods of the 'Indogermanisten,' protesting against the interpretation by comparative etymology of a language not known to be Aryan. It is not fair, however, to charge on them reasoning in a circle (as he does on Deecke, p. 123); for all linguistic argumentation rests, first and last, on a *petitio principii*. Pauli does show quite conclusively the danger of the etymological interpretation of a not understood language. Thus we see that Bugge's interpretation of our inscription (p. 2) and Deecke's (p. 4) do not agree. As concerns Etruscan Bugge has at different periods claimed that this language was (1) an independent member of the Aryan family most like Greek and Latin, and with some special connections with Balto-Slavic; (2) much closer to the Italic languages than to Greek or any other speech; (3) a member of the same group with Armenian. Such a variety of opinions does shake one's belief in the value of the etymological interpretation for a fossil language. What Pauli thinks of this method may be shown by recalling that in 1883 he claimed a special relation with Lithuanian, all by way of joke, though this joke was taken seriously by not a few. In our volume he says (p. 12): 'Ich halte auch jetzt noch in voller Schärfe aufrecht dass ich nach dieser Methode jede beliebige etruskische Inschrift aus jeder beliebigen Sprache, die verlangt wird, mit völlig annehmbarem Sinn und unter strikter Beobachtung der Laut- und Formenbildungsgesetze zu erklären vermag.'

The chief purpose of our book is to demonstrate that 'Lemnian' is akin to Etruscan. I believe for my own part that Pauli demonstrates this kinship by a comparison of their modes of word-formation, and by the correspondence of 'Lemnian' *aviz*: [si]alχviz: with Etruscan *avils* [ce]alχls. Whether his special interpretation of the Lemnian inscription, which he reaches after a very minute comparison with Etruscan, is correct one dare not affirm, for it is guessing that gives us the meaning of the words in both languages. For certainty of interpretation we must bide our time till some good fortune gives us a long bilingual inscription in Etruscan and some known language; then only can we be sure of the flexions and the definition of Etruscan words, as Pauli himself declares (p. 243).

The second large question our author discusses is the ethnological grouping of Etruscan. The layman wonders whether so much weight is to be given to names of places and of persons as these ethnological investigations seem inclined to give; and he feels hopelessly at sea when the ethnologists differ as to the type of the Etruscan skull. To me at least Pauli's argument is in some regards evanescent to the point of disappearance, I cannot see that he proceeds in a very different way from the 'Indogermanisten' when he employs the Ligurian gloss στυίννας = κατήλους 'hucksters' in a comparison with *zicu* of a bilingual inscription, '*Zicu* being possibly Etruscan for *Scribonius*, which is, in its turn, a popular etymology for **Scruponius* (p. 169)'! It must be admitted however that Pauli ever and anon acknowledges the tenuity of some of his arguments; I cite e.g. his *résumé* of the ethnological discussion (p. 223): 'Als sicheres Ergebnis ist nur das anzuerkennen dass die Etrusker und die lemnischen Pelasger verwandt sind. Für die anderen der untersuchten Völker reichen zur zeit unsere wissenschaftlichen Hilfsmittel noch nicht aus zu einem wirklichen Beweise, aber die Möglichkeit einer Verwandtschaft hat sich doch auch bei den Karern, Lydern und Lykern, bei den Susiern, den Südkaukasiern, den Rättern, den Ligurern und den Iberern, wenn auch bei allen nicht mit der gleichen Wahrscheinlichkeit, ergeben.'

The last of the larger questions to which our author devotes himself is to determine the relations of the Lemnians and Etruscans to one another. Against Bugge's theory that this Lemnian inscription is the work of a sort of Etruscan Vikings, our author

maintains that it harks back to Pelasgians out of Attica, and that the Etruscans are but another branch of the same Pelasgian stock.

I add a few words suggested by Pauli's general polemic against the methods of the 'Indogermanisten,' a polemic which is, in a certain sort, '*Reclam*' for his own method. He insists that kinship of languages must be recognized by similar grammatical structure, not by apparent similarities of sound, *i.e.* morphological comparison precedes etymological. He gives us (p. 149) a table comparing Etruscan and Lycian with some (modern) languages of the Caucasus. I will not object to the fact that the case-endings are here suspiciously alike for languages so far separated in time: I will but note that in his Etruscan paradigm the only case-endings are *si, s, -sa* (Gen. Dat. Loc.), and *bi || θ* (Loc.), and that these endings are almost as much like Aryan as they are like South-Caucasian. I call attention also to the author's argument (p. 139) against the Aryan character of Lycian, drawn from the loss of all final consonants: by such argumentation it is possible to disprove the Aryan character of Greek. 'Susisch' is also (p. 210) compared with Etruscan in respect of its numerals and relationship words; that *tur* 'son' and *sak* 'son' should be compared with Etruscan *tura* 'descendant' and *sex* 'daughter' is allowable enough, but nothing can be proved by comparing *katē || atta* 'father' with Etruscan *atru*, now interpreted *with some regard to etymology*, as it would seem, by 'mother' (Deecke, 'sister' or 'widow'). Words like *atta* are mere babbling of children, and liable to occur in Hottentot or Choctaw, and so are devoid of any value to prove kinship of languages. The same remark is applicable to 1st person pronoun forms with *m-* (p. 209).

Touching his claim of kinship between Etruscan and Lycian, Pauli has been reproached with the dissimilarity of their nouns of relationship. He instances the divergence of Lettish and Sanskrit as a parallel, and pleads geographical remoteness. To this it may be answered that Lettish diverges in this particular rather widely from its sister dialect, Lithuanian.

Our volume contains two rather extensive lapses into 'Indogermanismus,' (1) in a discussion of Phrygian epitaphs (p. 56), where our author disports himself with the evident pleasure of a practised poacher, and it must be admitted that he goes along light of foot; (2) in an examination of Deecke's claims that Lycian is an Aryan language (p. 116); but sharp-sighted as he is in his critique of Deecke's treatment, particularly of the numerals, Pauli will not remove, even with the sacrosanct phoneticians, all doubt as to the correspondences claimed by Deecke for the numerals, if the words in question prove to be really numerals as Deecke thinks. It is easy to magnify your opponent's variation from strict phonetic law, but Pauli admits about as important variation of vowels into his own interpretation of the Phrygian inscriptions.

I would repeat, in fine, that our book seems to me to demonstrate the kinship of 'Lemnian' with Etruscan almost, if not quite, conclusively; and contributes, I feel quite sure, valuable suggestions for the interpretation of the inscription. It is interesting to note in passing that some of his definitions seem even to reinforce the pleas of the 'Indogermanisten.' Not to mention *zivai* 'aetate' (: *√jiv* 'live') and *zeronaiθ* 'conditus est' (: *√χαράσσω* 'plough into furrows') we have *morinail* 'sepelivit,' based on *mor-* 'grave,' which reminds of course of *mor-s* 'death.' The Lemnians seemed, by the way, to have quite a large vocabulary for the notion 'death.' In the first inscription of fifteen words Pauli renders *naφθ* 'sepulcrum' and *tav[:jarzio* 'sepulcri est,' *zeronai* 'condidit,' *zeronaiθ* 'conditus est,' and *morinail* 'sepelivit.' The second inscription of eighteen words, which is claimed to be a corrected version of the first, adds in *tove-roma* '— Grab (!)' still another term for this idea. Thus there are, counting *mor-* as the base of *morinail*, four words here for 'sepulcrum.'

The proof-reading of the volume has left much to desire, but I content myself with asking if *römischen* (p. 183, l. 5) should not be *rätischen*.

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HARTLAND'S *LEGEND OF PERSEUS*, VOL. II.

The Legend of Perseus: by E. S. HARTLAND.
Vol. II. *The Life Token*. London: D.
Nutt. 1895. 12s. 6d.

ONE, or the one, external act common to all early religions is the act of sacrifice in some form or other. The inward sentiment, essential to any form of religion, however primitive, is a sense of dependence on supernatural power. And it is on the relation and interpretation of these two facts that all theories of the origin of natural religion must turn. In the feeling of dependence itself there is no reason why the emotion accompanying it should be exclusively the emotion of fear; nor is fear the only motive which prompts men to make gifts. But the helplessness of primitive man and the savage's undoubted terror of many supernatural influences have been held very generally to warrant the supposition that religion has its origin in fear; and this supposition in its turn has been the main support of the hypothesis that the essence of sacrifice consists in gifts prompted by fear. That hypothesis, like all hypotheses, must be brought to the test of fact; and, to maintain itself, must show at least that it is capable of accounting for all the facts which it is designed to explain.

In his *Religion of the Semites*, the late Robertson Smith demonstrated that there were certain facts for which the hypothesis failed to account. He showed that the gift-theory of sacrifice presupposes the conception of property and therefore cannot explain the sacrifice of animals, which were offered in sacrifice long before the conception of property had been evolved. He also showed that, though the introduction of the idea of property into the relations existing between gods and men affected eventually the conception of sacrifice, the original intention of animal sacrifice was communion with a supernatural and kindly power, not the propitiation of a malevolent power by means of gifts. He also argued that offerings of the worshipper's blood or hair had the same intention, viz. to renew the blood-covenant or to effect communion between the worshipper and the deity worshipped.

There remains however another kind of sacrifice, viz. that in which the worshipper does not slaughter an animal but makes an

offering of some kind or another to the gods, as Aegisthus did:

πολλὰ δ' ἀγάλματ' ἀνῆψεν, ὑφάσματα τε χρυσόν τε.

These offerings seem plainly to be actual gifts; and even the hair-offerings, which Robertson Smith interpreted sacramentally, can largely be explained (as they have been explained by Mr. Frazer in the *Golden Bough*) as consequences of the system of taboo. Thus at this stage it seemed that, if the gift-theory failed to account for the origin of animal sacrifice, still it was presupposed by all other kinds of offering; and though Robertson Smith (p. 335) had thrown out the pregnant hint, in connection with hair-offerings, that 'clothes are so far part of a man that they can serve as a vehicle of personal connection,' still offerings of rags and clothes could be explained either, like hair-offerings, by taboo, or in other ways. It is at this point that Mr. Hartland comes in with the second volume of his *Perseus*.

The savage is largely at the mercy of the association of ideas: as Mr. Andrew Lang has compactly put it, he is apt to mistake a casual connection of ideas for a causal connection of facts. For the savage, things thought of together exist together. Civilized philosophers have doubted whether the body is part of the self and not rather merely one of the world of objects around. The savage philosopher takes a more generous view of personality, and allows a much wider fringe to the conception: for him anything connected in thought with a person is part of that person, and for all practical purposes serves as well as the person himself. Thus through his foot-prints or the remnants of his food a man can be injured just as well as through any of his members. Now all these general propositions were more or less surmised before the appearance of Vol. ii. of the *Perseus*. The service that Mr. Hartland has rendered to science is, in the first place, that, with a learning and width of research even greater than in his first volume, he has placed these propositions upon such a sure basis of fact that subsequent research can only confirm them.

Thus Mr. Hartland has conclusively

demonstrated that not only a man's clothes but anything in any way or degree associated with him may be regarded not merely as a vehicle of personal connection but actually as part of the man himself: his personality is his personality. With this sure basis to go upon, Mr. Hartland then attacks the problem of the offerings made all over the world to sacred wells and trees. He begins by setting forth a vast collection of the facts which require explanation; and it soon becomes apparent that the gift-theory of sacrifice will only account for a relatively small number of them, viz. for those offerings which possess some value; whereas a satisfactory hypothesis 'must be equally applicable to sacred images, crosses, trees, wells, cairns and temples. It must account not merely for the pins in wells and the rags on trees, but also for the nails in trees, the pins in images, the earth or bricks hung on the sacred tree in India, the stones and twigs, flowers and coca-quids thrown upon cairns, the pellets which constellate Japanese idols, the strips of cloth and other articles which decorate Japanese temples, the pilgrims' names written on the walls of the temple of Kapilo on the banks of the Hugli, the nails fixed by the consuls in the Cella Jovis at Rome, and those driven into the galleries and floors of Protestant churches in the East of France. These are the outcome of equivalent practices, and the solution of their meaning, if a true one, must fit them all' (p. 212). Bearing in mind the savage conception of personality, viz. that it includes anything which is associated in thought with the person, however slight and transient its connection in fact, we can understand that anything which passes merely through a man's hands becomes part of the man; and that therefore benefits conferred upon it will be felt by the man. In a word, the nature or value (or want of value) of the offering is absolutely irrelevant: the one and only essential is that it shall be part of the person who through it is to be placed in permanent relation to the spirit to whom the offering is made: 'our examination of the practices of throwing pins into wells, of tying rags on

bushes and trees, of driving nails into trees or stocks, of throwing stones and sticks on cairns, and the analogous practices throughout the world, leads to the conclusion that they are to be interpreted as acts of ceremonial union with the spirit identified with well, with tree, or stock or cairn' (p. 228).

Robertson Smith exploded the gift-theory as far as animal-sacrifice is concerned. Mr. Hartland has made it for ever untenable as an explanation of the other forms of sacrifice. The sacramental theory of sacrifice is now the only one which has any claim to be considered a scientific hypothesis. But the theory that religion originates merely in fear is bound up with the gift-theory of sacrifice, and must share its fortunes. The importance therefore of Mr. Hartland's second volume to anthropology and the history of natural religion cannot easily be over-rated.

As anything that has once been connected with a man continues ever after to be part of that man, the unity of personality is compatible with its divisibility. *Per contra*, the divisibility of the clan and the individuality of its members does not prevent the savage from attributing to the clan a unity of existence as perfect and complete as that of any individual person; and the second half of this volume is occupied in demonstrating that 'the unity of the kin is a vital conception penetrating savage life to its core' (p. 442), and in deducing from it the explanation of various funeral rites and marriage ceremonies.

Perhaps it may be inquired what all this has to do with the legend of Perseus. The answer is that one incident in tales of the Perseus type is that the hero leaves behind him something by which his friends can tell whether he is alive or dead. That something is of course part of himself, on the savage theory of the self, and is called by Mr. Hartland the Life Token (External Soul). Another incident is that the death of the hero or of his adversary must be avenged by the whole of his clan—hence the need for Mr. Hartland to illustrate the solidarity of the clan.

F. B. JEVONS.

DE MIRMONT ON NAVAL CONSTRUCTION IN APOLLONIUS.

Le Navire Argo et la science nautique d'Apollonios de Rhodes, H. DE LA VILLE DE MIRMONT, professeur-adjoint à la faculté des lettres de Bordeaux. Paris: Armand Colin et Cie. 1895.

THIS is an elaborate dissertation of sixty pages marked by all the care and thoughtfulness which is characteristic of M. de Mirmont's writings. It is observed in a note that in my review of the same author's

translation of the *Argonautica*, about three and a half years ago, I have not criticized his interpretation of the passages referring to marine manoeuvres and seafaring matters generally. This is true enough, but it is obvious that a reviewer, in the limited space allowed him, cannot deal with everything, and it is difficult for a layman to avoid blunders amid the technicalities of marine affairs—a difficulty which is much increased when the reviewer is English, and the technical terms are in French. However on the present occasion no choice is left me, and I must do the best I can. The only general fault to be found with this dissertation is that it errs on the side of excessive minuteness and over-elaboration. There is hardly a marine phrase in the *Argonautica*—and there are a good many—that is not commented on. Thus the writer carefully notes all along the route the various places at which the Argonauts took in provisions and what these provisions consisted of. He carefully explains that in spite of various changes in the *personnel*, whether by death, or departure, or the addition of fresh heroes, the number of fifty rowers is always preserved. He chronicles every passage in the four books, amounting to about forty in number, where we read that the Argonauts used the oar. Sometimes he is ‘flogging a dead horse,’ as where he devotes a page to show that the *πρόροι* (forestays) were fastened on each side of the fore part of the ship, and not to the prow and poop respectively, or where he takes the trouble of proving that Argo was not the first ship. No one would care to deny either of these propositions. Again he digresses on the inferiority of Ancaeus to Tiphys as a steersman, the former having been chosen by Hera who ‘ne se connaît pas en hommes comme Athéné.’

M. de Mirmont considers that one of the main objects of Apollonius in writing the *Argonautica* was to reproduce the Homeric ship. Although his work could not command a large public, yet it was only a select audience that he desired to please, and this had its compensations, for he was thus at liberty to indulge in an archaeological exactness which was not possible for popular writers, such as dramatists. Assuming this to be the case—and I am not concerned to question it—we expect to find, and do find, many technical Homeric words, but we also find many words that are not in Homer such as *σκαλμός*, *λίον*, *λαῖφος*, *κεραία*, *σέλμα*, etc. These terms however are not inconsistent with the theory of M. de Mirmont, because

they are only later names of things that are found in Homer. But I do not see how the theory can be maintained when we find, according to M. de Mirmont, Homeric words used in a sense in which they do not occur in Homer. I am therefore led to criticize some of M. de Mirmont's interpretations as adverse to his own theory, which I hold to be, in the main, correct. It turns out then that I am sometimes defending his theory against himself. Apollonius, we are told, was well acquainted with the sea, having at any rate been to Rhodes and back, but it must be said that the latest German criticism, as represented by Busch, Gercke, and Susemihl, denies that Apollonius ever returned to Alexandria from Rhodes. Without assenting to this, it is an opinion that has to be met. M. de Mirmont draws a somewhat amusing but quite fanciful picture of Apollonius and his friends (like some ‘Innocent Abroad’) sauntering down to the quay to examine the ships, or to ‘assist at’ a launch. On his return home Apollonius draws up a *procès-verbal* of the launch, and imagines what it must have been like in heroic times. The naval authorities used by M. de Mirmont here are the same as those used by him in the notes to his translation, viz. Cartault's *La Trière athénienne* and Vars' *L'Art nautique dans l'antiquité et spécialement en Grèce* (which is an adaptation of Breusing's *Nautik der Alten*), with a decided preference for Cartault. M. de Mirmont is apparently unacquainted with Mr. Cecil Torr's excellent little book, *Ancient Ships*,—at any rate he makes no allusion to it. However it is now time to descend to particulars and note some of the interpretations here given, chiefly of those in which I differ from the writer.

1. *δρύοχοι*. There is a dispute as to whether this word means the ribs of the ship (*ἐγκοιλία*), or the cradle or framework made for the ship while it is in course of construction, i.e. whether they are or are not a part of the ship itself. M. de Mirmont, following Scheffer and Cartault, prefers the latter interpretation, which has some support from old commentators, but the express statement of Procopius (*de bell. Goth.* iv. 22), quoted by Mr. Torr, *τά τε παχέα ξύμπαντα ξύλα ἐς τὴν τρώπιν ἐναρμοσθέντα—ἅπερ οἱ μὲν ποιηταὶ δρύοχους καλοῦσιν, ἕτεροι δὲ νομέας—ἐκ τοίχων μὲν ἕκαστον θατέρων ἄχρι ἐς τῆς νεῶς διήκει τὸν ἕτερον τοίχον*, is almost decisive in favour of the former. The schol. on Ap. Rh. i. 723 also maintains this view and I fail to see that there is any contradiction in his words, as M. de Mirmont asserts.

They are (Keil, p. 342, 13) δρυόχους ἐν οἷς καταπύσσεται ἡ τρώπις ξύλοις, ταῦτα οὕτως καλοῦσιν Ὅμηρος (τ 574). δρυόχοι οὖν τὰ ἐγκοιλία τῆς νεώς. The line in Homer, and some other passages, do not prove anything as they are consistent with either interpretation.

2. In i. 533 it is said of Heracles, ἄγχι δὲ οἱ ῥόπαλον θέτο καὶ οἱ ἐνερθεν | ποσσὶν ἱπεκλύσθη νηὸς τρώπις. M. de Mirmont takes τρώπις to mean 'carlingue' (keelson) which the Greeks apparently called δέντερά τρώπις. There is however no reason, as far as I see, why the ordinary sense of τρώπις, viz. 'keel,' should not be suitable here, the meaning simply is that the keel was sunk deep into the water under the weight of Heracles. In the three other places where τρώπις occurs in Ap. Rh. it has its ordinary sense, and M. de Mirmont admits that Cartault does not agree with him on this point.

3. ὀλκαῖον (ὀλκήιον). The precise meaning of this word cannot be determined. Cartault takes it to be the stern-post. M. de Mirmont, on the other hand, considers that a comparison in the fourth book (ll. 1604 sqq.) proves it to be the prow, 'Quand Triton s'attache au ὀλκαῖον pour conduire Argo dans la mer, le dieu est comparé par Apollonios à un homme qui tient un cheval par la crinière pour l'entraîner à la course: si Triton poussait le navire par derrière, la comparaison ne serait pas juste.' No doubt if ὀλκ. meant the prow the comparison would be better, but we cannot always require exactitude in a simile, much less depend upon it for the interpretation of a word. The word ὀλκαῖον cannot, in my judgment, be separated from the Homeric ἐφόλκαιον which clearly denotes something at or near the stern. If Apollonius is reproducing the Homeric ship, it is not probable that he would use an Homeric word in a totally different sense.

4. κληῖς. It has been a subject of much dispute whether this word in Homer, as a naval term, means 'thole-pin' or 'bench' for rowers. The balance of evidence is, I think, in favour of the former interpretation, see e.g. θ 37. Apollonius however uses κληῖδες only in the sense of 'benches' (having the word σκαλμός for thole-pin), so it is probable that he so understood the word in Homer.

5. The lines i. 368 sqq. ἔζωσαν πάμπρωτον ἐσπρεφεῖ ἐνδοθεν ὄπλῳ | τευάμενοι ἐκάτερθεν, κ.τ.λ. are generally quoted as a *locus classicus* for ὑποζώματα by commentators on Hor. *Od.* i. 14, 6, and elsewhere. It is

almost certain however, as M. de Mirmont points out, that the rope here mentioned has no reference to ὑποζώματα. Mr. Torr has made it clear that ὑποζώματα were used on board ships of war to strengthen them, and that they formed part of the regular equipment of an Athenian trireme. Ships of war are not mentioned in Homer, nor was Argo a ship of war. Mr. Torr thinks that the obscure expression in Acts xxvii. 17, ὑποζωννύντες τὸ πλοῖον, means 'that they used expedients which answered the purpose of the girding cables.' Nearly seventy years ago Wellauer wrote on Ap. Rh. *l.c.*: 'itaque dubitari vix potest, quin de alia quadam colligatione, in ipsa navi facienda, loquatur poeta, quae qualis fuerit non satis perspectum habemus,' and I am not aware that we know any more about it now. M. de Mirmont's opinion, that a rope is meant which was used in launching and in drawing the ship to land, scarcely suits the context.

6. μεσόδμη and ἰστοδόκη. The former of these words is generally (and I believe rightly) understood to mean a socket for the mast when erect in the centre bench of the ship, and the latter a receptacle at the stern for the mast when in a recumbent position. M. de Mirmont agrees with this, and it was certainly the opinion of Apollonius (i. 563, and ii. 1262—1264) as to the respective meanings of the two words. Mr. Torr, however, commenting on β 424, ἰστὸν δ' εἰλάτινον κοίλῃς ἐντοσθε μεσόδμῃς | στήσαν ἀείραντες, takes ἐντοσθε to mean *from within*, and to go with ἀείραντες, in other words he identifies μεσόδμη with ἰστοδόκη or nearly so. I cannot help thinking that he is mistaken about this, and the reference to Lucian *Am.* 6, where the word μεσοκοιλία is apparently equivalent to ἰστοδόκη, by no means proves his point.

7. From the fact that there were no spare oars on board Argo (for Heracles, having broken his oar, had to go on shore to make one from a young tree) M. de Mirmont argues 'à plus forte raison' that the νηῖον ἐκ κοτίνου φάλαγξ set up to mark the grave of Idmon could not have been one of the φάλαγγες (rollers) used for launching the ship, but was the trunk of a wild olive, cut into the shape of a φάλαγξ, and he adds that such rollers would have been useless to them because they had not, like the Greeks before Troy, to draw their ship to land in view of a long stay. The point is a small one, but I do not think M. de Mirmont is right here—at any rate, his reasoning is unsound, for (1) it does not

follow that, because they did not take spare oars, they did not take the launching rollers with them, and (2) to attribute to the Argonauts a prophetic knowledge that they would never need the rollers again, seems to me unjustifiable and inartistic. Merkel, reading *νήριος*, clearly refers the word *φάλαγξ* to one of the rollers they had with them, and so does the scholiast.

8. Referring to the drawing of lots for seats, M. de Mirmont remarks that this was not the heroic custom, and accounts for it by the consideration that the Argonauts were not ordinary rowers, and that therefore lot alone could distribute their places. I confess I do not see how the extraordinary character of the Argonauts could make it more necessary that their places should be assigned by lot than the places of ordinary rowers. But I am disposed to think that, although such assignment by lot is not mentioned in Homer, Apollonius would not have set it down without some authority. Virgil apparently alludes to this custom in *sortiti remos* (*Aen.* iii. 510)—as to the interpretation of which I entirely agree with Mr. Page—and so does Propertius (iv. 21, 11). If it be objected that Virgil is merely following Apollonius, I would reply that he does not follow blindly, and that he would probably not follow Apollonius in an anachronism.

9. In i. 566 we have *ἐπ' ἱκρίοφιν δὲ κάλῳας*
| *ξεστῆσιν περόνησι διακρίδων ἀμφιβαλόντες.*

There is certainly some difficulty here, for how could these ropes (halyards) be fastened to the small decks (*ἱκρία*) at the prow or poop? Accordingly M. de Mirmont in his translation suggested *ἐπικριόφιν*, 'to the yard.' He now returns to the usual reading, and follows Cartault in interpreting 'to the mast,' which he justifies by the statement of schol. (*ad loc.*) and of Eustathius that *ἱκρίον* = part of the mast. However that may be, Homer uses *ἱκρία* only in the sense of 'decks' and elsewhere Apollonius uses it only in this sense. It seems therefore in the highest degree improbable that Apollonius should also use *ἱκρίον* in the sense of 'mast.' They are two very different things—to use a non-Homeric word which Apollonius often does, and to use a Homeric word in a non-Homeric sense, a distinction which M. de Mirmont seems to overlook. For the present passage, I can suggest no better solution than that given by Vars, viz. that the *περόναι* (*cabillots*, belaying-pins) round which the ropes were fastened were attached to something of the nature of an *ἱκρίον*, such as a 'fife-rail' (*râtelier*). I feel it is not satisfactory, but I know no better at present.

There are several other points I should have liked to deal with, especially with the interpretation of the difficult lines i. 1276, 1277, but too much space has been already occupied.

R. C. SEATON.

HARRIS' PLATO AS A NARRATOR.

Plato as a Narrator. A Study of the Myths, by W. A. HARRIS. A Dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Johns Hopkins University, Richmond, Va. Pp. 48.

LIKE many other dissertations for the doctor's degree, this is meant to be written, not to be read. The composition of this thesis, with the research involved, was eminently useful to the author, and the work displays sufficient scholarship and acquaintance with philological methods to justify the university in conferring the desired degree. But the composition is crude, and the Platonic scholar will find little to interest him. Plato's originality in this matter consists, according to the

author, not in the use of the myth, but in the 'blending of *μῦθος* and *λόγος*.' 'For philosophical narrative we are dependent upon Plato, and since Plato is the department [*sic*], the study of the myth is a study of philosophic narrative.' Platonic myths are divided into two classes, Socratic and non-Socratic,—a division which does not prove particularly fruitful. To the second of these two classes the author assigns (only) the myths of *Protagoras* 320 f., *Symposium* 189 f., and *Republic* 359 f. The myth of the *Gorgias* is called 'the simplest and apparently the most naive,'—whatever the latter adjective may mean. The writer's familiarity with the contents of the Platonic dialogues does not seem perfect; at least his words with regard to

the *Phaedo* are strangely inadequate: 'The scenery and situation of this dialogue is pathetic; the theme is courage in the face of death, and the argument turns mainly on the immortality of the soul. Socrates endeavours to show that one should necessarily be courageous, for, since the soul is immortal, there is no such thing as death.' Other passages puzzle the reader; like the following: 'In the *Republic* (iii. 414 C) we have a display of Socratic modesty. Here Socrates professes himself unable to tell an old Phœnician lie, and the humour is still further heightened by the remark of Glaucon after hearing a portion of the tale.' The best part of the

dissertation is in the last twenty pages, where the author sums up the results of his examination of the myths and comments on the rhetorical quality of Plato's narratives, with some good observations on special usages. Occasionally, as in the study of the use of tenses and of the participle, we note the marks of the writer's training under his distinguished teacher, Professor Gildersleeve. At times the writer seems to imitate his master's vivid style, but goes beyond him when he remarks upon Protagoras's 'large use of the imperfect, and the vulgar frequency of the historical present.'

Σ.

HAYLEY'S INTRODUCTION TO THE VERSE OF TERENCE.

An Introduction to the Verse of Terence, by H. W. HAYLEY, PH. D. Boston: Ginn and Co. 1894.

THE object of this little book of twenty-five pages is stated by the editor to be, 'not to present any new or original discoveries, but simply to state clearly and concisely the facts most important for the student of Terentian verse to know.' It begins with an account of the peculiarities of early Latin prosody as they appear in Terence. This is followed by a brief general description of the verse of Plautus and Terence, in which the versification of the two Roman poets is compared with that of the Greek Comedy, and the versification of Plautus with that of Terence. Then the metres

used by Terence are taken up in detail and illustrated by full metrical schemes, by an abundance of well-selected examples, and finally, in many cases, by lines of English poetry in the same metres. A brief description of a Latin *comœdia palliata* concludes the work.

The treatment, which is based on the best authorities, is exceedingly clear, and the book will not only be of service to those who read Terence from text-editions, but will also supplement the accounts of the metres in many of the annotated editions of the plays. The excellent typography and arrangement add not a little to the clearness of the presentation.

JOHN C. ROLFE.

ARCHAEOLOGY.

FISHER'S TRANSLATION OF BOISSIER'S *PROMENADES ARCHÉOLOGUES*.

Rome and Pompeii: Archaeological Rambles, by GASTON BOISSIER of the French Academy, translated by D. HAVELOCK FISHER. London: T. Fisher Unwin. 7s. 6d.

THE honoured name of M. Gaston Boissier is likely to draw some attention to this book; and the title might seem to suggest its suitability for a school-prize. It may be worth while therefore to say in a word or

two what it is. The deficiencies of M. Boissier's *Promenades Archéologiques* as well as its merits are well known to scholars. It contains a pleasantly written account of some of the more interesting excavations visited by M. Boissier nearly twenty years ago. The book corresponded pretty well to its French title; its scrappiness makes its English title quite inappropriate. Apart from this, the translation is probably one of the most incompetent that has been published for many years. The translator does not often blunder over his French, though

'the graceful spires of Tivoli' raises a doubt; but he seldom misses a chance of blundering over his classical references. Dionysius of Halicarnassus appears always as *Denys*: Ovid wrote *Fastes*; and *Aulu-Gelle* something else, apparently a life of Augustus, though somehow the emperor and the month are mixed up inextricably. Ti. Plautius Silvanus 'accompanied Claudius in the expedition to Britain under Nero,' afterwards he governed *Maesia*. Plato is supposed to have written a 'Phaedra.' 'Euripes' is used indiscriminately as singular or plural, with equal incorrectness. Our old friend Aelian appears as 'Elienus,' and Arrian as 'Arrienos.' As for the printing, one is almost proud of restoring 'the empire had then long since been expected by all. Time had wakened old republican rumours' to sense by conjecturing (in two lines!) 'accepted,' 'weakened' and 'rancours.' After this we are not surprised to find the enigmatical sentence (*perche ha vita?*). The foot-notes simply teem with blunders. No one who can possibly struggle through the original ought to be subjected to the pain of reading it in the form now submitted to an enduring English public.

A. S. W.

MONTHLY RECORD.

ITALY.

Vetulonia.—Among the results of recent extensive excavations may be mentioned the following objects of interest: A bronze bar or tablet terminating in the head of a woman wearing a hood. Fragments of a terracotta antefix with relief of a Gryphon. A series of stone weights with sockets for handles; 246 coins. Two similar bronze statuettes of youths holding paterae; one has been made with no left hand, and the other without a left arm, but a deformed left hand is attached to the side as if coming from under the drapery. Fragments of terracotta reliefs, perhaps from a temple, including a head of Minerva (?) of good style. Two fragments of red-figured vases from a tomb, with the upper part of a woman on each, in the style of Epiktetos. A large stone stèle with graffito design of a warrior to left, armed with helmet, axe, and shield with device of a six-point rosette; round the design an Etruscan inscription; a frog in amber; a series of rude figures and implements in bronze, of an early Etruscan type. No painted vases were found in the necropolis from which the last-named objects came, and therefore it is probably earlier than the sixth century B.C.¹

Santa Marinella, near Civita Vecchia.—The remains of a Roman villa, consisting of walls of *opus reticulatum*, have been found; it contained several good sculptures, including a statue of the youthful

Dionysos and a Pan with syrinx; a very beautiful Meleager of Scopaeic type; a head of Athena Parthenos; parts of an Apollo; and a relief representing the birth of Dionysos, who is being presented by Hermes to Zeus. The house appears to have been altered in the fourth century. The sculptures have been published by Petersen in the *Römische Mittheilungen* for 1895, p. 92. The place is known as Punicum in the Peutinger itinerary.²

S. Feliciano del Lago, Etruria.—A bronze handle of a patera has been found, with an interesting Etruscan inscription, dating from the third century B.C. It runs: *eca Cauthas achuias versie*; on the back, *aule nummas turce*. *Eca* is equivalent to *hoc*; Cauthas was an important Etruscan deity, represented by Divus Catiis in the *Indigitamenta*; *aule nummas* is in Latin *Aulus Numenius*.³

Lubriano, Etruria.—A series of Etrusco-Campanian vases of black ware has been found; also three bronze mirrors, of late date, but apparently copied from good originals. They represent: (1) Herakles, Apollo, Athena, Artemis, and Iolaos, all being inscribed; (2) two warriors; (3) four figures.⁴

Bracciano.—A *lapis honorarius* has been found on the site of the ancient Forum Clodium, forming the pedestal of a statue, from which it has been cut away to form a mortar. The person honoured is Publius Memorialis, who is known from *C.I.L.* x. 8038a, where he appears as imperial procurator. He sold to the Vanacini in Corsica some fields about which there was a dispute. He was then governor of Sardinia and Corsica under Vespasian. He is called in this inscription *praefectus cohortis III. Cyrenicae sagittariorum* (a new title for this cohort), also *praefectus gentis Numidarum*, sc. of the indigenous barbarians (see Tissot, *Géographie*, i. p. 457 ff.).⁴

Sulmona.—A new Pelignian inscription has come to light, in Latin characters. According to Signor Pascal it reads in Latin: C? HOSPVS C? L-LEGIVS | MEDDI-X AT[ITICVS? M-ATIVS-M[LIBERTVS] SEIVS CV[BANT | HIC CONDIDIT] SEPVLCRVN [SIBI S]IMVL VAE | [NIAE VXORI ET] FAMVLVS ET LIBERTIS | OF-OC[ELLIVS] PAQVI[F]-AT[RANVS].⁵

Faichio, in the Sabine territory.—Remains of an ancient *piscina* have been excavated, consisting of a building of two parallel corridors uniting in a semicircular termination, with a row of dividing arches and vaulted roofs.⁴

Boscovale.—The excavation of a *villa rustica* begun in 1876 has lately been completed. The part brought to light consists of the *culina*, with hearth in the centre, cistern, etc. On one side is an ingenious arrangement for communicating with the bath, with pipes and taps for regulating the supply of hot water from a copper of lead with earthenware cover.²

Rome.—Excavations have been continued in the neighbourhood of the Colosseum, and among other remains of sculpture a statue has been found, reproducing the type of the Giustiniani Hestia. Most of the tombs and inscriptions belong to the Christian period.⁵

Conca, near Velletri.—The remains of an important temple have been discovered, which was origin-

² *Ibid.* May 1895.

³ *Ibid.* July 1895.

⁴ *Ibid.* Sept. 1895.

⁵ *Ibid.* June 1895.

¹ *Notizie dei Lincei*, Aug. 1895.

ally Tuscan in plan, and belonged to the sixth century B.C. During the next two centuries its plan was gradually modified and enlarged, first to a Greek peripteral temple, then to a simple *cella*, and finally it was made dipteral. A trench had been made in the middle of the *cella* in which were deposited accumulations of votive objects, chiefly terracottas of a character showing affinity with those of southern Etruria. The architectural remains are chiefly of terracotta, and in the pediment of the earliest temple were painted statues of that material, of a fine archaic type. One of the antefixes of the peripteral building has a group of a Centaur and Nymph, the counterpart of one found at Falerii. Professor Barnabei identifies this temple with the shrine of Mater Matuta mentioned in Livy, as belonging to the ancient city of Satricum. Traces of two other temples and of walls also came to light, and the site of the necropolis has been ascertained.⁶

SICILY.

Syracuse.—Further excavations were made in 1893 in the necropolis of Fusco, of which Dr. Orsi has now issued a report. Some 360 tombs were opened, the bodies in nearly all of which had been buried, not burned; instances of *ἐγχυτρισμός* were also brought to light, several large vases containing the bones of children. The finds consisted chiefly of Proto-Corinthian vases, four stages of which are illustrated: (1) Purely geometrical patterns; small globular lekythi. (2) Geometrical patterns and friezes of animals; lekythi heart-shaped. (3) First signs of Oriental influence, and introduction of human figures. (4) Corinthian vases of distinctly Oriental type; these are comparatively rare. Among the finds may be mentioned: Fibulae, silver objects, and scarabs. Ivory tablet, apparently part of a brooch, with relief of the so-called winged Artemis *πρόνια θηρῶν* with a goat. A large Corinthian *olpe*, with three friezes of animals. An amphoriskos with design of a ship of Dipylon type. A pyxis with frieze of animals round the top. A terracotta squatting figure of Bes with hands placed on breast. A fine Proto-Corinthian lekythos with boar-hunt and hare-hunt. A black-figured kylix in the style of Nikosthenes; on obv., Zeus, Iris, and Hermes or Zephyros winged; on rev., departure of a mounted warrior. An oinochoe of Phaleron type with human-faced bull. A well-executed owl in painted terracotta. Two archaic terracotta female figures wearing the *πέλος*, in a sitting attitude with supports behind. A globular aryballos with dolphin. A krater containing skeletons; on obv., a panel with Sphinx wearing an Egyptian head-dress; on rev., a horse of Dipylon style; probably a local product with reminiscences of the Dipylon style in the ornament of the reverse.⁷

⁶ *Athenaeum*, 7 March 1896.

⁷ *Notizie dei Lincei*, April 1895.

GREECE.

Athens.—Dr. Dörpfeld, in his excavations on the Areopagus, has come upon remains of several buildings with mosaic pavements and traces of painting on the walls; an altar dedicated to Asklepios, Hygieia, and Amynos, about the beginning of our era; also pieces of sculpture and terracotta reliefs. A tomb has also been found with fragments of vases of the later Dipylon style and some wells; but no traces of the buildings or monuments referred to by Pausanias have come to light.⁸

EGYPT.

An inscription has been found at Philae with a combination of Greek, Latin, and hieroglyphics, the Greek being an inaccurate version of the Latin. It relates to Cornelius Gallus who was prefect of Egypt A.C. 30-29, and is a corroboration of Dio Cassius (liii. 23), who says that he was unable to bear his high position and set up statues everywhere, and inscriptions with exaggerated and boastful records of his performances on pylons of temples and pyramids.⁹

H. B. WALTERS.

Revue Numismatique. Part iii. 1895.

E. Babelon. 'Études sur les monnaies primitives d'Asie Mineure, iv. L'étalon milésien.'—E. Dronin. 'Onomastique arsacide; essai d'explication des noms des rois Parthes.'

Part iv. 1895.

Th. Reinach. 'Sur la valeur relative des métaux monétaires dans la Sicile grecque.'—M. Soutzo. 'Nouvelles recherches sur les origines et les rapports de quelques poids antiques.'

Zeitschrift für Numismatik (Berlin). Part 2. 1895.

E. J. Seltmann. 'Eine unbekannte Münze der Antonia und Julia.' H. Von Fritze. 'Die Münztypen von Athen im 6. Jahrhundert v. Chr.' H. Gaebler. 'Zur Münzkunde Makedoniens.'

Numismatic Chronicle. Part iii. 1895.

J. P. Six. 'Monnaies grecques, inédites et incertaines.'

Part iv. 1895.

F. Imhoof-Blumer. 'Griechische Münzen.'—*Review of Gnechi's 'Monete Romane, manuale elementare.'*

W. W.

SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS.

American Journal of Philology. Vol. xvi. 3. Whole No. 63. Oct. 1895.

Shakespeare, burlesqued by two fellow-dramatists, H. Wood. *On the old Armenian version of Plato's Apology*, F. C. Conybeare. Seeks to show that too exclusive a value has been set on the Clarkian Codex and that Vatic. 225, to which the Armenian version

is closely allied, should have more weight attached to it. *French words in Wolfram von Eschenbach*, L. Wiener. The following are reviewed; *Deecke's Lateinische Schulgrammatik und Erläuterungen zur Lateinischen Schulgrammatik*, by G. Lodge. The grammar is a good introduction to the larger works on Latin grammar. In treatment of cases Deecke is

a 'localist.' Roberts' *The Ancient Boeotians, their character and their culture and their reputation*, by B. L. Gildersleeve. Will do good service in rectifying crooked judgments and teaching us to appreciate the wide spread of culture among the Boeotians and their remarkable achievements in art. Thomas' *Cicéron, Verrines*, by W. P. Mustard. 'His book is indispensable to the student of the Verrines, and, thanks to its copious index, valuable to all students of Cicero.' *Vocabularium Jurisprudentiae Romanae*, Fasc. I. a ab abs—accipio, by several well-known German Scholars, rev. by M. Warren. Everywhere the same thoroughness and good judgment are manifest, for which philologists and jurists alike ought to be grateful, but the work will take fifteen years to accomplish. There are Brief Mentions of the second edition of Lucian Müller's standard work, *De Re Metrica Poetarum Latinorum praeter Plantum et Terentium*, B. Kaiser's Halle dissertation, *Quaestiones de elocutione Demosthenica*, as far as regards $\phi\eta\mu\iota\ \delta\tau\iota$ [see Rutherford, *Cl. Rev.* sup. p. 6], and of the real ellipse in the expression $\epsilon\iota\ \mu\eta\ \delta\iota\delta$.

Revue de Philologie. Vol. xix. Part 4. Oct. 1895.

La déclinaison dans les inscriptions attiques de l'Empire, J. Viteau. This art. is intended to complete for declension Meisterhans' *Grammatik des attischen Inschriften*. The exx. are all taken from Corp. Inscript. Attic. iii. 1 and 2. *Babrius* xc. (107), E. Tournier. Proposes $\mu\upsilon\delta\iota\ \delta\epsilon\ \delta\epsilon\iota\pi\omega\nu\ \mu\eta\delta'\ \delta\epsilon\kappa\rho\omega\nu\ \epsilon\pi\iota\ \psi\alpha\upsilon\sigma\alpha\iota\ |\ \chi\epsilon\iota\lambda\omega\nu\ \delta\eta\rho\varsigma\ \sigma\alpha\nu$. *Collations inédites de Plaute*, P. Le Breton. Seeks to show that the marginal notes in a copy of an Aldine Plautus of 1522, in the National Library at Paris, are by Jean Passerat, Professor of Latin at the Collège Royal about 1580, and an intimate friend of Pithou. Most of this number is taken up by the *Revue des Revues*.

Archiv für Lateinische Lexikographie und Grammatik. Ed. E. Wölfflin. Vol. ix. Part 4. 1895.

Amabo, H. Blase. Belongs to old Latin conversational language, and chiefly found in comedy. Used also by Cic. in his letters. *Est invenire*, E. Wölfflin. Arises from the Gk. $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu\ \epsilon\upsilon\phi\epsilon\iota\nu$. *Infinitivus auf -iri bei Augustin*, C. W. Die Latinität des Benedikt von Nursia, E. Wölfflin. *Redactifico in der lex Rossensis*, E. Wölfflin. The *d* was kept in good literature till towards the end of the fourth cent. *Inauratura. Didascalia apostolorum*, E. Wölfflin. Mentions several words in the Latin transl. which point to the vulgar Latin of the fourth cent. *Vulba, vienna, bunile, rauula, rauilla*, L. Havet. On the confusion between *b* and *v* in the spelling of these words. *Das duodecimalsystem* with specimen articles on *duodecim* and *sexaginta*, E. Wölfflin. *Zwei unedirierte Deklamationen des Calpurnius Flaccus*, O. Schwab. Two fragments hitherto unpublished. *Ueber die Latinität des Horaz-*

scholiasten Porphyryion, G. Landgraf. The assumption that P. lived in the first half of the fourth cent. shown to be well-founded. *Quocirca, idcirco, quapropter*, G. Landgraf. *Zur Alliteration*, E. Wölfflin. Well known to be commoner in archaic than in classical Latin. Ennius and Lucretius have twice as many alliterations as Lucan or Silius. *Zum S. C. de Bacanalibus. Convivialis and Convivialis*, E. Wölfflin. *Accidens—accidentia*, O. Hey. *Männliche Verbalsubstantiva mit dem Casus des Verbums*, P. Geyer. These are found in late, as well as in early, Latin. *Faluppas*, E. Lattes. Proved by the Italian *faloppa. Sorte ductus*, J. H. Schmalz. This phrase is found first in Cic. Rep. i. 51. In Tac. Ann. iii. 21 *Sorte ductos fusti necat* is verbally taken from Sall. frag. hist. (4, 22 M). *Accidia...accludo*, E. Wölfflin. *Ortus=Quelle*, A. Sonny. Found in Avienus. *Oratio=Gebot*, P. Geyer. This meaning, though found in Tertullian, cannot be shown in Minucius Felix, as Seiller maintains. *Accieo*, E. Wölfflin. Defends the text *accieo* in Plaut. Mil. 935. *Accipiter, Aclamatio, Aclamo*, A. Funck. *Dunc-Quandone*, A. Zimmermann. *Lateinische Tiernamen aus Menschennamen*, A. Zimmermann. Supports by Latin exx. Glöde's contention that in the early ages men readily gave to animals the names of men.

MISCELLAN. *Zu den Helmstedter Glossarfragmenten*, K. Dziatzko. Some corrections and additions. *Zu Keils Juvenal-Glossen, Imaguncula. Primum pilum deducere. Paedidus. Oculis contrectare. Milia mit dem Genitiv. Praeverto and Praeverlor*, W. Heraeus. *Spätlateinische Randglossen in Nonius*, W. M. Lindsay. *Stantes Missi*, M. Bréal. Interpreted to mean 'liberty to the victors.'

Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Paedagogik. Vol. 151. Part 12. 1895.

Verschollene länders des altertums, C. Krauth. Continued from Part 3 [*Cl. Rev.* ix. 284]. (4) The Scythian tradition of the origin of their race (Hdt. iv. 5 sqq.), and Aristas of Proconessus in Herodotus (iv. 13). (5) Traces of a mention of the Kuban and Tereh in Hdt. E. Mucke's *de consonarum in graeca lingua praeter Asiaticorum dialectum geminatione* (Freiberg 1895), H. Ziemer. This subject has been nowhere else so exhaustively treated. *Zu Livius*, K. J. Liebhold. In xxii. 50, 1 would insert *sors* after *morientis*. *Beilage zur Caesar-Kritik*, J. Lange. Concluded from the last no. [*Cl. Rev.* see p. 77]. *Zu Ovidius metamorphosen*, W. Baunier. On iv. 765 sqq. and vi. 279 sqq. *Zu Tacitus*, Th. O. The conjecture of K. Hachtmann in no. 6 sup. [*Cl. Rev.* ix. 429] was published in 1882 by H. Schütz. *Zur rettung des Avianus*, F. Heidenhain. Further remarks on the *apologi Aviani* in continuation of a Strasburg program of 1894. L. Renjes' *de ratione quae inter Plini nat. hist. l. xvi. et Theophrasti libros de plantis intercedit* (Rostoch 1893), H. Stadler. *Ein unbaechtetes fragment des Theophrastes*, H. Stadler. A fragment found in Athenaeus.

A Correction to CLASSICAL REVIEW, X., p. 30, 2nd column, end of paragraph:

Instead of: 'I propose to read the last vs. *tua est*; *lecto*, etc.' read: I presume that the copyist had before him *TUUS EST LECTO*,

etc., which, by a palaeographic error, became *tuus est legio*—and then, by grammatical correction, *tua est legio*—.

LIST OF NEW BOOKS.

ENGLISH BOOKS.

- Aeschylus*. Franklin (S. B.) Traces of Epic Influence in the Tragedies of Aeschylus. 8vo. Baltimore.
- Budge* (E. A. W.) The Life and Exploits of Alexander the Great, being a series of translations of the Ethiopic histories of Alexander by the Pseudo-Callisthenes and other writers. 8vo. 644 pp. Cambr. Univ. Press. 12s. 6d.
- Cicero*. Pro Cluentio, edited by J. D. Maillard. With notes, test papers, vocabulary, and translation. Crown 8vo. 288 pp. (University Tutorial Series.) Clive. 5s. 6d.
- Ciceronis De natura deorum*, translated by F. Brooks. Crown 8vo. 218 pp. Methuen. 3s. 6d.
- Euripides*. Ion, edited, with introduction, notes, and critical appendix, by C. S. Jerram. 12mo. 194 pp. (Clarendon Press Series.) Frowde. 3s.
- Horace*. Carminum Liber II., with introduction and

- notes by J. Gow. 12mo. 110 pp. (Pitt Press Series.) Cambr. Univ. Press. 1s. 6d.
- The Odes and Carmen Seculare, translated into English verse by A. S. Aglen. Crown 8vo. 208 pp. Maclehose. 4s. 6d.
- Lees* (W. N.) The Claims of Greek. 8vo. 15 pp. Syracuse, N.Y. 25 cts.
- Lucian*. Timon. Fritzsche's text, with notes and vocabulary by J. B. Sewall. 12mo. vi, 145 pp. Boston, Ginn. 55 cts.
- Orpheus*. Mystical Hymns, translated, and demonstrated to be the Invocations which were used in the Eleusinian Mysteries, by Thos. Taylor. Crown 8vo. 262 pp. Dobell. 5s. 6d.
- Ovid*. Heroides I., V., XII. Edited by A. H. Allcroft and B. J. Hayes. Crown 8vo. 84 pp. (Preceptors' Series.) Clive. 1s. 6d.

FOREIGN BOOKS.

- Allmer* (A.) et *Dissard* (P.) Musée de Lyon: Inscriptions antiques. Tome IV., V. 8vo. 523, 243 pp. Lyon. Each vol. 15 fr.
- Ammianus*. Novák (Rob.) Curae Ammianaeae. 8vo. iv, 92 pp. Prag, Storch. 2 Mk. 60.
- Arrianus*. Hartmann (K.) Ueber die Taktik des Arrian. 8vo. 20 pp. Bamberg.
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